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of  being  radical ly  re-shaped. 
The  area  has  become  one  of 
the  world’ s  new  epicentres  for 
investment  in  resource  extract ion, 
corporate  agr icul ture  and 
infrastructure  development.  Yet 
as  this  infusion  of  mater ia l  and 
f inancial  investment  is  reshaping 
economies,  i ts  e f fects  are  much 
broader.  They  extend  to  residents’ 
cul tural  imaginar ies,  everyday 
meanings  and  the  organizat ion 
of  socia l  l i fe  a long  this  coasta l 
region.   Images  of  a  near  future  of 
smooth  and  easy  t ransport  f rom 
port  to  c i ty  inspire  some  actors’ 
a t tempts  to  grab  hold  of  the  re igns 
of  urban  restructur ing,  to  steer  i t 
to  their  advantage.  While  others 
look  to  revi ta l ize  memories  of 
long-standing  t rade  re lat ions 
with  Asia  in  order  to  emphasize 
and  histor ical ly  root  the  potent ia l 
intersect ing  changes—in  land  use 
and  ownership,  in  the  mechanisms 
of  infrastructural  investment,  and 
in  the  physical  remaking  of  c i t ies. 
Moreover,  the  reformatt ing  of 
pol icy  and  legal  f rameworks  taking 
place  in  the  region’ s  pr imary  urban 
centres—Nairobi,  Kampala,  Dar  es 
Salaam,  Addis  Ababa  and  Maputo—
has  a l lowed  f inancial  f lows  to 
be  directed  into  t ransforming 
large  t racts  of  exist ing  urban 
bui l t  environments,  ready  for 
appropriat ion.  Taken  together, 
these  processes  are  spurr ing  new 
forms  of  internecine  conf l ic t, 
urban  inequal i ty  and  populat ion 
displacement.
Yet  these  new,  high-end  suburbs 
and  sate l l i te  c i t ies  are  a lso 
of ten  or iented  to  a  var iety  of 
e lsewhere.  They  look  outward 
toward  new  resource  f ront iers 
open  to  consol idat ion,  or  toward 
burgeoning  markets  ready  for 
capture—as  the  next  generat ion  of 
Afr icans  leapfrog  into  the  future. 
As  such,  these  investments  s ignal 
of  the  region  as  a  substant ia l 
node  in  the  enhancement  of  the 
Indian  Ocean  as  an  economic 
powerhouse. 
In  this  ser ies  of  essays,  we  probe 
the  on-going  t ransformations  in 
the  East  Afr ican  corr idor,   paying 
part icular  a t tent ion   how  these  are 
mediated  in  and  through  socia l 
l i fe.  We  do  so  by  consider ing  ideas 
of  c i rculat ions  and  crossings—
between  hinterlands  and  urban 
centres,  as  wel l  as  within  a  r is ing 
Indian  Ocean  economy. 
The  Indian  Ocean  l i t toral  has  been 
the  object  of  increasing  volumes 
of  inward  investment,  occurr ing 
across  d i f ferent  temporal i t ies 
and  scales.  I t  is  not  yet  c lear, 
though,  how  the  dist inct  nat ions 
making  up  the  corr idor,  f raught 
with  the  di f f icul t  colonial 
inher i tances  and  post-colonial 
conf l ic ts,  might  consol idate  these 
investments  for  broader  socia l 
and  economic  gains.  One  of  the 
chal lenges  is  the  speed  of  these 
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not  only  a  re-making  of  the  c i ty, 
but  of  the  re lat ions  that  connect 
urban  l i fe  to  i ts  mater ia l,  socia l 
and  imaginary  hinterlands. 
How  do  such  rapid  t ransformations 
intersect  with  enduring  problems 
of  underdevelopment,  shr inking 
volumes  of  arable  land,  a  highly 
mobi le  populat ion  composed  of 
both  speculat ive  so journers  and 
pol i t ica l  refugees,  h igh  rates  of 
unemployment  and  re l iance  upon 
makeshif t  economies ?  As  the 
Indian  Ocean  region  becomes  an 
epicenter  of  new  formations  of 
investment  that  draw  i t  fur ther 
within  Asian  f inancial,  technical 
and  cul tural  c i rcui ts,  how  wil l 
speci f ic  nat ional  and  local 
interests  act  to  d i rect  these  f lows ? 
What  are  the  cr i t ica l  inst i tut ions 
and  mechanisms  leveraging  these 
t ransformations,  and  what  cul tural 
contestat ions  underl ie  them ? 
What  kinds  of  cosmopol i tan 
imaginar ies—in  terms  of 
ant ic ipatory  cul tural,  aesthet ic 
and  bodi ly  pract ices—do  they 
e l ic i t ?
As  these  quest ions  make  c lear, 
corr idors  are  not  s imply  economic 
fabr icat ions.  They  are  conduits 
of  force.  As  they  reach  between 
hubs—of  generat ion  and  exchange, 
of  sea  and  shore,  of  c i ty  and 
hinterland—corr idors  organize 
economies,  pol i t ics  and  socia l 
l i fe  around  part icular  d i rect ional 
pr ior i t ies.  In  this  way,  corr idors 
produce  certa in  a l ignments,  which 
may  mean  disconnect ion  as  of ten 
as  i t  does  connect ion.  Corr idors 
are  a lso  st range  non-places,   
meant  for  passage,  for  movement-
through  rather  than  inhabitat ion. 
In  our  cal l  to  think  about  what 
i t  means  to  inhabit  the  corr idor, 
then,  we  want  to  consider  how 
they  channel  c i ty  l i fe  in  re lat ion 
to  mater ia l i t ies  and  imaginar ies 
of  connect ion,  but  a lso  how  they 
are  themselves  t ransformed  and 
directed  ( or  d iverted )  through 
people’ s  d iscrete  and  mult iple 
acts  habi tat ion.  Contrary  to  an 
image  of  unimpeded  connect ion, 
then,  the  corr idor  is  economical ly, 
pol i t ica l ly  and  socia l ly  product ive 
precisely  because  of  such 
accret ions  of  habi ts  of  c i rculat ion, 
of  stopping  to  catch  one’ s  breath, 
or  racing  to  get  a  leg  up. 
The  channel l ing  ef fects  of 
corr idors  are  not  merely  evident 
in  the  physical  t ransformations 
of  the  bui l t  environment.  They 
are  a lso  ref lected  in  the  ways 
that  people  at tune  themselves 
to  the  new  or  ant ic ipated 
opportunit ies  that  go  a long 
with  these  t ransformations,  the 
ways  that  people’ s  a t tent ion  is 
drawn  into  the  grand  narrat ives 
of  development  and  how  they 
attempt  to  inhabit  these  imagined 
spaces  and  make  them  their  own. 
From  the  substant ia l  wri t ings 
about  af fect  in  recent  years, 
we  know  how  such  col lect ive 
af fect ive  atmospheres  propel 
a l l iances  that  exert  force—
things  leap  over,  c i rcumvent, 
leak  through,  spread  out,  ramify 
beyond  household,  nat ion,  kin, 
c i t izenship  and  c lass.  But  i f  we 
are  to  avoid  turning  this  focus  on 
af fect  into  some  kind  of  protean 
vi ta l ism,  i t  is  important  to  keep 
in  mind  the  way  that  people,  in 
their  mult ipl ic i ty  of  interests, 
capaci t ies,  and  commitments 
instant iate  themselves  in 
st ructur ing  manoeuvres,  the 
way  they  extend  themselves 
as  avai lable  to  be  inserted  into 
st ructures  and  plans  not  of  their 
own  making  as  a  way  of  prof fer ing 
Corridors produce 
certain allignments 
which may mean 
disconnection as often 
they do connection
As  a  plural i ty  of  faul t  l ines  and 
a l l iances  emerge  in  the  ef for ts  to 
shape  the  control  of  resources, 
how  do  the  region’ s  c i t ies 
recompose  socia l  and  economic 
arrangements ?  As  the  region’ s 
c i t ies  are  increasingly  imagined 
as  the  nexus  for  substant ia l ly 
expanded  t ransnat ional 
interchanges,  what  kinds  of 
socia l  complexi t ies  are  l ikely 
to  ensue ?  Are  there  new  modes 
of  urban  development  that  do 
not  s imply  mirror  standardized 
formats  inher i ted  f rom  elsewhere, 
but  rather  emerge  f rom  long-
honed  pract ices  of  inhabitat ion 
on  the  part  of  the  region’ s  urban 
major i ty ?
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a  certa in  c la im,  or  of  maximizing 
the  scope  and  ef f icacy  of  act ions 
and  events.  Inhabit ing  the 
corr idor,  then,  means  holding  on 
to  histor ies  that  might  otherwise 
be  je t t isoned,  or  a t tempting  to 
concret ize  openings  and  gains  as 
the  ground  on  which  these  have 
been  bui l t  s l ips  away  with  the 
next  t ide  of  investment,  pol icy 
innovat ion,  formal izat ion  or 
st rategic  abandonment. 
In  this  d iverse  col lect ion  of 
essays,  our  goal  is  to  explore  what 
i t  means  to  inhabit  the  corr idor. 
We  consider  the  myriad  ways 
that  people  connect  to,  move 
thro ugh  and  inhabit  these  spaces-
in-transformation.  Grounded  in 
var ious  urban  and  urbanizing 
nodes  a long  the  East  Afr ican 
corr idor,  we  respond,  in  our  own 
ways  and  in  combinat ion,  to  a 
set  of  concerns  that  intersect 
with  an  East  Afr ican  turn  toward 
Asia.  While  much  is  new  in  these 
oceanic  connect ions,  we  must 
a lso  at tend  to  cont inui t ies—
the  long-honed  repertoires  of 
urban  l iving  and  patterns  of 
urbanizat ion—as  wel l  as  to  the 
ways  in  which  the  longue-
durée  of  mari t ime  interre lat ion 
and  crossing  a long  the  Indian 
Ocean  l i t toral  resurfaces 
in  contemporary  pract ices 
around  property,  in  not ions 
development  or  in  the  aesthet ics 
of  prosper i ty.  Col lect ively,  we 
look  s imultaneously  at  dearly 
held  legacies  as  wel l  as  emergent 
modal i t ies  of  the  urban.  The 
essays  can  be  grouped  into  three 
loose  themes,  but  read  together 
they  bui ld  on  and  cross  cut  each 
other  to  of fer  an  impression  of 
urban  l i fe  a long  the  corr idor. 
In  a  corr idor  long  character ized  by 
histor ies  of  t rans-local  re lat ions,  a 
number  of  quest ions  ar ise : 
What  are  the  impacts  of  a  seeming 
accelerat ion  and  deepening  of 
interre lat ions  among  East  Afr ica, 
the  Middle  East  and  Asia ?
What  are  the  socia l  impl icat ions 
of  increasing  levels  of  inward 
f inancial  investment ? 
How  are  the  f r ic t ions  and 
f luidi t ies  of  t ransport  corr idors 
made  to  matter  as  people,  goods 
and  ideas  get  caught  up  in  var ious 
forms  of  intermediat ion ?
What  kinds  of  values  are 
generated—how,  and  by  whom—
in  the  product ion  of  rapid  turn-
around-t imes,  pauses,  bott lenecks 
and  other  forms  of  in /ef f ic iencies ? 
How  do  new  imaginat ions  of 
regional  coherence  a long  the 
East  Afr ican  coast  re late  to  the 
speci f ic i t ies  of  internecine 
cooperat ion  and  conf l ic t  on  the 
ground,  and  the  emergence  of 
new  scales  of  contestat ion  or 
col laborat ion ?
How  are  imaginar ies  of  the  c i ty 
made  use  of  as  urban  inhabitants 
re-shape  their  mater ia l 
surroundings ?
In  what  ways  are  th e  acts  of 
col lect ing  and  arranging  the 
mater ia l  requisi tes  for  dwel l ing 
embroi led  in,  or  d isar t iculated 
f rom  broader  socia l  and  pol i t ica l 
st ruggles ? 
How  do  urban  inhabitants  weigh 
the  imperat ive  toward  vis ibi l i ty 
and  display,  which  make  them 
legible  to  others  against  desires 
for  a  degree  of  opaci ty  and 
obfuscat ion  that  may  extend  their 
room  to  manoeuvre ?
If  infrastructure  is  a  mater ia l 
inscr ipt ion  onto  the  surfaces 
of  things,  i f  i t  i s  a  technology 
of  const i tut ing  part icular 
domains,  narrat ives,  conduits, 
ar t iculat ions—something  that  both 
const i tutes  and  wounds—how  does 
infrastructure  operate  to  br ing  into 
existence  new  forms  of  “regional 
consciousness, ”  including  senses 
of  home  and  e lsewhere,  senses  of 
interre latedness  among  seemingly 
disparate  places  and  t imes ?
How  does  infrastructure  at tempt 
to  “catch  up”  to  existent  and 
emerging  “i t inerant”  or  “popular” 
c i rcui ts  of  movement  and 
exchange ;  how  does  i t  fac i l i ta te 
or  ward  of f  the  capaci t ies  of 
c i rculat ion  and  emplacement ?
How  do  the  mult iple  forces 
exerted  by  c i rcui ts  of  movement, 
new  forms  of  regional izat ion, 
deep  histor ies  of  t rans-oceanic 
commerce,  pol i t ica l  contestat ion, 
resurgent  and  waning  nat ional ism 
and  extended  urbanizat ion  create 
new  terr i tor ies  of  operat ion 
for  socia l  l i fe  in  a  process  of 
cont inuous  decomposi t ion  and 
recomposi t ion ?
What  kinds  of  modes  of 
conveyance,  media,  aesthet ic 
performances  and  mappings  are 
deployed  to  organize  senses  of 
the  region,  as  wel l  as  ideas  and 
viewpoints  about  what  courses  of 
act ion  are  possible,  prof i table,  and 
valuable ?
How  do  inhabitants  acquire 
a  working  knowledge  about 
where  to  go,  how  to  create  and 
mobi l ize  assets,  forge  i t inerar ies 
of  c i rculat ion,  put  together 
legi t imate  c la ims  on  places  and 
resources ?
As  c i t ies  are  wedged  in  the 
interst ices  between  land  and  sea, 
how  are  changing  conf igurat ions 
on  the  disposi t ion  of  land  and  the 
navigat ional  f ramework  of  the  sea 
reworking  urban  socia l i t ies ? 
How  do  new  modal i t ies  of 
extract ion,  occupancy  and 
displacement  conjoin  with  the 
growth  c i t ies  and  urban  ways  of 
l i fe ? 
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digi t  economic  growth  in  recent 
years  has  largely  been  dr iven  by 
new  investments  f rom  China, 
India,  Japan,  Saudi  Arabia,  Turkey, 
the  United  Arab  Emirates  and 
the  Ethiopian  diaspora.  As  a 
resul t,  routes  and  rhythms  in  the 
movement  of  Ethiopia’ s  people, 
animals,  knowledge,  money,  food, 
water,  energy  and  resources  of 
a lmost  every  other  kind  are  in  f lux. 
The  Ethiopian  government  has 
undertaken  an  histor ic  urban  turn 
in  nat ional  development  pr ior i t ies 
to  as  i t  seeks  to  channel,  focus  and 
rescale  these  f lows.  A  new  model 
of  integrated  planning  rethinks 
certa in  c i t ies  at  the  regional  scale, 
and  envisions  urban  expansion 
areas  as  key  f i ts  between  social 
and  mater ia l  infrastructures  of  the 
future.  While  federal ist  governance 
in  Ethiopia  seeks  to  channel 
urbanizat ion,  a  new  pol i t ics-based 
urbanizat ion  is  i tse l f  constraining 
and  recondit ioning  the  bounds  of 
federal ist  governance.
In  this  essay,  I  connect  the 
emergence  of  integrated  planning 
with  the  quest ion  of  c i t izenship 
a long  Ethiopia’ s  dynamic  urban /
regional  interfaces.  Planning 
pract ices  a long  these  internal 
borderlands  reveal  the  paradox 
of  “integrat ion”  in  a  rapidly 
urbanizing  and  t ransforming 
society.  Urbanizat ion  during 
these  boom  years  has  enabled  the 
Ethiopian  government  to  think 
grandly  about  i ts  c i t ies  and  to 
experiment  with  the  rescal ing 
of  urgent  planning  imperat ives. 
Nowhere  are  the  f r ict ions  around 
these  t ransformations  more 
c lear  than  the  expansion  area 
region,  and  the  language  of  the 
new  const i tut ion  was  the  basis 
for  naming  the  Southern  Nat ions, 
Nat ional i t ies  and  Peoples  Region 
( SNNPR ) .
A  second  stage  of  terr i tor ia l isat ion 
came  in  2005 ,  when  Addis  Ababa 
and  Dire  Dawa  were  recognized 
as  autonomous  charter  c i t ies. 
Both  c i t ies  were  large  populat ion 
centres  and  nodes  in  nat ional 
t ransport  networks,  and  each 
had  a  diverse  makeup  that  did 
not  comport  with  the  imagined 
uniformity  of  any  nat ional  region. 
Addis  Ababa  thus  was  carved  out 
f rom  the  Oromia  region,  though 
completely  surrounded  by  i t.  Dire 
Dawa  was  carved  out  f rom  between 
the  Oromia  and  Somali  regions. 
There  is  some  speculat ion  today 
that  Awassa  and  Bahir  Dar—the 
rapidly  growing,  diverse  regional 
capita ls  of  the  SNNPR  and  the 
Amhara  Region,  respect ively—may 
also  become  charter  c i t ies.
Here,  best  pract ices  in  regional 
planning  for  urban  expansion 
would  seem  appropriate,  as 
they  of ten  a im  at  the  provision 
of  st reamlined  infrastructures, 
ef f ic ient  service  del ivery,  green 
growth  or  other  such  publ ic  goods. 
Regional  planning  reconceives 
a  c i ty  as  part  of  an  expanded 
metropol i tan  system,  catalysed 
by  a  combinat ion  of  cheap  land, 
l imited  infrastructure  and  smal ler 
human  sett lements  lying  outside 
the  c i ty.  According  to  this  view,  the 
short-run  burdens  of  development 
within  a  c i ty’ s  expansion  area 
would  be  of fset  by  the  long-run 
benef i ts  of  a  common  metropol i tan 
region  of  harmonized  urban 
funct ions.  Regional  planners  and 
c i ty  managers  work  together  to 
erode  the  spat ia l,  economic  and 
pol i t ical  l imits  to  what  they  see  as 
a  c i ty’ s  inexorable  growth. 
of  Ethiopia’ s  capita l  c i ty,  Addis 
Ababa,  in  the  surrounding  Oromia 
region.
Urban  growth  in  Ethiopia  today 
is  shaped  as  much  by  the  logic 
of  ethnic  federal ism  as  the 
complexity  of  g lobal  economic 
change.  The  previous  regime, 
the  Derg,  sought  to  minimize 
ethnic  and  rel ig ious  di f ference 
in  a  punit ive  social ist  system 
that  advanced  a  rural  b ias  in 
development.  Mi l i t ias  f rom  the 
Tigray,  Amhara,  Southern  and 
Oromia  regions  toppled  the  Derg 
in  1991  to  form  a  rul ing  coal i t ion 
cal led  the  Ethiopian  Peoples’ 
Revolut ionary  Democrat ic  Front 
( EPRDF ) .  In  pr inciple,  the  EPRDF’ s 
system  of  ethnic  federal ism 
counters  legacies  of  pol i t ical 
marginal izat ion  by  grant ing  each 
of  Ethiopia’ s  regions  co-equal 
sovereignty  and  even  the  r ight 
to  secede,  as  happened  with 
Er i t rea.  In  pract ice,  however,  few 
of  Ethiopia’ s  80  ethnic  groups 
are  meaningful ly  incorporated  in 
regions  or  part ies.  Li t t le  dayl ight 
separates  the  EPRDF  from  the 
Ethiopian  state,  and  the  formation 
of  a l ternat ive  part ies  has  been 
systematical ly  denied.
Ethnic  federal ism  has  profoundly 
reshaped  Ethiopia’ s  pol i t ical 
terr i tor ies  in  two  stages.  Fi rst, 
whereas  the  Derg  had  recognized 
13  regions,  the  EPRDF  ini t ia l ly 
recognized  nine  regions,  known 
as  “nat ions” .  Six  of  them  were 
named  in  recognit ion  of  part icular 
ethnic  groups :  Tigray,  Amhara, 
Afar,  Harar i,  Somali  and  Oromia. 
One  region,  Benishangul-Gumuz, 
was  named  for  a  combinat ion 
of  a  place  name  and  an  ethnic 
group.  Two  regions  were  deemed 
too  diverse  to  have  a  def ining 
ethnic  character ;  a  place  name 
was  chosen  for  the  Gambela 
T
he  urban  revolut ion 
unfolding  across 
much  of  Afr ica 
is  a  cr i t ical  issue 
in  Ethiopia.  This 
country’ s  double-
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Citizens  have pushed back against  the  Ethiopian government’s 
urban turn in  i ts  national  development  priorit ies
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Recent  years  have  seen  the 
dramatic  emergence  of  social 
movements  contest ing  ethnic 
federal ism  and  the  logic  of 
regional  planning.  In  Apri l 
of  2014 ,  universi ty  students 
in  the  c i ty  of  Ambo,  Oromia, 
held  an  unsanct ioned  protest 
against  cronyism,  inequitable 
development  and  the  denial  of 
Oromo  sovereignty.  Pol ice  broke 
up  the  protest  and  opened  f i re, 
ki l l ing  several  students.  Dozens 
of  others  were  detained  and 
disappeared,  and  mart ia l  law  and 
media  blackouts  were  imposed. 
The  incident  prompted  nat ional 
and  internat ional  outrage. 
of  Ethiopians  detained,  many 
have  been  sent  to  so-cal led 
rehabi l i tat ion  camps.  By  early 
2017 ,  the  EPRDF  announced  the 
re lease  of  many  pr isoners.  But  the 
path  to  reform  is  unclear.  Pr ime 
Minister  Hai lemariam  Desalegn 
cal led  a  state  of  emergency  in 
October  2016  and  Parl iament  has 
extended  i t  further  to  July  2017 .
With  their  integrated  plan 
shelved,  these  are  heady  t imes  for 
Ethiopia’ s  growing  professional 
cadre  of  planners.  While  the 
major i ty  of  them  eschew  party 
pol i t ics,  they  are  of ten  proud 
of  their  turn  towards  integrated 
planning.  I t  suggests  their 
increasing  technical  capabi l i t ies 
and  independence  f rom  foreign 
advisors.  They  have  made  bold  and 
histor ic  achievements  in  planning 
Addis  Ababa,  many  of  which  have 
been  especial ly  popular  with 
the  c i ty’ s  growing  middle  c lass. 
With  some  credence,  planners 
c la im  that  their  ef forts  have  been 
misunderstood  or  knowingly 
misrepresented  for  pol i t ical  gain. 
But  while  they  have  hope  for  the 
c i ty’ s  dynamic  future  possibi l i t ies 
and  growth,  some  acknowledge 
that  the  protests  have  caused 
them  to  feel  ambivalent.  In  an 
expression  of  d iscomfit,  one 
senior  planner  said,  “we  are  not 
bui lding  a  nat ion,  we  are  bui lding 
ethnic  regions. ”
Under  other  pol i t ical 
c i rcumstances,  integrated 
planning  could  be  a  chance 
to  bui ld  col laborat ions  across 
regions,  c i t ies  and  towns.  After 
a l l,  everyday  l i fe  in  Ethiopia  is 
not  just  character ized  by  ethnic 
divis ions,  but  a lso  by  many 
hopeful  and  open-ended  si tuat ions 
of  mutual i ty  and  interdependence. 
Shared  languages,  mult i-ethnic 
family  networks  and  relat ive 
harmony  between  rel ig ious  groups 
are  just  some  of  the  bonds  that 
l ink  Ethiopia’ s  people,  both  within 
and  across  regions.
Ethiopia’ s  f ront iers  for  the 
negot iat ion  of  space,  power  and 
ident i ty  l ie  in  rural  and  urban 
places.  But  increasingly,  these 
f ront iers  run  along  the  of f ic ia l 
interfaces  of  c i t ies  and  regions. 
Within  the  new  circui ts  and 
megastructures  of  connect ivi ty  in 
East  Afr ica,  then,  the  prospects 
of  urban  expansion  in  Ethiopia 
are  marked  by  f r ict ion,  as  wel l  as 
f lows.
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But  the  common  assumptions 
of  regional  planning  c irculat ing 
g lobal ly  do  not  assume  ethnic 
federal ism  as  a  ground  truth. 
In  2012 ,  the  Addis  Ababa 
municipal i ty  adopted  the  long 
view  of  the  regional  planner  and 
inaugurated  the  Ad d i s  Ab a b a  a n d 
t h e  S u r ro u n d i n g  O ro m i a  S p e c i a l  Z o n e 
I n te g ra te d  D eve l o p m e n t  P l a n  P ro j e c t 
O f f i c e .  Af ter  a l l,  Addis  Ababa’ s 
populat ion  of  nearly  four-mil l ion 
residents  are  projected  by  the 
United  Nat ions  to  double  by  2040 , 
seemingly  making  i ts  regional 
planning  an  imperat ive. 
Unl ike  previous  master  plans, 
which  tended  to  focus  on  Addis 
Ababa’ s  internal  parts,  the  of f ice 
would  rethink  the  c i ty  as  part  of 
a  “special  zone”  encompassing 
f ive  nearby,  smal ler  c i t ies  in 
Oromia  region  roughly  30 - 40 km 
beyond  Addis  Ababa’ s  c i ty  l imits. 
Each  of  these  outlying  c i t ies  was 
meant  to  special ize  in  sectoral  and 
funct ional  tasks  for  an  integrated 
metropol i tan  area.  While  residents 
l iving  within  the  “special 
zone”  see  both  chal lenge  and 
opportunity  in  Addis  Ababa’ s  rapid 
growth,  the  consultat ions  between 
Addis  Ababa  and  i ts  surrounding 
municipal i t ies  were  not  reciprocal 
or  very  part ic ipatory.  Rather, 
local  stakeholders  in  these 
consultat ions  have  usual ly  been 
appointed  of f ic ia ls  or,  in  some 
cases,  inf luent ia l  business  people. 
The  dynamic  corr idor  st retching 
f rom  Addis  Ababa  some  20 km  to 
the  c i ty  of  Bishoftu  in  Oromia 
has  been  understood  by  some  as 
e i ther  an  economic  opportunity, 
and  by  others  as  a  looming  threat 
to  the  sovereignty  and  terr i tor ia l 
integr i ty  of  Oromia.  To  many 
Oromos,  this  corr idor’ s  foreign-
owned  factor ies,  expressways, 
and  other  s igns  of  Addis  Ababa’ s 
expansion  are  reminders  of  their 
marginal izat ion  s ince  the  late-
nineteenth  century.  At  that  t ime, 
Abyssinian  ar istocrats  marched 
f rom  Addis  Ababa  into  Oromia  and 
other  lowland  kingdoms,  annexed 
their  land,  and  forced  them  into 
the  f ramework  of  modern  Ethiopia. 
Other  urban  expansions  may  also 
encroach  on  Oromia,  such  as  the 
c i ty  of  Awassa  crossing  into  the 
region  f rom  the  south,  or  the  c i ty 
of  Harar  crossing  into  the  region 
f rom  the  northeast.
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During the boom years, 
ethiopia’s government 
has thought grandly 
about its cities and 
experimented with 
the rescaling of urgent 
planning imperatives
In  2015  and  2016 ,  urban  protests 
fol lowed  across  much  of  Oromia, 
and  then  spread  to  the  Amhara 
and  Harar i  regions,  and  even 
to  Addis  Ababa.  The  protests 
opened  pathways  of  mult i-ethnic 
sol idar i ty  against  the  f ramework 
of  ethnic  federal ism,  rather  than 
through  i t. 
In  January  2016 ,  the  Oromo 
Peoples’  Democrat ic  Organizat ion 
( OPDO )  acceded  to  popular 
pressure  and  announced  the 
suspension  of  the  integrated 
planning  of f ice’ s  st rategy.  This 
has  general ly  been  construed  as 
the  s ingle  most  ser ious  pol i t ical 
threat  to  EPRDF  in  i ts  25  years 
of  rule.  The  EPRDF  subsequently 
promised  a  nat ional  process  of 
pol i t ical  reform,  underscor ing 
a  c lear  urban  turn  in  Ethiopia’ s 
complex  regional  pol i t ics.  But 
the  growth  of  this  movement 
has  come  with  sacr i f ice.  Mi l i tant 
act ion,  including  r iots,  barr icades 
and  attacks  on  pol ice  stat ions, 
have  been  met  with  brutal  force. 
Securi ty  agents  have  ki l led  at  least 
400  people  and  tortured  many 
others.  Among  the  thousands 
CORRIDORS_Design_v1.indd   8 2017/08/17   8:00 AM
0 9
C I T Y S C A P E S | C O R R I D O R S
organizat ion  establ ished  in  1999 . 
Despi te  i ts  shi f t ing  legal  status 
s ince  a  2008  ban,  support  for  the 
group  was  highly  vis ible  pr ior  to 
the  2012  e lect ions,  with  angry 
graf f i t i  procla iming  “MRC  The 
Coast  is  Not  Kenya”  cover ing  wal ls 
in  Mombasa  and  Lamu.  While 
media  and  the  state  label led  i t 
as  an  “i l legal  organized  cr iminal 
group, ”  “gang, ”  and  even  “mil i t ia, ” 
the  MRC  insist  that  i t  should 
rather  be  understood  as  a  socia l 
movement.  In  2012 ,  I  met  Omar 
Bambam,  the  Mombasa  Is land 
chairman  and  nat ional  t reasurer 
of  the  MRC.  He  def ined  MRC  as  a 
“revolut ionary  group  represent ing 
a l l  coasta l  people,  seeking 
f reedom  for  the  coast  by  any 
means  necessary” .  He  nonetheless 
emphasized  that  MRC  were  opposed 
to  violence.  The  courts,  he  sa id, 
were  the  group’ s  main  batt leground 
where  they  presented  histor ical 
a nd  l egal  arguments  for  secession.
The  MRC  evoked  the  history  of  the 
Ten-Mile  Str ip  of  the  coast  and 
i ts  incorporat ion  into  the  state 
of  Kenya  to  make  i ts  c la ims.  The 
narrow  str ip  of  the  coast  st retching 
f rom  Lamu  to  Vanga  had  remained 
under  the  nominal  sovereignty 
of  the  Sul tan  of  Zanzibar,  even 
as  the  rest  of  Br i t ish  East  Afr ica 
became  Kenya  Colony  in  1920 .  This 
d ist inct ion  was  important,  not 
only  as  the  status  of  the  coast  was 
being  debated  at  independence, 
but  a lso  beyond.  Quest ioning  the 
legal  val id i ty  of  the  Kenyan  state 
in  201 0 ,  the  MRC  denounced  the 
agreements  of  1963  and  1895 , 
through  which  the  st r ip  became 
part  of  Kenya,  and  argued  instead 
While  the  MRC  can  be  s i tuated 
within  the  history  of  coasta l 
nat ional ist  movements,  i t  i s  a lso 
di f ferent  in  that  i t  acts  as  an 
umbrel la  under  which  mult iple 
c la ims  converge  in  the  present. 
The  MRC  and  i ts  sympathizers 
are  making  c la ims  about  three 
inter-related  points :  land  and 
autochthony,  the  history  of 
autonomous  c i ty-states  on  the 
coast,  and  an  imaginary  t ied  to 
the  history  of  t rade  and  socia l 
re lat ions  across  the  Indian  Ocean. 
These  mult iple  c la ims  ul t imately 
point  to  a  histor ical  imaginary 
in  which  the  coast  is  imagined 
as  a  space  shaped  by  the  Ind ian 
Ocean,  and  therefore  dist inct 
f rom  “upcountry, ”  and  the  Kenyan 
nat ion.  An  MRC  supporter  in  Lamu 
made  some  of  these  c la ims  c lear  to 
me. 
Mohamed  Omar  was  a  member 
of  the  MRC  in  Lamu.  A  local 
landowner,  in  2012  he  declared 
his  support  for  MRC  through  his 
part ic ipat ion  in  an  organizat ion 
cal led  the  Hidabu  Sel f-Help  Group. 
This  group  was  t rying  to  “return” 
Hidabu  Hi l l,  a  plot  of  land  in 
Lamu,  to  “indigenous  people”  and 
hal t  i ts  sett lement  by  people  f rom 
“upcountry. ”  The  argument  he 
made  were  based  on  a  d iscourse 
of  autochthony.  Hidabu  Hi l l, 
c la imed  Omar,  was  one  of  the 
or ig inal  sett lements  in  the  Lamu 
area,  and  as  such  Bajunis  f rom  the 
archipelago  rather  than  Kikuyus 
f rom  the  inter ior  should  enjoy 
ent i t lements.  Bajuni  c la ims  to  this 
land  were  legi t imized  based  on  a 
not ion  of  autochthony. 
Autochthony  discourses  are 
of ten  used  to  make  “authent ic” 
c la ims  to  resources.  In  Lamu,  as 
e lsewhere  on  the  Swahi l i  coast, 
the  resurgence  of  autochthony 
can  be  s i tuated  within  the  recent 
that  the  coast  was  a  separate 
country,  based  on  the  Zanzibar 
Protectorate  agreement  of  1890 
whereby  the  coasta l  st r ip  was 
only  leased  to  the  Br i t ish  by  the 
Sul tan  of  Zanzibar.  Further,  the 
MRC  considered  the  October  1963 
agreement  as  val id  only  for  50 
years,  a f ter  which  the  coast  was 
to  become  autonomous.  The  MRC 
based  these  c la ims  on  a  part icular 
reading  of  histor ical  documents, 
as  wel l  as  by  c i t ing  “missing 
documents” .
n  201 0 - 11 ,  coasta l 
Kenya  saw  the 
r is ing  popular i ty 
of  the  Mombasa 
Republ ican  Counci l 
( MRC ) ,  a  secessionist 
Historical  legacies  of  exploitation and sovereignty feed 
activist  narratives  in  the  port  city  of  Lamu
LAMU,  
A BATTLEGROUND 
OF MEMORY AND 
ASPIRATION
With the planned 
construction of a deep 
water port, kenyan 
government visions see 
Lamu becoming “the 
Dubai of Africa
Scholars  such  as  Just in  Wil l is 
and  George  Gona  have  viewed 
the  MRC’ s  rete l l ings  of  history 
as  a  chal lenge  to  the  state. 
They  highl ight  how  the  MRC’ s 
vis ion  is  f ractured—couched  for 
some  in  terms  of  autochthony, 
and  for  others  as  a  vis ion  of  an 
independent,  mult i-ethnic  coasta l 
nat ion  that  der ives  i ts  leg i t imacy 
f rom  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sul tan 
of  Zanzibar.  In  many  ways,  the 
MRC  draws  on  previous  coasta l 
nat ional ist  movements,  but  as 
histor ian  Jeremy  Prestholdt  has 
argued,  i t  is  novel  in  that  i t  is 
more  inclusive  of  d iverse  coasta l 
groups.
N I D H I  M A H A J A N 
I
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MARKETPLACE
Vendors sell vegetables inside the Maputo Central 
Market in the Mozambican capital. The country 
is recovering through decades of war and is 
experiencing a construction boom.
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development  of  an  extract ive 
economy  along  the  coast  that 
threatens  to  exacerbate  deep-
rooted  issues  of  insecure 
land  tenure.  The  discourse  of 
autochthony  has  fused  with 
another  histor ical  imaginary,  one 
that  looks  to  an  Indian  Ocean  past 
and  the  history  of  c i ty-states  on 
the  coast  of  East  Afr ica  to  argue 
for  independence.
After  a  tour  of  Hidabu,  Omar 
showed  me  a  poster  he  had 
made.  I t  bore  the  t i t le :  “Kenya’ s 
Independence  Opened  the  Door 
to  the  Coast’ s  Maladies. ”  Below 
the  t i t le  was  a  poem  that  argued 
for  secession,  as  wel l  as  images 
of  two  coins,  one  with  “Mombasa” 
inscr ibed  on  i t,  the  other  with 
the  mark  of  the  Imperia l  Br i t ish 
East  Afr ica  Company.  The 
Mombasa  coin  was  as  evidence 
of  the  history  of  the  autonomous 
c i ty-state,  whi le  the  other  coin 
was  supposed  to  represent  the 
dist inct  history  of  the  coast  as 
a  Protectorate  under  colonial 
rule.  By  wri t ing  the  poem  and 
including  the  images,  Omar  sought 
to  delegi t imize  the  nat ion-state, 
and  seek  an  a l ternate  vis ion  of 
belonging  grounded  in  the  history 
of  the  region’ s  autonomous  coasta l 
c i ty-states.
While  some  Lamu  residents 
have  focused  on  the  past,  the 
government  of  Kenya  has  been 
looking  to  the  future.  The  Kenya 
Ports  Author i ty  ( KPA )  began 
advert is ing  the  Lamu  Port 
South  Sudan  Ethiopia  Transport 
( LAPSETT )  corr idor  pro ject  in 
2012 .  The  government  envisions 
that  Lamu  wil l  one  day  become 
the  Indian  Ocean  terminus  for  a 
ra i l-land  br idge,  c la iming  that 
Lamu  wil l  become  the  “Dubai  of 
Afr ica” .  While  the  government 
of  Kenya  markets  this  future  for 
Lamu,  i ts  residents  complain 
of  economic  marginal izat ion, 
crumbling  infrastructure, 
increased  land  grabbing  and 
insecuri ty.  The  LAPSETT  project, 
they  bel ieve,  wi l l  s imply 
exacerbate  these  problems. 
The  local  c ivi l-society 
organizat ion  Save  Lamu  emerged 
at  the  forefront  of  these  protests. 
In  2012 ,  Save  Lamu  appl ied  to 
the  courts  for  an  injunct ion  on 
the  port,  c i t ing  const i tut ional 
violat ions.  The  court  case  was 
rooted  in  deep-seated  conf l ic ts 
over  land  and  coasta l  autonomy. 
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“First ly,  the  sent iments  are 
a lmost  l ike  the  MRC.  Secondly, 
the  sent iments  are  about  land, ” 
explained  Maal im  Baadi,  Save 
Lamu’ s  former  chairman.  He  told 
me  that  the  “indigenous”  t r ibes 
of  Lamu  were  a l l  squatters,  not 
owning  t i t le  deeds  to  their  lands. 
Al though  not  a  member  of  the 
MRC,  Baadi  echoed  some  of  the 
MRC’ s  ideas,  arguing  that  issues  of 
land  ownership  for  “indigenous” 
peoples  must  be  resolved.  Baadi 
a lso  echoed  broader  t ropes  in 
arguments  made  in  Lamu  against 
the  port,  such  as  decreased  job 
opportunit ies  for  wa pwa n i  or 
coasta l  folk,  with  an  inf lux  of 
“migrants”  f rom  upcountry.  He 
a lso  argued  that  nepot ism  had 
a l lowed  for  Kikuyus  to  receive 
t i t le  deeds  in  the  area  as  opposed 
to  other  inhabitants  of  Lamu. 
While  embroi led  in  current 
pol i t ics,  Baadi’ s  sent iments 
about  present  inequal i t ies 
and  tensions  are  entangled  in 
ideas  about  autochthony  and 
the  past.  By  invoking  the  MRC, 
Baadi  placed  current  tensions 
between  state  and  c ivi l  society 
within  a  histor ical  imaginary 
that  quest ions  the  legi t imacy 
of  the  state.  Individuals  such  as 
Baadi  and  groups  such  as  the  MRC 
react  to  present  t ransformations 
in  coasta l  Kenya  by  invoking  a 
d i f ferent  imaginary  of  belonging, 
not  only  engaging  with  discourses 
of  autochthony,  but  by  viewing  the 
coast  as  a  place  shaped  by  i ts  own 
part icular  history  of  t rade  and 
socia l  re lat ions  across  the  Indian 
Ocean. 
The  MRC  is  harnessing  histor ical 
narrat ives  to  imagine  a  d i f ferent 
future  for  the  coast  than  that 
envisaged  by  the  Kenyan  state. 
The  MRC  not  only  re imagines 
the  coast  as  being  shaped  by  i ts 
Indian  Ocean  past,  but  a lso  c la ims 
to  re present  i ts  d iverse  present-
day  populat ion,  which  includes 
Mij ikendas,  Bajunis,  Swahi l is, 
South  Asians  and  Arabs—in  ef fect 
a lso  def ining  what  anthropologist 
Engseng  Ho  has  cal led  “local 
cosmopol i tans”  as  “nat ives”  of 
the  coast.  In  doing  so,  the  MRC  is 
reframing  discourses  of  nat ivism 
from  the  1960 s,  imagining 
belonging  within  a  more  inclusive 
f ramework.  This  has  g iven  their 
arguments  broad  appeal.  The 
diverse  groups  represented  in 
the  MRC  are  held  together  by  a 
common  ideology  that  includes 
a  shared  understanding  of  the 
history  of  colonial,  imperia l 
and  now  nat ional  power.  “The 
coast  has  been  suf fer ing  s ince 
independence, ”  Bambam  told 
me.  He  viewed  this  “suffer ing” 
within  a  histor ical  cont inuum 
that  encompassed  per iods  of 
Omani  and  Br i t ish  imperia l ism, 
and  included  the  present  Kenyan 
state  within  this  history  of 
“exploi ta t ion” .
When  the  MRC  looks  to  an 
Indian  Ocean  past,  i t  does  so  by 
def ining  i tse l f  as  represent ing 
a  populat ion  born  of  this  past. 
I ts  d iscontent  with  the  Kenyan 
state  is  f ramed  within  a  history 
of  autonomous  c i ty-states,  and 
Omani,  and  Br i t ish  imperia l ism. 
The  MRC  imagines  pol i t ica l  and 
socia l  belonging  a long  di f ferent 
l ines,  c i rcumscr ibed  not  by  the 
Kenyan  state,  but  by  the  memory 
of  this  past—and  imagining  of 
a  d i f ferent  future  for  the  coast. 
A  landmark  Court  of  Appeal  rul ing 
in  July  2016 ,  which  overturned  the 
2008  ban  on  the  group,  has  been 
the  source  of  an  existent ia l  cr is is. 
Now  that  the  MRC  is  a  legal  ent i ty, 
should  i t  become  a  pol i t ica l 
party ?  What  would  i t  mean  for  a 
secessionist  group  to  part ic ipate 
in  nat ional  e lect ions ? 
Residents  of  Lamu  cont inue 
to  st ruggle  against  the  large 
development  pro ject  that  wi l l 
potent ia l ly  t ransform  the 
coastl ine.  The  government  and 
Amu  Power,  a  pr ivate  f i rm,  are 
proposing  a  coal  power  plant 
in  Kwasasi,  on  the  mainland. 
This  land  has  histor ical ly  been 
farmed  by  communit ies  f rom 
Pate,  an  is land  in  the  archipelago. 
Rumours  of  the  pro ject  have  led 
to  land  speculat ion,  with  buyers 
f rom  across  the  country  invest ing 
in  property  in  the  hopes  of 
eventual ly  being  compensated. 
Save  Lamu  cont inues  to  protest 
both  LAPSETT  and  the  Kwasasi 
energy  pro ject.  The  power  plant 
has  been  a  part icular  source 
of  conf l ic t  and  divis ion.  Many 
approve  of  the  pro ject  as  they 
envisage  receiving  compensat ion 
for  their  land,  but  some  worry 
about  the  environmental  hazards 
of  the  coal-burning  faci l i ty.  Lamu 
is  a  port  c i ty  in  which  ideas  of  the 
nat ion,  belonging  and  the  role  of 
c ivi l  society  remain  contested, 
and  the  past  is  being  harnessed 
to  make  c la ims  to  r ights  in  the 
present.
While the government 
markets this future 
for Lamu, its residents 





The  MRC  is  viewed  as  a  threat 
by  the  Kenyan  state.  While 
coasta l  nat ional ists  a t  the  end 
of  the  colonial  era  argued  their 
case  through  pol i t ica l  part ies, 
the  MRC  has  an  amorphous 
legal  standing.  Fol lowing  the 
at tacks  at  Gar issa  Un iversi ty 
Col lege  in  Apri l  2015 ,  the  Kenyan 
government  label led  the  MRC  as 
a  terror ist  organizat ion,  in  ef fect 
delegi t imizing  the  MRC  as  a 
pol i t ica l  actor. 
Yet,  much  has  changed  s ince  in 
the  past  two  years.  Mohamed 
Omar  no  longer  l ives  in  Lamu. 
The  contested  land  in  Hidabu 
Hi l l  was  acquired  by  the  Kenyan 
government.  Omar  is  no  longer 
engaged  in  act ivism.  Support  for 
the  MRC  has  a lso  been  in  decl ine 
in  Lamu,  a l though  they  remain 
act ive  in  other  parts  of  the  coast. 
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debates  about  both  the  nature  of 
“region”  and  “urban” . 
In  part icular,  I  wonder  what,  i f 
anything,  is  ga ined  by  thinking 
the  urban  without  an  outside ?  I f  i t 
i s  necessary  to  read  urbanizat ion 
as  the  spat ia l  logic  of  advanced 
capi ta l ism  into  a l l  manner  of  socia l 
and  physical  landscapes,  as  is 
suggested  by  Nei l  Brenner,  then  is 
i t  possible  to  conceive  of  Eastle igh, 
Kampala  and  even  Dubai—places 
f rom  which  surpluses  of  t ime, 
energy  and  aspirat ion,  a longside 
capi ta l,  bodies  and  labour,  are 
drawn  out  and  reworked  to  produce 
the  volat i le  stochast ic i ty  of  South 
Sudan’ s  dusty  backwater  economy—
as  hinterlands  of  Juba ?  I f  this  is 
the  case,  where  exactly  does  this 
leave  us ? 
How  does  this  help  us  to 
understand  the  socia l,  imaginat ive 
and  mater ia l  processes  that  have 
made  Juba ?  My  interest  here  is 
what  these  precar ious  migrat ion 
c i rcui ts  I  descr ibe  te l l  us  more 
broadly  about  the  im /possibi l i ty 
of  work  and  desires  for  autonomy 
within  the  region ? 
Let  me  begin  with  Mart in,  a 
middle-aged  father  of  four. 
Or ig inal ly  f rom  Kampala,  he  faced 
a  l i fe  of  just  making  ends  meet  as 
a  storekeeper.  Af ter  rent,  school 
fees  and  medical  expenses  he 
wasn’ t  able  to  save  any  mo ney. 
Recognizing  that  he  was  unable  to 
progress  economical ly  in  Uganda, 
Mart in  star ted  to  think  about 
opt ions.  South  Sudan  presented 
i tse l f  as  a  viable  opt ion,  a  place 
where  he  arr ived  expect ing 
“to  get  something  good” .  Juba 
wasn’ t  Mart in’ s  in i t ia l  choice 
of  dest inat ion,  but  i ts  locat ion 
re lat ive  to  Uganda—he  descr ibed  i t 
as  being  in  the  “neighbourhood” —
and  the  ease  of  arranging  entry 
made  i t  appeal ing. 
cost  of  operat ing  a  business  here 
extremely  high. 
Between  car  accidents,  i l lness, 
road  ambushes  and  per iodic 
bouts  of  xenophobic  violence,  i t 
is  easy  to  lose  one’ s  l i fe  in  Juba, 
part icularly  as  a  foreigner. 
Why,  then,  in  2015 ,  were  there 
st i l l  so  many  migrants  there, 
despi te  the  r isks ?  I  suggest  that 
to  answer  this  quest ion  requires 
thinking  regional ly,  to  consider 
the  var ious  hinterlands  that  come 
together  to  produce  Juba.  Al though 
located  on  the  margins  of  East 
Afr ica,  Juba  draws  in  labour, 
f inance,  food  and  construct ion 
mater ia ls  f rom  surpr is ingly 
extensive  conduits :  f rom  Burundi 
in  the  south,  Cairo  in  the  north, 
Niger ia  in  the  west,  and  Asmara, 
I
n  2015 ,  South  Sudan 
was  among  the  top 
ten  migrant  host ing 
countr ies  in  Afr ica, 
according  to  of f ic ia l 





Until  the  recent  f lair-up in  violence,  Juba was a  city  of  great 
possibil i ty  for  migrants  from all  over  East  Africa
L É O N I E  S .  N E W H O U S E
regardless  of  whether  measured 
by  absolute  number  or  as  a 
percentage  of  the  populat ion.  In 
the  same  year,  South  Sudan  was 
a lso  involved  in  a  bloody  and 
bi t ter  internal  conf l ic t,  one  that 
cont inues  to  this  day.  Despi te 
the  obvious  dangers,  migrants 
were  drawn  to  the  country  by 
the  promise  of  a  new  oi l-r ich 
capi ta l  that  required  bui lding  f rom 
scratch,  of  favourable  exchange 
rates,  and  of  a  capt ive  and  open 
market,  where  anything  brought 
in  would  turn  a  prof i t.  The  new 
Angola,  some  said. 
But,  as  I  have  wri t ten  e lsewhere, 
by  any  standard,  Juba,  the  capi ta l 
of  South  Sudan,  is  a  d i f f icul t  place 
to  do  business.  I t  is  hot,  dangerous 
and  far  f rom  the  commercia l 
hubs  of  Afr ica’ s  Indian  Ocean 
l i t toral.  In  a  l i tera l  sense,  the 
inland  corr idor  that  begins  in  the 
port  of  Mombasa  ends  here,  a long 
with  the  tarmac.  Paved  roads 
are  l imited,  and  the  a i rport  is 
smal l ;  br inging  goods  in  presents 
many  logist ical  chal lenges.  The 
endemic  malar ia  st ra ins  are 
part icularly  debi l i tat ing,  and 
the  few  medical  fac i l i t ies  are 
under-resourced.  The  populat ion 
is  poor,  and  the  regulatory 
regime  opaque,  personal ized  and 
constantly  shi f t ing.  The  mil i tary 
and  pol ice  act  with  impunity  in 
the  knowledge  that  courts  are 
s low  and,  more  of ten  than  not, 
complic i t ;  whi le  the  populat ion 
is  wel l  armed,  and  disposed 
to  vig i lant ism.  Al l  support ing 
infrastructure—water,  e lectr ic i ty, 
sewage,  te lecommunicat ions, 
waste  disposal,  basic  secur i ty—
must  be  se l f-provided,  making  the 
Between car accidents, 
illness, road ambushes 
and periodic bouts of 
xenophobic violence, it 
is easy to lose one’s life 
in Juba, particularly as 
a foreigner
Hargeisa  and,  i f  we  bel ieve  the 
rumours,  the  pirat ical  waters  of 
the  gul f  of  Aden  in  the  east. 
To  g ive  f lesh  to  these  disparate 
hinterlands,  I  t race  migrant 
t rajector ies  backwards  to  consider 
the  channels  and  conduits 
that  d i rect  and  energize  such 
precar ious  c i rcui ts.  My  broader 
interest  is  to  consider  these 
examples  a longside  academic 
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debates  about  both  the  nature  of 
“region”  and  “urban” . 
In  part icular,  I  wonder  what,  i f 
anything,  is  ga ined  by  thinking 
the  urban  without  an  outside ?  I f  i t 
i s  necessary  to  read  urbanizat ion 
as  the  spat ia l  logic  of  advanced 
capi ta l ism  into  a l l  manner  of  socia l 
and  physical  landscapes,  as  is 
suggested  by  Nei l  Brenner,  then  is 
i t  possible  to  conceive  of  Eastle igh, 
Kampala  and  even  Dubai—places 
f rom  which  surpluses  of  t ime, 
energy  and  aspirat ion,  a longside 
capi ta l,  bodies  and  labour,  are 
drawn  out  and  reworked  to  produce 
the  volat i le  stochast ic i ty  of  South 
Sudan’ s  dusty  backwater  economy—
as  hinterlands  of  Juba ?  I f  this  is 
the  case,  where  exactly  does  this 
leave  us ? 
How  does  this  help  us  to 
understand  the  socia l,  imaginat ive 
and  mater ia l  processes  that  have 
made  Juba ?  My  interest  here  is 
what  these  precar ious  migrat ion 
c i rcui ts  I  descr ibe  te l l  us  more 
broadly  about  the  im /possibi l i ty 
of  work  and  desires  for  autonomy 
within  the  region ? 
Let  me  begin  with  Mart in,  a 
middle-aged  father  of  four. 
Or ig inal ly  f rom  Kampala,  he  faced 
a  l i fe  of  just  making  ends  meet  as 
a  storekeeper.  Af ter  rent,  school 
fees  and  medical  expenses  he 
wasn’ t  able  to  save  any  mo ney. 
Recognizing  that  he  was  unable  to 
progress  economical ly  in  Uganda, 
Mart in  star ted  to  think  about 
opt ions.  South  Sudan  presented 
i tse l f  as  a  viable  opt ion,  a  place 
where  he  arr ived  expect ing 
“to  get  something  good” .  Juba 
wasn’ t  Mart in’ s  in i t ia l  choice 
of  dest inat ion,  but  i ts  locat ion 
re lat ive  to  Uganda—he  descr ibed  i t 
as  being  in  the  “neighbourhood” —
and  the  ease  of  arranging  entry 
made  i t  appeal ing. 
At  the  t ime  Mart in  made  his 
decis ion  to  migrate,  ta les  of 
Juba’ s  possibi l i t ies  c i rculated 
in  the  c i t ies  of  East  Afr ica  l ike 
rumours  of  El  Dorado.  St i l l,  when 
he  arr ived  in  2009 ,  Mart in  had 
a  d i f f icul t  go  of  i t,  remaining 
without  stable  income  for  nearly 
a  year.  Eventual ly,  he  was  able  to 
save  up  enough  money  to  buy  a 
Chinese  motorcycle.  From  what 
he  earned  using  i t  as  a  taxi,  he 
was  then  able  to  set  up  a  smal l 
outdoor  food  sta l l  that  se l ls 
chicken  and  chips.  Now,  he  spends 
his  mornings  cutt ing  up  chicken 
that  his  wife  and  a  couple  of 
other  partners  wi l l  la ter  cook  at 
the  restaurant.  His  a f ternoons  are 
spent  dr iving  his  motorcycle  taxi 
to  earn  a  b i t  more  and  even  out 
his  income.  What  he  l ikes  about 
this  arrangement,  he  explains, 
is  that  he  is  the  one  who  sets 
the  condit ion  of  his  labour,  who 
decides  how  and  when  he  wi l l 
work.  While  he  admits  that  there 
are  some  di f f icul t ies  doing  in 
business  in  Juba,  he  has  indeed 
found  something  good. 
Mart in’ s  exper iences  are 
exemplary  of  many  migrants  to 
Juba  f rom  East  Afr ica  —they  are 
pr imari ly  f rom  Kenya  and  Uganda, 
but  a lso  Tanzania,  Rwanda  and 
Burundi.  Many  of  the  migrants  I 
spoke  with  sa id  that  South  Sudan 
was  an  easier  environment  in 
which  to  star t  a  business,  e i ther 
because  the  capi ta l  needs  for  an 
informal  business  were  not  high, 
or  because  there  was  not  as  much 
compet i t ion  as  in  their  home 
countr ies.  Most  were  repatr iat ing 
their  earnings,  using  them  to 
subsidize  socia l  reproduct ion  in 
their  places  of  or ig in,  but  with 
an  eye  towards  earning  enough  in 
the  long  run  to  be  able  to  make 
star t ing  a  business  at  home  a 
viable  prospect. 
As  they  earned  a  l iving  in  Juba, 
their  c i rculat ions  home  and 
back  again,  their  capture  and 
revert ing  of  mater ia l  ga ins  to  their 
places  of  or ig in  can  be  seen  as 
the  beginning  of  a  lay  process  of 
weaving  South  Sudan,  or  a t  least 
Juba,  into  the  economic  l i fe  of  the 
region.  Risky  as  i t  was,  the  prof i ts 
made  in  Juba  were  recirculated 
into  the  t rappings  and  dist inct ions 
of  c lass  status—post-secondary 
school  fees  for  chi ldren,  for 
example,  or  land  purchases  and 
home  bui lding  pro jects.
But  there  were  other  types  of 
c i rculat ions  that  drew  in  resources 
f rom  much  further  af ie ld.  These 
condensed  in  the  t rajector ies  of 
those  whose  interests  in  Juba 
were  economic,  but  not  only  so. 
The  Darfur i  e lectronics  dealers, 
Er i t rean  hotel iers  or  Somal is 
br ining  in  the  construct ion 
mater ia ls  ( rebar  and  cement, 
petrol  and  i ron  sheet ing )  used  to 
bui ld  this  c i ty  f rom  scratch  a l l 
have  dist inct  t rajector ies.  What  is 
part icularly  remarkable  about  this 
group  of  migrants  is  that  many  of 
them  choose  Juba  despi te  having 
other  opt ions.  While  they  might 
otherwise  qual i fy  for  refugee 
protect ion,  they  nevertheless 
re jected  that  designat ion  in 
order  to  pursue  ful ler  and  more 
autonomous  l ives  in  a  r isk-f i l led 
c i ty  at  the  margins  of  East  Afr ica. 
And  these  migrants  drew  on  other, 
broader  networks  and  knowledge 
economies  in  making  the  decis ion 
to  migrate,  to  invest,  and,  indeed, 
to  bui ld  Juba. 
Take  Yemane,  for  example. 
Yemane  used  to  run  a  business 
import ing  car  batter ies  f rom 
Dubai  to  Asmara,  but  a  few  years 
ago  was  cal led  by  a  re lat ive  who 
told  him  that  there  were  good 
business  opportunit ies  in  Juba. 
For  the  moment,  he  was  running 
an  internet  café  just  up  the  road 
f rom  the  universi ty.  His  shop 
of fered  not  only  net  access,  but 
a lso  pr int ing  and  word  processing 
by  the  page  or  the  minute. 
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The new Standard Guage Railway running between 
Nairobi and Mombasa arrives at Nairobi Station. 
The service became operational in May 2017. 
The Chinese built connection runs over 
472 Kilometers.  Photo: SIMON MAINA/AFP/GETTY 
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Business  was  not  so  br isk,  but  he 
was  holding  out  in  Juba  for  the 
meant ime,  laying  the  foundat ions 
for  b igger  plans. 
Once  things  returned  to  peace, 
Yemane  told  me,  he  was  planning 
to  partner  with  his  brother  who 
was  based  in  Birmingham  to  star t 
up  the  f i rst  recycl ing  faci l i ty 
in  the  country.  There  was  a  lot 
of  money  to  be  made  in  such  a 
venture,  he  assured  me.  He’ d 
a l ready  scoped  out  the  costs  of 
the  required  machinery.  Now  was 
a  t ime  to  wait  for  the  money  f rom 
his  brother,  and  for  the  pol i t ica l 
s i tuat ion  to  stabi l ize  a  b i t.  Then 
he  would  be  ready,  when  peace 
came.  When  I  asked  whether 
Yemane  thought  to  do  business 
in  Dubai  again,  or  t ry  for  Europe 
l ike  his  brother,  he  responded 
dismissively  saying  that  to  l ive  in 
Europe  is  to  be  spoon  fed,  t reated 
l ike  a  chi ld. 
He  dismissed  the  idea  of 
depending  on  socia l  benef i ts  in 
Europe,  insist ing  “We  are  human 
beings ! ”  Comfort,  a long  with 
digni ty  and  a  sense  of  purpose 
were  important  to  Yemane.  “I 
wa nt  to  b e—wha t  you  cal l  i t ? —
hardworking. ”  He  spoke  of 
owning  a  business,  not  s imply 
being  a  sa lary  earner.  Yemane’ s 
perspect ives  on  l i fe  in  Europe 
were  informed  by  information 
f rom  his  brother  in  England,  and 
a lso  his  wife,  who  now  l ived 
in  Sweden  with  their  chi ldren. 
Yemane,  l ike  many  others  I  spoke 
with,  expressed  distaste  for  the 
idea  of  l iving  as  a  dependent 
on  the  welfare  state,  for  the 
constra ints  of  l i fe  imposed  on 
refugees  both  in  the  region’ s 
camps  and  outside  i t.  A  return  to 
his  former  Dubai  t rading  venture 
was  s imilarly  ruled  out :  the  t ime 
for  that  had  passed.  There  were 
now  too  many  people  plying  that 
route. 
Yemane  was  not  a lone.  By  2015 , 
Somal i  and  Er i t rean  migrants 
made  up  a  s igni f icant  presence 
in  the  economic  l i fe  of  Juba, 
dominat ing  the  provis ion  of 
bui lding  mater ia ls,  petroleum,  dry 
goods,  a lcohol  and  hospi ta l i ty. 
In  interviews,  many  re jected 
the  c i rcumscr ibed  l ives  that 
would  be  avai lable  to  them  as 
refugees,  whether  in  the  north-
eastern  Afr ican  region  or  further 
af ie ld.  Most  were  able  to  draw  on 
t ransnat ional  family  networks 
to  jump-start  their  businesses  in 
Juba,  be  i t  f ront ing  high  rents  for  a 
shop,  bui lding  hotels,  subsidizing 
the  f i rst  purchase  of  goods  in 
Dubai,  Istanbul  or  Shenzhen,  or 
invest ing  in  nascent  industr ia l 
ventures  such  as  water  and  soda 
bott l ing  faci l i t ies,  recycl ing  plants 
and  heavy  machinery. 
There  are  c learly  s imilar i t ies 
in  the  t rajector ies  that  brought 
Mart in  and  Yemane  to  Juba—
both  took  a  hard  look  at  the 
broader  economic  and  pol i t ica l 
condit ions  at  home,  and  saw  l i t t le 
scope  for  expanding  their  f ie ld 
of  operat ions.  Both  considered 
other  dest inat ions  before  choosing 
Juba,  which  they  hoped  would 
become  the  new  Angola,  a  place 
to  stumble  into  a  quick  for tune. 
But  more  importantly,  perhaps, 
was  the  concept  of  agency :  sett ing 
one’ s  own  course,  arranging  one’ s 
l i fe  and  working  according  to 
one’ s  own  pr ior i t ies.  Within  the 
region,  i t  was  Juba,  more  than  any 
other  place  that  of fered  this  sense 
of  possibi l i ty,  a t  least  for  a  t ime.
By  2015 ,  the  a l lure  was  fading—
but,  by  then,  Juba  had  been 
i r reversibly  t ransformed.  Mult i-
storey  hotels  with  rooftop  cafes 
and  g lass-clad  shopping  mal ls 
f i l l  the  c i ty  skyl ine,  a longside  the 
skeletons  of  hal f-bui l t  bui ldings. 
As  the  r isks  of  operat ing  in 
Juba  have  grown,  only  the  most 
invested  migrants  remain—those 
who  have  committed  too  much 
to  Juba,  and  can’ t  walk  away.  But 
fewer  and  fewer  people  now  arr ive 
to  make  a  l i fe  in  this  get-r ich 
c i ty.  To  imagine  Juba  now,  f rom 
the  st reets  of  Nairobi,  is  to  think 
of  evacuat ion  f l ights  rather  than 
a l l  the  money  that  might  be  made 
there.  The  gold  rush  is  over.
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reconf igure  an  unusual ly 
central ized  s ingle-party  state.  In 
the  1990 s,  l iberal izat ion  of fered 
many  opportunit ies  for  pr ivate 
se l f-enrichment  previously  denied 
to  pol i t ic ians  under  f i rst  president 
Jul ius  Nyerere’ s  st r ic t  socia l ist 
Leadership  Code.  By  the  mid  2000 s, 
however,  i t  was  a lso  evident  that 
se l f-enrichment  was  necessary 
for  pol i t ica l  survival.  Under  the 
centr i fugal  pressure  of  mult i-party 
democracy,  a  form  of  compet i t ive 
rent-seeking  emerged  whereby 
e l i te  pol i t ic ians  sought  to  skim 
f lows  of  foreign  a id  and  investment 
through  fact ional ized   networks 
whi le  maintaining  a  façade  of 
democrat ic  accountabi l i ty. 
Race  has  played  a  complex  role 
in  this  ca lculus,  part icularly 
around  Tanzania’ s  energy  sector. 
Despi te  an  of f ic ia l ly  race-bl ind 
egal i tar ianism,  the  dominant  Party 
of  the  Revolut ion  ( CCM )  taci t ly 
persecuted  Asian  nat ionals  in  the 
1970 s  and  80 s.  A  ser ies  of  scandals 
in  the  2000 s  stoked  the  popular 
sense  that  CCM  was,  i ronical ly, 
now  col luding  with  weal thy  Asian 
businessmen  in  exchange  for 
f inancial  support.  In  response, 
CCM  pol i t ic ians  of ten  t r ied  to 
d isplace  this  racia l ised  f rustrat ion 
with  corrupt ion  onto  an  ant i-
western  cr i t ique  of  “foreigners” 
and  of  western-style  reform  in 
general.  For  their  part,  western 
companies  and  their  development 
partners,  who  are  st ruggl ing  to 
reta in  their  inf luence,  are  in  many 
respects  no  less  exploi tat ive,  but 
of ten  displace  this  uncomfortable 
fact  by  leaning  on  the  language  of 
good  governance,  a  language  that 
Here  I  focus  one  aspect  of  this 
history :  a  20 -year  deal  with 
Independent  Power  Tanzania 
Limited  ( IPTL )  and  Pan  Afr ican 
Power  Solut ions  Tanzania  Limited 
( PAP )  for  1 00 MW  of  d iesel-
generated  e lectr ic i ty.  Hai led  by 
so me  as  an  i nstance  o f  so uth-
south  col laborat ion,  denounced  by 
other  as  unpatr iot ic  corrupt ion, 
the  pro ject  has  been  embraced 
as  pragmatic  development 
and  resisted  as  neo-colonial 
exploi tat ion.  Whatever  the  precise 
t ruth,  IPTL’ s  and  PAP’ s  byzant ine 
t rajector ies  reveal  the  way  that 
for  over  a  century  Tanzanian 
governance  has  remained  a  ser ies 
of  compet i t ions  and  col laborat ions 
between  Afr icans,  Asians  and 
Euro-Americans,  a l l  jockeying  for 
posi t ion  a long  the  Swahi l i  coast.
By  the  late  1990 s,  decades  of 
mismanagement  and  under-
provisioning  had  lef t  Tanzania’ s 
hydroelectr ic  power  sector  in 
disrepair.  Amidst  prolonged  cycles 
of  drought  and  broader  plans 
for  pr ivat izat ion,  the  Ministry 
of  Energy  and  Minerals  ( MEM ) 
s igned  a  short-term  contract  for 
emergency,  d iesel-fueled  power 
with  the  re lat ively  unknown 
company  IPTL.  This  cur iously 
morphed  into  a  20 -year  Pr ivate 
Product ion  Agreement  ( PPA ) 
for  1 00 MW  of  d iesel-generated 
e lectr ic i ty,  thereby  s idel ining  an 
on-going  World  Bank-sponsored 
pro ject.  Worryingly,  the  pr ice  at 
which  IPTL  would  se l l  power  to 
Tanesco  was  to  be  calculated  af ter 
a  determinat ion  of  the  plant’ s 
capi ta l  costs.  The  World  Bank 
suspended  the  Songas  contract 
in  protest.  Independent  and 
opposi t ion  presses  publ ished 
a  good  deal  of  cr i t ic ism  on  the 
expensive  and  redundant  pro ject. 
i ronical ly  harkens  back  to  the 
pol i t ica l  vocabulary  of  socia l ist 
rect i tude. 
In  what  fol lows  I  sketch  these 
i ronies  as  they  have  played  out 
in  Tanzania’ s  part ia l ly  pr ivat ized 
energy  sector.  Tanzania  has 
enjoyed  over  a  decade  of  high 
GDP  growth,  but  as  many  cr i t ics 
have  observed  this  has  not 
t ranslated  into  to  a  golden  age 
of  “Afr ica  r is ing”  or  witnessed 
a  substant ia l  growth  in  the 
O
ne  of  the  most 
interest ing  aspects 
of  recent  Tanzanian 
history  is  the  way 
foreign  investment 
has  helped  to 
Tanzania’s  energy sector  has  been a  source  profit  and power 





The IPTL has 
been hailed by some 
as an instance of 
South-South 
collaboration, and 
denounced by others 
as unpatriotic 
corruption 
middle  c lass.  A  poignant  symbol 
of  this  d isconnect  is  Tanzania’ s 
e lectr ic i ty  supply,  which  has 
become  less  re l iable  and  more 
expensive  as  the  country’ s 
economic  and  cul tural  importance 
has  expanded.  The  roots  of 
this  impasse  l ie  in  20  years  of 
state  capture  of  energy  reform. 
Lucrat ive  contracts  with  pr ivate 
power  plants,  of ten  burning 
expensive  diesel  or  heavy  fuel 
o i l,  have  cr ippled  the  f iscal 
solvency  of  the  nat ional  power 
company,  Tanesco,  and  prevented 
re investment  in  i ts  physical  and 
inst i tut ional  st ructures. 
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shareholder  VIP  Engineer ing. 
VIP  was  composed  of  a  group  of 
Tanzanian-Asian  businessmen 
represented  by  James  Rugemal ira, 
a  former  Bank  of  Tanzania 
employee  and  pr ivate  sector 
representat ive  of  an  “indigenous” 
( wa z awa )  entrepreneur  associat ion. 
Many  minister ia l  e l i tes  supported 
the  deal,  including  future 
president  Jakaya  Kikwete.  This 
pro-IPTL  crowd  dismissed 
cr i t ic ism  as  opposi t ion  to 
south-south  cooperat ion  and  a 
conspiracy  on  the  part  of  “foreign 
agents”  ( reads :  World  Bank ) . 
One  of  IPTL’ s  most  vocal  cr i t ics 
has  been  Br ian  Cooksey,  a 
sociologist,  consul tant  and 
occasional  invest igat ive  journal ist. 
In  1998  let ter  to  the  A f r i c a n , 
Cooksey  was  dubbed  a  racist 
with  a  “pathological  hatred  of 
south-south  cooperat ion, ”  and 
further  descr ibed  as  possessing 
“derogatory  tendencies  towards 
Afr ican  governments,  leaders 
and  i ts  people” .  Wri t ing  in  2002 , 
Cooksey  descr ibed  how  he  had 
var iously  been  referred  to  as  a 
“dangerous  underground  advisor, ” 
“sel f-  appointed  energy  expert, ” 
“tax-evader, ”  “unl icensed 
gemstone  dealer, ”  and  “a 
f requenter  of  a  d isreputable  Dar  es 
Salaam  dance  hal l” . 
In  some  respects,  Cooksey’ s 
whiteness  served  as  rhetor ical 
d isplacement  of  ant i-Asian 
discourse  that  had  put  CCM  on 
the  back  foot  ideological ly.  I t 
a l igns  indigenous  businessmen—
both  Asian-  and  Afr ican-
Tanzanian  nat ionals—within  a 
broader  south-south  ecumene  by 
t r iangulat ing  them  against  neo-
colonial  inter ference  of  the  World 
Bank  and  i ts  supposed  lackeys, 
embodied  here  in  the  f igure  of  the 
louche  expat.  Hence  on  one  hand 
i t  t ies  together  famil iar  socia l ist 
themes  of   st rategic  f r iendship, 
racia l  egal i tar ianism  and  ant i-
western  se l f-rel iance.  But  instead 
of  invoking  these  deals  in  the 
name  of  the  wa n a n c h i  ( c i t izens ) , 
the  new  vict ims  in  this  rhetor ic 
are  Asian /Afr ican  businessmen 
and  “leaders. ”  Western  actors 
such  as  the  World  Bank,  foreign 
press  and  donors  responded  by 
cr i t ic is ing  IPTL  in  moral iz ing 
language  that  recal led  Nyerere’ s 
r ighteousness. 
I f  nothing  e lse,  these  i ronic 
inversions  and  t ransposi t ions 
invi te  us  to  rethink  the  way 
history  is  exper ienced  a long  the 
East  Afr ican  coast.  Instead  of  stark 
breaks  separat ing  moral  socia l ism 
from  amoral  neol iberal ism,  or 
f rom  western  a id  to  eastern  t rade, 
regional  history  in  what  came 
to  be  Tanzania  might  be  better 
seen  as  shi f t ing  conf igurat ions 
of  three,  enduring  socio-pol i t ica l 
or ientat ions.  Because  of  i ts  rac ia l 
segregat ion,  Dar  es  Salaam  is 
sometimes  cal led  mji  wa  rangi  ta tu 
( “a  c i ty  of  three  colours” ) ,  and  we 
might  extend  this  t r ichotomy  to 
nat ional  pol i t ics  a t  large.
First ly,  there  is  the  force 
and  a l lure  of  western-style 
technocrat ic  development, 
or ig inal ly  exempli f ied  in  white 
colonists.  Secondly,  there  is 
entrepreneuria l  l iberty  and 
accumulat ive  possibi l i ty 
exempli f ied  in   “coasta l” 
merchants.  Thirdly,  there  is  the 
moral  legi t imacy  of  Afr ican 
indigenei ty,  exempli f ied  in  neo-
customary,  gerontocrat ic  chiefs. 
In  the  independence  per iod,  the 
The  IPTL  deal  exempli f ied  the 
ethno-racia l  d imensions  of 
l iberal izat ion.  By  the  late  1980 s, 
donor  pressure  and  a  prolonged 
economic  cr is is  moved  the  state 
to  accept  a  host  of  st ructural 
adjustment  reforms.  Under 
Nyerere’ s  successor,  President 
Al i  Hassan  Mwinyi  ( 1986 - 95 ) , 
the  state  deregulated  i ts  currency 
and  l iberal ized  imports.  This 
shi f ted  the  incent ive  st ructure  for 
nat ional  e l i tes.  Instead  of  re lying 
on  access  to  the  resources  and 
prest ige  of  government  posi t ions, 
agg ressive  vi g o g o  ( t ree  t runks ) 
accrued  rents  on  import-export 
t rade,  real  estate  and  divest i ture 
of  parastata ls.  Wel l-developed 
t rade  networks  meant  that 
many  otherwise  marginal ized 
Tanzanian-Asian  businessmen 
were  suddenly  wel l  posi t ioned  to 
jo i n  these  ol igarchic  a l l iances.
Fi t t ing  this  prof i le,  IPTL  was  a 
jo int  venture  between  Mechmar 
Corporat ion  of  Malaysia 
and  minori ty  Tanzanian 
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new  Tanzanian  state  inher i ted  the 
colonial  st rategy  of  merging  the 
f i rst  and  third,  whi le  suppressing 
the  second.  That  is,  i t  combined 
moral  author i ty  ( previously 
reserved  for  colonial ly-employed 
chiefs )  with  bureaucrat ic  power 
( previously  monopol ized  by 
white  missionary  schools  and 
Afr ican  c lerks ) ,  and  cont inued  to 
c i rcumscr ibe  the  power  of  coasta l 
t raders  begun  under  colonial ism. 
These  categor ies  soon  hardened 
into  the  taci t ly  racia l ised  logic 
of  nat ional  c i t izenship,  in  which 
Asian  and  Arab  t raders  became 
c i rcum-Indian  Ocean  others  who 
were  not  ful ly  part  of  the  pol i ty. 
In  some  sense  the  histor ical 
energy  of  the  post-socia l ist  era 
revolves  around  the  way  Afr ican 
legi t imacy,  western  development 
and  Asian  entrepreneuria l  l iberty 
a l l  became  kale idoscopical ly 
reconf igured.  The  emboldened 
vi g o g o  e l i te  pursued  their 
accumulat ive  schemes  under  the 
rhe tor ical  banner  of  a  south-
south  developmental ism  that, 
they  c la imed,  could  r ival  the  west. 
Western  donors,  whose  words 
carr ied  far  less  weight  in  the  face 
of  a l ternat ive  sources  of  funding 
and  patronage,  leaned  on  the 
language  “good  governance”  as  a 
kind  of  proxy  moral  legi t imacy. 
Indigenous  Afr ican  businessmen 
played  both  s ides.  Some,  l ike 
James  Rugemal ira,  ra i led  against 
the  patronizing  manager ia l ism 
of  western  donors,  c la iming  the 
r ight  of  personal  enr ichment  and 
posing  as  suppressed  captains  of 
industry  in  the  making.  Others 
in  the  opposi t ion  decr ied  CCM, 
point ing  to  the  dubious  inf luence 
of  Asian  capi ta l,  and  against  i t 
c la imed  the  pol i t ica l  leg i t imacy 
of  pr ivi leging  Afr ican  nat ionals  in 
business.  These  new  combinat ions 
interacted  with  old  associat ions  to 
create  shi f t ing  a l l iances. 
IPTL  entered  into  a  near  decade-
long  ser ies  of  legal  batt les  with 
Tanesco,  beginning  with  the 
a l legat ion  that  IPTL  had  inf lated 
tenders  and  br ibed  ministers 
to  push  i ts  contract  through. 
Nevertheless,  by  2005 ,  i t  had 
come  onl ine  and  represented 
a  s igni f icant  t ransformation 
of  the  nat ional  gr id.  Thermal 
sources  ( natural  gas  and  diesel ) 
came  to  out-supply  hydropower, 
compris ing  over  50 %  of  a l l  power 
produced.  Financial ly,  Tanesco 
cont inued  to  operate  at  a  loss, 
sometimes  paying  wel l  over  hal f 
i ts  revenue  for  plant  fuel  and 
capaci ty  charges.
In  2005  Standard  Chartered  Bank 
Hong  Kong  ( SCB-HK )  purchased 
IPTL’ s  d ist ressed  $ 120 -  mil l ion 
debt.  The  same  year,  Tanesco 
opened  up  a  second  case  against 
IPTL,  accusing  i t  o f  miscalculat ing 
capaci ty  charges.  Tanesco’ s 
recurr ing  payments  to  IPTL 
were  put  in  a  deed  or  escrow 
account  unt i l  a  judgment  could 
be  reached  by  the  Internat ional 
Centre  for  Sett lement  of 
Investment  Disputes.  As  of  2013 , 
the  escrow  had  bal looned  to  over 
$ 122 -mil l ion.  In  2014 ,  Rugemal ira 
i l legal ly  t ransferred  IPTL’ s  shares 
to  an  unknown  company  cal led 
Pan  Afr ican  Power  ( PAP ) ,  over 
SCB-HK’ s  object ions.  Then,  with 
the  apparent  col lusion  of  members 
of  the  cabinet,  parl iament  and 
Tanesco,  the  disputed  escrow 
monies  were  t ransferred  to  PAP 
as  wel l.  I t  was  la ter  a l leged 
in  a  parl iamentary  report  that 
Rugelamira  had  donated  much 
of  that  money  to  var ious  CCM 
ministers  and  e l i tes.
PAP  is  owned  by  Harbinder  Singh 
Sethi.  Born  in  1958  in  I r inga,  a 
town  in  the  southern  highlands 
of  Tanzania,  Sethi  moved  to 
Kenya  in  1980 s  dur ing  Tanzania’ s 
socia l ist  ant i-Asian  postur ing. 
There  he  f lour ished  as  a  f inancier 
connected  to  the  pol i t ica l ly 
powerful  Moi  family.  His 
subsequent  return  to  Tanzania  was 
marked  by  two  decades  o f  gradual 
re incorporat ion  of  t ransnat ional 
Indian  Ocean  f inancial  networks 
into  the  pol i t ica l  apparatus. 
Moreover,  as  with  the  f i rst  round 
of  controversy  nearly  20  years 
ago,  the  Asian  dynamics  of  the 
scandal  were  an  uncomfortable 
and  palpable  subtext. 
The  Sikh  temple  in  Dar  es  Salaam 
defended  Singh  in  the  press  dur ing 
PAP’ s  court  batt les. 
For  his  part,  S ingh  and  IPTL 
promptly  donated  to  var ious 
churches,  pol ice  stat ions,  schools 
and  other  char i table  causes  to 
s ignal  nat ional ist  bona  f ides.  In 
another  paral le l,  Rugemal i ra  and 
IPTL  ( now  IPTL-PAP )  redirected 
ant i-Asian  sent iment  to  ant i-
foreigner  sent iment.  IPTL-PAP 
issued  a  statement  accusing  the 
cal l  for  invest igat ions  into  the 
escrow  issue  as  a  pl oy  to  help  a 
“foreign  bank”  col lect  a  f raudulent 
debt  at  the  expense  of  a  heroic 
Tanzanian  investor. 
As  of  June  of  2017 ,  S ingh  and 
Rugemal ira  have  been  arrested 
and  charged  with  “economic 
sabotage, ”  a  socia l ist-style 
prosecut ion  that  bore  the  imprint 
of  the  2015  president ia l  e lect ion. 
John  Maguful i’ s  administrat ion 
quickly  adopted  a  nat ional ist 
posture  and  a  ser ies  of  bul l ish 
ant i-corrupt ion  campaigns. 
These  might  be  understood 
as  symbol ic  react ions  to  the 
t ransnat ional  rent-seeking  of  the 
Kikwete  administrat ion  and  the 
unpopular i ty  i t  caused  CCM.  But 
whether  Sing  and  Rugemal ira  wi l l 
be  convicted,  and  whether  IPTL-
PAP  contract  wi l l  be  cancel led, 
remains  to  be  seen.  
In  some  ways  the  part ia l 
real ignment  of  an  East  Afr ican 
government  away  f rom  the 
west  towards  c i rcum-Indian 
Ocean  networks  of  economic 
power  harkens  back  to  the  la te 
nineteenth  century,  the  last  major 
histor ical  era  of  a  l iberal ized 
economy.  During  that  per iod, 
Indian  Ocean  merchants,  white 
colonizers,  and  autochthonous 
leaders  a l l  formed  f luid  a l l iances 
as  they  jockeyed  for  posi t ion 
within  an  unstable  regional 
hegemony.  Today,  just  as  the 
part ia l  pr ivat izat ion  of  Tanzania’ s 
gr id  speaks  to  polycentr ic 
arrangements  of  capi ta l  and 
technology  that  t ranscend  the 
consol idat ion  of  the  nat ion-
state,  the  ol igarchies  that  prof i t 
f rom  such  arrangements  echo 
earl ier  pol i t ica l  formations.  What 
perhaps  has  changed  is  the  power 
of  racia l ised  discourses  to  f ix, 
f rame,  and  just i fy  the  winners 
and  losers  in  this  d ispensat ion. 
Ul t imately,  though,  the  t roubled 
state  of  Tanzania’ s  power  gr id  can 
be  painted  in  no  s ingle  colour. 
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“An important  starting point  in  thinking about  the  role  of  infrastructure  in 
‘inhabiting the  corridor’  might  be  Marshall  Berman’s  ‘All  that  is  Solid  Melts 
into  the  Air’  and the  contradictions  enrolled  in  the  creative  destruction 
implicit  in  modernisation.  It  leaves  us  asking how we consider  the  dialectic 
of  modernity  across  the  second wave of  urbanisation,  of  which the  Indian 
Ocean is  a  crucial  geographical-historical  axis.  Most  pertinently  what  does 
being an East  African mean in  the  context  of  rapid  urban transformation, 
surging economies  and new territorial  formations.  One way of  teasing apart 
such new geographies  is  through a  consideration of  the  paradoxes  incased 
in  the  multiple  infrastructures  of  this  modernisation.   Here  we can see 
‘infrastructures  on the  run’  as  a  generative  process  of  creative  destruction 
into  varied forms of  networked l i fe.  These  dynamics  simultaneously  create 
connections  and displacements,  extractions  and everyday material  f lows, 
movement  and resistance.” 
W O R D S  &  P H O T O - E S S A Y  B Y  J O N  S I L V E R
P H O T O
Demands for water show infrastructure as key site for urban politics in Kiberia, Nairobi (2015)
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P H O T O
The mobile materialities of resistance during the Uganda election in Kabalagala, Kampala (2016)
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The Indian Ocean economy is creating new logistical infrastructure at the port in Zanzibar City (2014)
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Alternative water distribution system beyond the pipeline in Nairobi (2015)
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Waste collection covers the market but not the housing in Namuwongo, Kampala (2016)
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Large scale electrification provides one way to connect in Kiberia, Nairobi, (2015)
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Ordinary people,  his  interviews 
revealed,  share  the  same dream 
of  what  the  future  city  wil l  look 
l ike  as  the  “big  people”  who wil l 
benefit  from its  real isat ion.  “Yes, 
we wil l  be  the  vict ims,”  De Boeck 
generical ly  quotes  the  farmers,  “but 
st i l l  i t  wil l  be  beautiful.”  De Boeck 
argues  that  for  Kinshasa,  a  shared 
longing for  a  better  ci ty  offers  “a 
new space that  escapes  from the 
real  order  of  things”—while  the  new 
city  remains  an out-of-reach dream 
for  poor  Congolese,  i ts  signif icance 
l ies  in  i ts  imaginative  effects. 
In  Isiolo,  LAPSSET also  has 
imaginative  effects.  Ekal  and Echwa 
told  me that  Isiolo  Resort  City 
would be  “smart” .  But  although 
thus  far  largely  elusive  as  material 
fact,  the  anticipation of  LAPSSET 
is  already having very material 
effects.  Isiolo  is  expanding at  i ts 
edges,  including into  i ts  outskirts 
into  places  where  people  l ike 
Ekal  and Echwa l ive.  While  i t  is 
true  that  LAPSSET’s  imaginative 
effects  are  constituted by escapist 
dreams and fantasies,  the  project 
has  also  been met  with a  degree  of 
suspicion and apprehension.  These 
suspicions  index the historical ly 
fraught  relat ionship between 
locals  and national  government, 
as  well  as  local  ethnic  tensions 
and poli t ical  competit ion among 
Isiolo’s  diverse  cultural  groups. 
This  combination of  affective 
responses  to  LAPSSET is  generative 
of  and regenerated through an 
“economy of  anticipation”—a term 
anthropologist  Jamie Cross  uses 
to  describe  the  processes  through 
which anticipated special  economic 
zones  take shape in  India.  Isiolo’s 
economy of  anticipation is 
primari ly  manifest ing  in  the  cutt ing 
and claiming of  land around the 
town’s  edges. 
being sold  by a  hawker  outside 
Isiolo’s  Catholic  Mission.  How does 
the  circulation of  such words  and 
images  about  the  future  work on 
the present?
This  essay draws on 12  months 
of  ethnographic  f ieldwork in 
Isiolo,  a  diverse  town of  about 
60,000 people  si tuated at 
the  interface  between fert i le 
highlands in  central  Kenya and 
the desert  lowlands of  the  north. 
Long neglected by colonial  and 
post-independence government 
administrat ions,  Isiolo  has  in 
recent  years  been reframed through 
the LAPSSET plans  as  a  “new 
frontier”  for  economic growth. 
The project  is  framed around 
an oi l  pipel ine  and transport 
infrastructure  wil l  l ink oi l  f ields 
in  South Sudan with a  new port  at 
Lamu,  spanning the vast  terr i tory 
of  northern Kenya,  which has 
long been excluded from national 
development.  Isiolo  features  as 
a  key node along the road and 
rai lway corridor.  Once nicknamed 
mwish o  wa  l a m i  (“the end of  the 
tarmac”),  Isiolo  is  expected to 
host  various  “value-adding” 
projects,  including an international 
airport,  modern abattoir  and new 
city  project  in  the  “belly”  of  the 
mountains  pointed out  by Ekal.
In  recent  years,  scholars  have 
paused on glossy images  of 
Dubai-esque cit ies  in  Africa 
with streamlined infrastructures 
and ref lected upon the agency 
of  these  images,  which seem 
so far-removed from African 
real i t ies.  Many f ind that  they 
are  surprisingly  seductive  to 
ordinary people,  even those  l ikely 
to  be  excluded by the projects. 
In  2011,  anthropologist  Fi l ip  De 
Boeck wrote  about  interviews 
he conducted with farmers  in 
Kinshasa facing evict ion from an 
area  designated for  a  large  gated 
community,  La  Cité  du Fleuve. 
I
n November  2014,  I 
met  Ekal  and Echwa, 
a  young Turkana 
couple  carrying their 
small  child  along 





Property  speculation is  not  the  preserve  of  el i tes,  as  events  in 
a  northern Kenyan town suggest
H A N N A H  E L L I O T T
runs  north through Isiolo,  a  town 
roughly 300km north of  Nairobi. 
The road wil l,  one day,  reach 
Ethiopia.  Ekal  and Echwa l ived 
in  a  settlement  f ive  ki lometres 
northeast  of  Isiolo  that  was 
inhabited mostly  by settled 
Turkana pastoral ists  and their 
l ivestock.  They were  returning 
home from the local  hospital 
where  they had taken their  sick 
child.  As  we walked,  Ekal  pointed 
towards  the  mountains  that  r ise  up 
out  of  f lat  plains  about  20km west 
of  Isiolo.  “All  of  that  bel ly,”  he 
said,  referring  to  the  curved shape 
made by one of  the  mountain 
faces,  “wil l  be  skyscrapers.”  The 
area  he pointed to  was the si te 
for  the  Isiolo  Resort  City,  which 
forms part  of  plans  for  the  larger 
Lamu Port  South Sudan Ethiopia 
Transport  (LAPSSET)  corridor.  He 
had seen images  of  the  unbuilt  c i ty 
on a  calendar. 
On a  visi t  to  the  mountains  a 
month earl ier,  I  had found nothing 
to  indicate  the  rudiments  of  a 
ci ty.  The area  lacked even a  fence 
to  bound the si te.  Nevertheless, 
words  and images  about  LAPSSET 
were  commonplace in  Isiolo.  The 
media  published renderings  of 
unbuilt  infrastructures  appearing 
in  the  project  plans,  and local 
NGOs held  seminars  to  “sensit ize” 
communities.  The PowerPoint 
presentations  at  these  seminars 
also  showed computer-generated 
renderings  of  the  resort  ci ty, 
along with budgeted sums for  the 
infrastructure  and projections  of 
future  population f igures.  I  too 
came across  glossy calendars 
detai l ing  the  main features  and 
route  of  the  LAPSSET corridor 
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Ordinary people,  his  interviews 
revealed,  share  the  same dream 
of  what  the  future  city  wil l  look 
l ike  as  the  “big  people”  who wil l 
benefit  from its  real isat ion.  “Yes, 
we wil l  be  the  vict ims,”  De Boeck 
generical ly  quotes  the  farmers,  “but 
st i l l  i t  wil l  be  beautiful.”  De Boeck 
argues  that  for  Kinshasa,  a  shared 
longing for  a  better  ci ty  offers  “a 
new space that  escapes  from the 
real  order  of  things”—while  the  new 
city  remains  an out-of-reach dream 
for  poor  Congolese,  i ts  signif icance 
l ies  in  i ts  imaginative  effects. 
In  Isiolo,  LAPSSET also  has 
imaginative  effects.  Ekal  and Echwa 
told  me that  Isiolo  Resort  City 
would be  “smart” .  But  although 
thus  far  largely  elusive  as  material 
fact,  the  anticipation of  LAPSSET 
is  already having very material 
effects.  Isiolo  is  expanding at  i ts 
edges,  including into  i ts  outskirts 
into  places  where  people  l ike 
Ekal  and Echwa l ive.  While  i t  is 
true  that  LAPSSET’s  imaginative 
effects  are  constituted by escapist 
dreams and fantasies,  the  project 
has  also  been met  with a  degree  of 
suspicion and apprehension.  These 
suspicions  index the historical ly 
fraught  relat ionship between 
locals  and national  government, 
as  well  as  local  ethnic  tensions 
and poli t ical  competit ion among 
Isiolo’s  diverse  cultural  groups. 
This  combination of  affective 
responses  to  LAPSSET is  generative 
of  and regenerated through an 
“economy of  anticipation”—a term 
anthropologist  Jamie Cross  uses 
to  describe  the processes  through 
which anticipated special  economic 
zones  take shape in  India.  Isiolo’s 
economy of  anticipation is 
primari ly  manifest ing  in  the  cutt ing 
and claiming of  land around the 
town’s  edges. 
Among locals,  the  LAPSSET 
project  is  perceived by many as 
the  latest  in  a  series  of  plots  by 
a  coercive national  government 
bent  on appropriat ing  land and 
resources  from northerners.  This 
relates,  in  part,  to  the  posit ioning 
of  the  LAPSSET route  and the 
clustering of  projects  around 
the town—areas  which have 
historical ly  been disputed with 
neighbouring Meru County,  a 
larger  consti tuency than Isiolo 
with greater  poli t ical  importance 
to  the  national  government.  In  the 
context  of  the  recent  devolution 
of  government  in  Kenya,  the 
precise  location of  the  LAPSSET 
infrastructures  wil l  determine 
which county government  benefits 
from the projects,  in  terms of 
revenue,  employment,  contracts 
and opportunit ies  for  patronage 
and poli t ical  reproduction.  The 
new airport  offers  a  good example: 
i ts  terminal  buildings  and control 
towers  are  in  Isiolo  County while 
i ts  runway extends into  Meru. 
There  are  also  anxieties  around 
attempts  by the national 
government  to  “adjudicate”  land 
in  northern Kenya to  “make 
ownership clearer”  ahead of 
LAPSSET.  Title  to  land in  Isiolo 
remains  legal ly  insecure.  I t 
has  tentatively  been classif ied 
“community  land” under  the 
Community  Land Bil l,  a  draft 
piece  of  legislat ion st i l l  under 
debate  in  parl iament.  Isiolans 
note  that  land is  in  short  supply 
in  neighbouring Meru County,  and 
worry that  Isiolo,  as  one of  the 
country’s  last  land frontiers,  wil l 
be  the  start ing  point  of  a  rush on 
northern land.  The Isiolo  County 
government  has  attempted to 
stal l  land adjudication attempts 
by the national  government 
and hold  out  for  the  new bil l. 
There  are  concerns  that  delays 
in  the  bi l l’s  passing could offer 
a  “window of  opportunity”  for 
the  acquisit ion and privatization 
of  land by “influential”  people 
with connections  to  the  national 
government.
Jamie Cross  argues  that  planning 
as  a  “mode of  anticipation” comes 
into  productive  tension with other 
kinds  of  anticipatory practice,  “as 
diverse  communities  of  people 
work towards  futures  that  improve 
upon the present”.  Rumours 
circulate  in  Isiolo  that  “big 
people”  l ike  Jimmy Kibaki,  a  son 
of  Kenya’s  former  president  Mwai 
Kibaki,  and Martha Karua,  a  former 
just ice  minister  and long-standing 
parl iamentarian for  a  central 
Kenyan constituency,  acquired land 
around the si te  of  the  proposed 
resort  ci ty  prior  to  the  LAPSSET 
projects  being announced.  This 
anticipation propelled a  rush on 
land by a  diversity  of  ordinary 
cit izens.  While  many land 
acquisit ions  are  by middle-class 
investors  from Isiolo  and beyond, 
poor  townspeople  tend to  be  at  the 
forefront  of  this  process,  cutt ing 
and claiming land at  the  town’s 
peripheries  before  the  bigger 
people  arr ive. 
Property  speculation is  not  the 
preserve of  el i tes.  One day,  in 
Isiolo’s  town centre,  I  bumped into 
Guyo,  a  Borana man and father  of 
four  who l ives  in  a  neighbourhood 
in  the  north of  the  town and is 
employed on a  casual  basis  as  a 
watchman.  “Don’t  you want  land 
here?”  he asked,  as  he  invited 
me to  join  him in  a  col lective 
acquisit ion.  He projected that 
within f ive  years  Isiolo  would be 
a  ci ty  and l ivestock compounds 
would be  a  thing of  the  past. 
deals  and of  privi leging i ts  Borana 
constituents  l iving in  the  town. 
This  suspicion has  given r ise  to 
similar  anticipatory practices 
among other  ethnic  groups.  Regina, 
an elderly  Turkana woman who 
l ived in  a  disintegrating mud house 
in  a  vi l lage  northeast  of  Isiolo,  was 
one such part icipant.  The vi l lage 
where  she l ived had init ial ly 
been settled by poor  Turkana and 
Samburu pastoral ists,  but  was  now 
quickly developing into  a  middle-
class  neighbourhood as  well-off 
residents  of  Isiolo  (and beyond) 
acquired plots  and built  stone 
houses. 
Regina was at  r isk  of  losing the 
plot  she l ived on as  a  wealthy 
northern Kenyan had claimed the 
land;  he  maintained that  i t  had 
been al located to  him long ago by 
the former  Isiolo  County Council. 
During a  visi t,  Regina told  me that 
she had acquired a  new plot  at  the 
edge of  the  area  to  the  northeast 
of  Isiolo  town,  not  far  from where 
Ekal  and Echwa l ive.  Regina 
described how she,  together  with 
a  large  number  of  other  Turkana 
from Isiolo,  had rushed to  cut  land 
there,  afraid  that  others  would get 
there  f irst.  “Isiolo  wil l  be  Nairobi,” 
she explained.  “Borana want  to 
make Isiolo  theirs  …” 
In  February 2017,  a  national 
dai ly  announced that  Isiolo  could 
lose  i ts  resort  ci ty  owing to  the 
recommendations  of  Kenya’s 
National  Environment  Management 
Authority,  which pointed to  the 
fact  that  the  proposed si te  was  a 
corridor  for  wildl i fe.  The art icle 
did  not  ref lect  on any thwarted 
opportunit ies  for  development  or 
employment  should Isiolo  lose  the 
project,  but  noted that  i t  would 
have “major  ramifications”  for 
thousands of  speculators  who had 
acquired land in  the  area.  Some 
commentators  have suggested 
that  the  making of  speculative 
economies  in  land becomes part 
of  the  logic  of  wildly  ambitious 
development  projects  in  places  l ike 
Kenya.  Perhaps.  Whether  Isiolo’s 
ci ty  of  the  future  manifests  or  not, 
i t  seems l ikely  that  this  northern 
Kenyan town wil l  continue 
expanding and being cut  at  i ts 
edges.  As  Kenyans seek out  new 
investment  opportunit ies,  and as 
land in  neighbouring central  Kenya 
becomes increasingly  scarce,  i t 
seems unlikely  that  Isiolo  wil l 
lose  i ts  branding as  the  gateway to 
Kenya’s  “new frontier”  any t ime 
soon.  
There are also anxieties 
around attempts by the 
national government 
to “adjudicate” land 
in northern Kenya 
to “make ownership 
clearer”
In  his  thirt ies,  Guyo was a  member 
of  a  registered youth group that 
was  concerned with ‘development’ 
issues  such as  HIV/AIDS 
awareness,  but  was  also  active  in 
the  acquisit ion of  land.  The group 
had claimed a  large  piece  of  land 
northeast  of  Isiolo  town,  which 
they divided into  plots.  Guyo spoke 
about  preserving his  plot  for  his 
children,  but  added that  he  would 
consider  sel l ing  i t  i f  prices,  already 
soaring,  rose  any higher. 
Guyo then mentioned said  that 
he  was part  of  another  group 
that  had acquired several  large 
pieces  of  land in  an area  further 
out  of  the  town.  Notably,  both 
groups were  made up of  fel low 
Borana.  Members  of  other  ethnic 
groups in  Isiolo  suspected that 
a  Borana-dominated county 
government  supported these  land 
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atmosphere  of  the  t ime.  Like 
a l l  o ther  reposi tor ies  of  h istory, 
monuments  legi t imate  and  s i lence 
part icular  c la ims,  depending 
on  the  pol i t ica l  context  of  the 
moment.
In  a  s i tuat ion  of  recovery  af ter 
violence,  a  quest  for  independence 
f rom  Somal ia-Mogadishu  and  a 
search  for  a  def ini t ive  ident i ty  for 
the  people  of  Somal i land,  what  are 
the  monuments  in  Hargeisa—the 
capi ta l  c i ty,  and  centre  of  cul tural, 
pol i t ica l  and  economic  act ivi ty—
saying ?
The  c i tyscape  of  Hargeisa  includes 
f ive  large  monuments.  The  best 
known  is  Ta a l a d a  Xo r iya d d a  iyo  D a l 
J i rka  D a h s o o n  ( Statue  of  Liberty, 
or  Country  Not  Yet  Discovered ) , 
which  features  the  Mi G.  The  others 
are  Ka a re ,  a  repl ica  of  a  f ighter 
tanker  in  Togdheer  Area ;  the 
dove  or  peace  monument ;  S a n a d 
G u u ra d i i  2 3 a a d ,  a  monument  to 
uni ty  that  portrays  a  hand  holding 
the  map  of  Somal i land ;  and  the 
Dh a g a x t u u rka  ( l i tera l ly,  throwing 
stones ) .  The  lat ter  is  a  tomb  for 
the  student  protestors  who  were 
gunned  down  on  20  February  1982 
for  protest ing  the  government 
of  President  Mohamed  Siyad 
Barre  for  arrest ing  volunteers  in 
the  Hargeisa  Group,  who  were 
helping  provide  publ ic  services 
in  “pol i t ica l ly  depr ived”  Hargeisa. 
( A  s ixth  monument  placed  on  the 
road  f rom  the  a i rport  that  depicted 
an  archer  was  replaced  by  an 
advert is ing  hoarding  for  SOMTEL,  a 
te lecommunicat ion  company. )
These  monuments  were  introduced 
to  Hargeisa  in  the  la te  1990 s  at 
the  behest  of  the  c i ty’ s  mayor, 
Cawo  Elmi  Abdul lah.  During 
Cawo’ s  term,  he  introduced 
var ious  placemaking  ini t ia t ives. 
For  the  f i rst  t ime,  Hargeisa 
received  secur i ty  and  t raf f ic 
V
is i tors  to  Hargeisa, 
the  capi ta l  of  the 
se l f-declared  but 
internat ional ly 
unrecognised 





The painful  history of  Hargeisa  is  inscribed in  a  series  of 
monuments  across  Somaliland’s  capital  city
Y U S U F  S E R U N K U M A
Somal i land,  wi l l  not  miss  the 
imposing  monuments  placed  at 
st rategic  intervals  on  the  road 
f rom  the  a i rport  through  the 
central  business  d ist r ic t  to  the 
president ia l  palace.  Erected  at 
key  junct ions  and  squares,  they 
are  unmissable.  Zeinab  Badawi,  a 
Sudanese-Bri t ish  journal ist  with 
BBC,  reported  on  their  presence  in 
2011 ,  in  part icular  the  Russian-
made  Mi G  f ighter  je t  astr ide  a 
monument  in  central  Hargeisa. 
Badawi  noted  that  the  monument 
was  a  reminder  “of  the  bi t ter 
batt les  the  people  here  fought 
to  break  away  f rom  the  rest  of 
Somal ia  in  1991 ” .  The  monument 
has  appeared  on  the  cover  of  a 
number  of  books  about  Hargeisa, 
and  of ten  headl ines  websi tes  on 
Somal i land.  I t  is  an  ar t iculate 
monument.
Students  of  publ ic  memoria ls  have 
of ten  busied  themselves  with  the 
nature  of  history  that  monuments 
ar t iculate.  In  addi t ion  to  interest 
in  authorship,  they  have  a lso 
debated  ident i t ies  constructed, 
futures  imagined  and  publ ics 
mobi l ised.  Not ions  of  authent ic i ty 
and  accuracy  of ten  form,  a lbei t 
problematical ly,  the  undercurrents 
of  these  conversat ions.  The 
monument  thus  becomes  a  s i te 
of  contest  and  negot iat ion  for 
d i f ferent  c la ims.  Wri t ing  about 
monuments  in  Par is,  ar t  h istor ian 
Sergiusz  Michalski  noted  in 
2008  that  publ ic  monument 
“ref lects  the  state’ s  ideological 
foundat ions” .  As  “si tes  of 
memory, ”  and  as  indicators  of 
present  and  futures  aspirat ions, 
monuments  te l l  stor ies  in  the 
context  of  the  histor ical-pol i t ica l 
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atmosphere  of  the  t ime.  Like 
a l l  o ther  reposi tor ies  of  h istory, 
monuments  legi t imate  and  s i lence 
part icular  c la ims,  depending 
on  the  pol i t ica l  context  of  the 
moment.
In  a  s i tuat ion  of  recovery  af ter 
violence,  a  quest  for  independence 
f rom  Somal ia-Mogadishu  and  a 
search  for  a  def ini t ive  ident i ty  for 
the  people  of  Somal i land,  what  are 
the  monuments  in  Hargeisa—the 
capi ta l  c i ty,  and  centre  of  cul tural, 
pol i t ica l  and  econom i c  act ivi ty—
saying ?
The  c i tyscape  of  Hargeisa  includes 
f ive  large  monuments.  The  best 
known  is  Ta a l a d a  Xo r iya d d a  iyo  D a l 
J i rka  D a h s o o n  ( Statue  of  Liberty, 
or  Country  Not  Yet  Discovered ) , 
which  features  the  Mi G.  The  others 
are  Ka a re ,  a  repl ica  of  a  f ighter 
tanker  in  Togdheer  Area ;  the 
dove  or  peace  m onum ent ;  S a n a d 
G u u ra d i i  2 3 a a d ,  a  monument  to 
uni ty  that  portrays  a  hand  holding 
the  map  of  Somal i land ;  and  the 
Dh a g a x t u u rka  ( l i tera l ly,  throwing 
stones ) .  The  lat ter  is  a  tomb  for 
the  student  protestors  who  were 
gunned  down  on  20  February  1982 
for  protest ing  the  government 
of  President  Mohamed  Siyad 
Barre  for  arrest ing  volunteers  in 
the  Hargeisa  Group,  who  were 
helping  provide  publ ic  services 
in  “pol i t ica l ly  depr ived”  Hargeisa. 
( A  s ixth  monument  placed  on  the 
road  f rom  the  a i rport  that  depicted 
an  archer  was  replaced  by  an 
advert is ing  hoarding  for  SOMTEL,  a 
te lecommunica t i on  company. )
These  monuments  were  introduced 
to  Hargeisa  in  the  la te  1990 s  at 
the  behest  of  the  c i ty’ s  mayor, 
Cawo  Elmi  Abdul lah.  During 
Cawo’ s  term,  he  introduced 
var ious  placemaking  ini t ia t ives. 
For  the  f i rst  t ime,  Hargeisa 
received  secur i ty  and  t raf f ic 
l ights,  and  fountains  were  bui l t 
in  several  places  across  the 
c i ty—the  fountains  have  a l l  s ince 
disappeared,  and  t raf f ic  l ights 
are  only  now  reappear ing.  Cawo’ s 
reforms  were  very  popular,  to  the 
extent  that  ca l lers  to  phone-in 
shows  on  radio  and  te levis ion  sent 
greet ings  to  him  before  their  k in 
and  f r iends.  Some  commentators 
have  suggested  that  Cawo’ s 
popular i ty  surpassed  that  of  the 
presi dent,  Muhammad  Egal  ( 1993 -
2002 ) ,  who  reacted  by  ja i l ing 
hi m  for  a  month  on  t rumped-
up  charges.  Egal’ s  successor, 
P resi dent  Kahin  Riyale  ( 2002 -
1 0 ) ,  s imply  d ismissed  Cawo  from 
off ice. 
Cawo’ s  monuments  endure  and 
have  gained  increasing  popular i ty 
ove r  the  years.   Their  pop ular i ty—
especia l ly  their  wide  c i rculat ion 
and  reproduct ion  in  other  forms 
and  media—signals  their  power 
to  speak  and  mobi l ise  audiences 
towards  certa in  ideat ions. 
But  what  exac tly  do  Cawo’ s 
monuments  say ?  How  do  they 
manage  to  mobi l ise  such  wide 
and  diverse  audiences ?  Al though 
intended  to  complement  each 
other,  in  this  essay  I  wi l l  focus 
on  one :  the  Statue  of  Liberty. 
This  monument,  the  most  vis ible 
landmark  in  Hargeisa,  i l luminates 
ideat ions  present  in  the  other 
monuments. 
The  a i rcraf t  is  an  actual  Russian 
Mi G  f ighter  je t.  In  1988 ,  Barre 
contracted  South  Afr ican 
mercenar ies  to  bomb  Hargeisa ; 
Somal i  nat ionals  in  the  a i r  force 
had  refused  to  undertake  the 
at tack  on  their  countrymen.  After 
the  bombing  ra id  the  mercenar ies 
abandoned  three  f ighter  je ts  a t 
the  a i rport.  In  1998 ,  re l ishing 
the  stabi l i ty  and  safety  that  had 
returned  to  Somal i land  at  the 
end  of  c lannist  f ight ing  in  1996 , 
Cawo  had  one  of  the  je ts  moved 
to  Freedom  Square  where  i t  was 
insta l led  atop  a  pyramid-shaped 
pl inth. 
Within  a  short  per iod,  the 
monument  became  the  most 
representat ive  and  adored 
symbol  of  Hargeisan  history  and 
aspirat ion.  The  monuments  ably 
mobi l ised  a  local  publ ic—besides 
i ts  appearance  in  formal  media, 
the  monument  appears  in  wal l 
drawings  and  graf f i t i  in  d i f ferent 
parts  of  the  c i ty.  The  monument  is 
located  in  the  c i ty’ s  main  business 
centre.  I t  is  f lanked  by  numerous 
shops  and  is  a  located  near 
Hargeisa’ s  main  downtown  market. 
The  s i te  a lso  doubles  as  a  car  park 
dur ing  the  main  work  hours.  I t  is 
a  popular  place  for  s h a a  iyo  s h e e ko 
( tea  and  ta lk )  fol lowing  af ternoon 
prayers.
The  base  holding  up  the  Mi G  is 
decorated  with  two  prominent 
painted  images.  The  tableaux 
paint ings  and  accompanying 
capt ions  explain  part icular 
moments  in  the  1988  c ivi l  war, 
dur ing  which  an  est imated  1 0 , 000 
people  died  in  two  months. 
Women  f igure  prominently  in  both 
paint ings  as  protagonists.  One 
paint ing  shows  a  man  and  woman 
in  c lothes  painted  with  colours  of 
the  Somal i land  f lag.  The  woman 
bears  a  r i f le,  whi le  the  man 
behind  her  is  terr ibly  injured ;  both 
his  arms  and  legs  are  bleeding 
f rom  their  stumps.  The  scene 
includes  a  number  of  muti lated 
bodies.  There  are  soldiers  shoot ing 
at  f leeing  c ivi l ians.  Two  planes, 
which  are  marked  with  the  f lag  of 
Somal ia,  bomb  the  c i ty.  “Bombs 
ra ined  on  us, ”  reads  a  capt ion.
The  other  paint ing  shows  a  woman 
with  a  chi ld  on  her  back.  She 
bears  the  Somal i land  nat ional 
f lag ;  adopted  in  1996 ,  i t  was 
or ig inal ly  the  f lag  of  the  Somal i 
Nat ional  Movement  ( SNM ) ,  who 
fought  against  Barre.  Behind  the 
woman  is  an  e lderly  man  with 
only  one  amputated  leg.  At  the 
bottom  lef t  of  the  paint ing  is  a 
man  in  c ivi l ian  c lothes  at tempting 
to  take  a  gun  away  f rom  a  soldier 
wear ing  a  red  beret—Barre’ s 
most  notor ious  mil i tary  uni t  was 
cal led  the  Ha n g a s h  ( Red  Berets ) . 
In  the  background  are  images  of 
a  mosque,  tanks  and  several  dead 
bodies.  At  r ight,  the  scene  is  being 
rol led  up,  reveal ing  an  idyl l ic 
vi l lage  scene  below,  a  metaphor  of 
regenerat ion.
The  Russian  je t  a top  of  the 
monument  underscores  the 
absolute  helplessness  of  the 
Hargeisa  people  being  bombed 
in  the  paint ing.  I t  reminds  the 
people  of  Hargeisa  of  their  painful 
re lat ionship  with  Somal ia,  the 
cruel ty  that  was  meted  out  and 
carnage  that  occurred.  Al though 
composed  of  aesthet ical ly 
dubious  paint ings,  the  memoria l 
is  an  e loquent  statement  on  the 
vict imhood  of  Somal i landers, 
as  wel l  their  resi l ience  and 
survival ist  spir i t.  The  switch  f rom 
helpless  vict imhood  to  resolute 
resistance  suggests  the  country’ s 
hard-fought  l iberat ion  is  not  yet 
complete. 
At  the  base  of  the  monument, 
two  dates  are  acknowledged : 
26  June  1960 ,  when  Somal i land 
achieved  independence  f rom 
Great  Br i ta in,  and  18  May  1991 , 
when  the  country  uni lateral ly 
declared  independence  f rom 
Somal ia.  Interest ingly,  with  the 
except ion  of  acknowledging  these 
dates,  the  monument  says  nothing 
about  Great  Br i ta in.  S ince  the 
monument  memoria l ises  moments 
of  oppression  by  earl ier  and  later 
colonisers,  the  s i lence  regarding 
Br i ta in’ s  wrongs  in  Somal i land  is 
deafening.
Instead,  the  monument  mobi l ises 
residents  and  vis i tors  to  Hargeisa 
to  see  Somal ia-Mogadishu  as 
an  enemy.  This  view  of  Somal ia 
mediates  business,  cul ture  and 
pol i t ica l  interact ion  in  Hargeisa, 
within  and  without.  In  2015 , 
Hargeisa’ s  most  renowned  band, 
Hidigaha  Geeska  ( The  Ho rn  Stars ) , 
were  arrested  on  their  return  to 
the  country  af ter  performing  in 
Mogadishu  during  the  Eid  Aduha 
celebrat ions :  they  were  accused 
of  waving  the  Somal ia  f lag  dur ing 
celebrat ions.  Earl ier  this  year, 
journal ist  and  act ivist  Abdul Mal ik 
Coldon  was  arrested  upon  arr ival 
a t  Hargeisa  fol lowing  a  vis i t  to 
Mogadishu  where  he  had  met 
President  Mohamed  Abdul lah 
Farmaajo.  I t  is  c la imed  he  vowed 
to  return  to  Somal i land  and 
preach  unif icat ion  with  Somal ia-
Mogadishu.  Perhaps,  i f  Coldon 
and  the  music ians  with  Hidigaha 
Geeska  had  been  more  at tent ive  to 
Hargeisa’ s  def ining  monument,  to 
i ts  impl ic i t  narrat ive,  they  would 
have  avoided  arrest.  In  the  context 
of  Somal i land’ s  present  pol i t ico-
cultural  aspirat ions,  residents 
of  Hargeisa  ought  to  be  more 
at tent ive  of  the  narrat ive  of  their 
monuments.
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A MONUMENT TO A DARK PAST
People sit under a russian made MIG fighter jet 
that was used in 1988, hanging in Hargeisa as 
monument and reminder of atrocities carried out 
during the country’s civil war. PHOTO: MOHAMED 
ABDIWAHAB/AFP/Getty
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As  demand  for  goods  increased 
among  Kenyans,  other  bui ldings 
in  Eastle igh  began  to  be  used 
in  s imilar  ways.  The  increased 
demand  for  reta i l  space  by  t raders 
saw  reta i l  leasing  become  a 
highly  lucrat ive  enterpr ise.  As 
space  became  even  scarcer,  new 
bui ldings  were  bui l t.  In  most  cases 
they  were  funded  by  advance 
payments  f rom  the  prospect ive 
t rader—payments  known  as 
“goodwil l” .  The  aggregated 
payments  provided  enough  for 
construct ion  and  a  modest  prof i t. 
These  newer  mal ls  reta ined  the 
older  shopping  centre  formula,  but 
incorporated  features  such  as  hotel 
space  and  mosques.
Very  soon  the  model  of  the  Somal i 
shopping  centre  spread  to  other 
towns  across  Kenya,  including 
Nakuru,  northwest  of  Nairobi. 
The  fourth  largest  c i ty  in  Kenya, 
Nakuru  is  a  regional  centre 
posi t ioned  a long  the  country’ s 
main  t rading  route.  The  f i rst 
Somal i  shopping  complex  here 
opened  in  the  centre  of  town, 
near  the  Jamia  mosque,  in  1995 .  I t 
occupies  a  run-down  two-storey 
lodge  bui l t  in  the  1970 s.  In  the 
next  couple  of  years  three  more 
Somal i  shopping  centres  opened 
in  c lose  proximity,  a l l  operated  by 
Kenyan-Somalis.  These  bui ldings 
are  s ingle-storey  and  consist  of 
long  corr idors  f rom  which  the 
shops  can  be  entered.  Non-Somali 
ta i lors  occupy  spaces  at  the  rear  of 
the  bui ldings.  Many  of  the  t raders 
are  as  wel l  not  part  of  the  Somal i 
community. 
Dubai  Shopping  Centre  is  the 
largest  Somal i  reta i l  space  in 
Nakuru.  Opened  in  201 0 ,  i t  is 
a lso  the  f i rst  such  purpose-bui l t 
edi f ice  in  Nakuru.  In  i ts  f i rst  year 
of  operat ion,  stores  were  spacious 
and  the  bui lding  exuded  a  touch 
of  luxury.  By  year  two  shops  were 
into  networks  br inging  cheap 
consumer  goods  f rom  Asia  to  East 
Afr ica.  Eastle igh  has  dramatical ly 
changed  over  the  last  two  decades 
fol lowing  the  arr ival  of  refugees 
f rom  Somal ia.  Once  a  lower-
middle  c lass  resident ia l  estate,  i t 
i s  now  dominated  by  mult i-storey 
shopping  centres,  hotels  and 
resident ia l  apartments. 
The  evolut ion  of  the  Somal i 
shopping  centre  as  a  d ist inct 
model  can  be  t raced  back  to 
Gar issa  Lodge,  a  hotel  occupied 
by  Somal ian  refugees  in  the 
early  1990 s.  Some  of  the  Somal i 
lodgers  brought  with  them  trade 
exper ience  f rom  Mogadishu 
and  were  able  to  access  f lows 
of  smuggled  goods—especia l ly 
c lothes  and  e lectronics—coming 
f rom  Dubai,  through  Somal ia, 
into  Kenya.  They  began  t rading 
these  f rom  their  rooms,  d isplaying 
them  on  their  beds  by  day.  Word 
gradual ly  spread  among  Kenyans 
that  cheap  goods  could  be  bought 
at  Gar issa  Lodge,  and  the  growing 
t rade  t ransformed  the  nature  of 
the  premises. 
N
airobi  has  become  a 
c i ty  of  mal ls.  Af ter 
South  Afr ica,  Kenya  is 
the  largest  shopping 
centre  market  in 




Somali  entrepreneurs  in  Kenya have transformed the  informal 
retail  economy in  substantive  ways 
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and  bi l led  as  a  “c i ty  within  a 
c i ty, ”  the  Sar i t  Centre  was  the 
f i rst  western-style  mal l  in  East 
and  Central  Afr ica.  More  such 
mal ls  fol lowed,  notably  in  the  last 
decade.  Al l  o f  these  mal ls  fol low, 
more  or  less,  the  g lobal  model  of 
the  high-end  consumerist  le isure 
space,  featur ing  formal ised  t rade 
by  commercia l  chains  se l l ing 
known  brands  for  local  e l i tes  and 
middle  c lasses  as  wel l  as  tour ists. 
The  mal ls  we  focus  on  here  are 
d i f ferent. 
Lacking  the  g lamour  of  western-
style  shopping  mal ls,  “Somal i” 
shopping  centres  have  one  or 
more  f loors  with  t raders  rent ing 
micro-sta l ls,  some  as  smal l  as  a 
table.  The  markets  are  “Somal i” 
in  so  far  as  they  were  introduced 
as  a  model  by  ethnic  Somal is 
f rom  Somal ia  and  Kenya,  and  are 
l inked  to  Somal i  t rade  networks. 
The  model  has  s ince  been  taken 
up  by  non-Somali  businesspeople 
as  wel l,  complicat ing  their 
c l assi f icat ion  as  “Somal i” .
The  Somal i  shopping  centre 
evolved  in  the  ea rly  1990 s 
fol lowing  changes  in  the  usage 
of  urban  space.  Three  paral le l 
processes  led  to  this  change :  the 
l iberal izat ion  of  the  business 
sector,  broader  urbanizat ion 
processes,  and  the  migrat ion  of 
business  people  f rom  Somal ia  to 
Kenyan  c i t ies  as  refugees. 
The  Nairobi  suburb  of  Eastle igh 
is  known  for  i ts  substant ia l 
populat ion  of  refugees ;  i t  i s  a lso  a 
g lobal  commercia l  hub,  whose  50 
shopping  centres  are  integrated 
The markets are 
“Somali” in so far as 
they were introduced 
as a model by ethnic 
Somalis from Somalia 
and Kenya, and are 
linked to Somali trade 
networks
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As  demand  for  goods  increased 
among  Kenyans,  other  bui ldings 
in  Eastle igh  began  to  be  used 
in  s imilar  ways.  The  increased 
demand  for  reta i l  space  by  t raders 
saw  reta i l  leasing  become  a 
highly  lucrat ive  enterpr ise.  As 
space  became  even  scarcer,  new 
bui ldings  were  bui l t.  In  most  cases 
they  were  funded  by  advance 
payments  f rom  the  prospect ive 
t rader—payments  known  as 
“goodwil l” .  The  aggregated 
payments  provided  enough  for 
construct ion  and  a  modest  prof i t. 
These  newer  mal ls  reta ined  the 
older  shopping  centre  formula,  but 
incorporated  features  such  as  hotel 
space  and  mosques.
Very  soon  the  model  of  the  Somal i 
shopping  centre  spread  to  other 
towns  across  Kenya,  including 
Nakuru,  northwest  of  Nairobi. 
The  fourth  largest  c i ty  in  Kenya, 
Nakuru  is  a  regional  centre 
posi t ioned  a long  the  country’ s 
main  t rading  route.  The  f i rst 
Somal i  shopping  complex  here 
opened  in  the  centre  of  town, 
near  the  Jamia  mosque,  in  1995 .  I t 
occupies  a  run-down  two-storey 
lodge  bui l t  in  the  1970 s.  In  the 
next  couple  of  years  three  more 
Somal i  shopping  centres  opened 
in  c lose  proximity,  a l l  operated  by 
Kenyan-Somalis.  These  bui ldings 
are  s ingle-storey  and  consist  of 
long  corr idors  f rom  which  the 
shops  can  be  entered.  Non-Somali 
ta i lors  occupy  spaces  at  the  rear  of 
the  bui ldings.  Many  of  the  t raders 
are  as  wel l  not  part  of  the  Somal i 
community. 
Dubai  Shopping  Centre  is  the 
largest  Somal i  reta i l  space  in 
Nakuru.  Opened  in  201 0 ,  i t  is 
a lso  the  f i rst  such  purpose-bui l t 
edi f ice  in  Nakuru.  In  i ts  f i rst  year 
of  operat ion,  stores  were  spacious 
and  the  bui lding  exuded  a  touch 
of  luxury.  By  year  two  shops  were 
subdivided  into  smal ler  uni ts 
and  further  outdoor  stores  were 
created  around  the  bui lding ;  extra 
reta i l  space  was  a lso  carved  out  of 
the  inner  corr idors. 
Eastle igh  is  s igni f icant  to  most 
of  the  t raders  in  Nakuru  as  i t 
funct ions  as  their  d ist r ibut ion 
centre.  Goods  imported  into  Kenya 
by  Somal is  are  sold  wholesale  at 
Eastle igh  to  t raders  f rom  al l  over 
Kenya,  many  of  them  non-Somalis. 
This  model  has  been  taken  up  by 
non-Somali  businesspeople  too. 
Establ ished  in  1994 ,  Freemark 
Limited  subdivided  the  plenary 
hal l  a t  the  Kenyatta  Internat ional 
Conference  Centre  ( KICC )  into 
table-sized  sta l ls ;  by  the  end  of 
the  1990 s,  the  subdivis ion  t rend 
had  spread  to  many  shops  a long 
Moi  Avenue  in  central  Nairobi.  In 
other  urban  parts  of  Kenya  s imilar 
developments  took  place,  with 
newly  constructed  of f ice  bui ldings 
sometimes  including  “exhibi t ion” 
sta l ls  on  the  lower  f loors.
While  open-air  markets  are  held 
in  publ ic  spaces,  the  Somal i 
shopping  centres  are  pr ivately 
owned  enterpr ises,  of ten  with 
a  rather  long  chain  of  brokers, 
owners  and  complex  network  of 
leasers  and  sub-leasers.  These 
reta i l  businesses  are  marked 
by  three  spat ia l  innovat ions : 
shopping  centres  are  establ ished 
in  st ructures  of ten  bui l t  for 
other  purposes  ( archi tectural 
repurposing ) ,  several  smal l  shops 
are  created  inside  exist ing  stores 
( reta i l  densi ty ) ,  and  addi t ional 
reta i l  stores  are  establ ished  in 
common  spaces  inside  and  outside 
bui ldings  ( sprawl ) . 
Despi te  occupying  pr ivate  spaces, 
Somal i  shopping  centres  operate 
more  l ike  open-air  markets  than 
western-style  mal ls.  Smal l-scale 
t raders,  who  of ten  work  a lone  or 
have  only  one  employee,  typical ly 
run  these  stores.  Their  wares  are 
of ten  cheap ;  t raders  do  not  se l l 
branded  goods  produced  for  and 
bought  by  the  r ich.  The  product 
of fer ings  are  not  especia l ly 
var ied,  and  of ten  t raders  c luster 
in  one  area  se l l ing  s imilar  i tems. 
Furthermore,  the  pr ice  sett ing 
inside  Somal i  shopping  centres 
resembles  that  noted  by  Cl i f ford 
Geertz  in  1978  in  a  “bazaar 
economy” ,  not  the  set-pr ice  model 
prevalent  in  western-style  mal ls. 
In  his  2011  book  G h e t to  a t  t h e  C e n te r 
o f  t h e  Wo rl d :  C h u n g k i n g  Ma n s i o n s, 
Ho n g  Ko n g ,  Gordon  Matthews 
descr ibes  the  mal l  as  the  “epi tome 
of  the  American  Dream, ”  and 
typi f ies  bazaars  as  “marts  of  low-
end  g lobal izat ion” .  In  Kenya, 
the  newly  bui l t  Somal i  shopping 
centres  adopt  the  image  of  the 
formal ised  western-style  mal l,  in 
ef fect  pro ject ing  the  urban  t raders’ 
dreams  of  weal th  and  progress. 
What  d ist inguishes  these  shopping 
centres  f rom  markets  and  mal ls 
are  their  funct ional  focus  on 
processes  of  se l l ing  and  buying. 
Markets  are  of ten  open  places 
where  people  meet.  In  some  cases, 
they  are  used  to  stage  pol i t ica l 
or  re l ig ious  ra l l ies,  and  are 
therefore  publ ic  arenas.  Shopping 
mal ls,  whi le  not  designed  as 
publ ic  places,  provide  space  for 
recreat ion,  and  urban  dwel lers 
appropriate  the  mal ls  for  uses 
other  than  consumption,  re-
making  pr ivate  spaces  into  publ ic 
ones.  By  contrast,  Somal i  shopping 
centres  are,  in  many  cases,  h ighly 
specia l ized  consumption  spaces 
where  the  pragmatism  of  t rade 
dominates.  In  Nakuru,  there  are 
no  areas  where  people  can  eat  or 
dr ink,  or  even  s i t  down  and  chat—
archi tectural  researcher  Hannah 
le  Roux  has  descr ibed  these  as 
“s low  spaces” .  Their  absence  may 
part ly  be  due  to  the  locat ion  of 
s low  spaces  around  the  shopping 
centres  in  Nakuru,  but  we  argue  i t 
is  a lso  an  outcome  of  the  intense 
economic  usage  of  space.
I L L U S T R A T I O N
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The  t raders  occupying  these 
shopping  centres  face  compet i t ion 
f rom  hawkers  se l l ing  goods 
on  the  st reet.  The  compet i t ion 
for  customers  can  be  f ierce.  In 
2016 ,  tensions  between  market 
t raders  and  hawkers  in  Eastle igh 
resul ted  in  the  temporary  c losure 
of  shopping  centres  in  protest 
against  the  prol i ferat ing  st reet 
t rade.  Despi te  the  low  overhead 
costs  of  hawkers,  t raders  in 
the  Somal i  shopping  centres 
nonetheless  enjoy  s igni f icant 
custom.  I t  is  our  content ion 
that  the  Somal i  shopping-centre 
model  is  successful  because  i t 
g ives  informal i ty  a  room.  Our 
understanding  of  informal i ty 
is  informed  by  Kei th  Hart,  and 
here  refers  to  a  re lat ive  absence 
of  regulat ion  a longside  many 
elements  of  uncerta inty.
Informal  business  pract ices 
are  entrenched  in  Kenya.  The 
l imited  space  in  of f ic ia l  publ ic 
markets  provided  by  the  Kenyan 
administrat ion  prompted  many 
people  in  the  1980 s  and  90 s 
to  work  in  informal  economic 
st ructures.  St ructural  adjustment 
programmes,  which  stymied 
the  formal  economy,  and  rapid 
urbanizat ion  contr ibuted  to  the 
growth  of  the  informal  economy. 
The  possibi l i ty  of  earning  a  l iving 
was  met  by  a  consumer  demand 
for  cheap  goods. 
The  informal  economy  is  noted 
for  i ts  precar i ty.  In  the  1980 s, 
a  t ime  of  pol i t ica l  tension 
and  heightened  violence  and 
insecuri ty,  t raders  faced  a 
worsening  economic  c l imate 
and  arbi t rary  pol ic ies  regarding 
st reet  t rade.  Hawkers  had  to 
endure  arrests  and  government-
led  demoli t ions  of  their  sta l ls, 
as  wel l  as  the  cr iminal  act ivi t ies 
by  var ious  st reet  gangs.  The  f i rst 
Somal i  shopping  centres  opened  in 
the  early  1990 s.  They  of fered  new 
commercia l  networks  and  a  secure 
space—from  pol ice  and  thieves—for 
doing  business.  Goods  could  be 
secured  inside  shopping  centres, 
which  a lso  provided  protect ion 
against  ra in  and  sun.  The  stabi l i ty 
of  a  shop  a lso  generates  t rust  in 
shopkeepers :  wholesalers  are  more 
l ikely  to  entrust  goods  on  credi t 
to  someone  with  a  physical  shop 
than  to  a  mobi le  hawker.
Nat ional  and  regional 
governments  responded  to  this 
commercia l  development  by 
bui lding  new  publ ic  markets. 
Operat ing  them  proved  di f f icul t 
in  many  cases.  In  Nakuru,  for 
instance,  the  construct ion  of 
Wakul ima  and  Nasher  markets 
was  overshadowed  by  corrupt ion 
a l legat ions.  In  contrast,  the 
pr ivate  shopping  centres  st i l l 
f lour ish,  creat ing  an  interl inkage 
of  informal  and  formal  ways  of 
doing  business.  Over  t ime  some 
of  these  businesses  have  become 
more  formal ized :  they  are  ful ly 
incorporated  into  the  Kenyan 
reta i l  landscape,  though  within 
their  wal ls  much  business  act ivi ty 
remains  more  or  less  informal. 
Rents  for  micro-sta l ls  in  a  Somal i 
shopping  centre  are  much  lower 
than  for  a  room-size  shop  in  a 
western-style  mal l,  and  even  with 
a  re lat ively  smal l  investment  i t  is 
possible  to  establ ish  a  respectable 
business  in  these  shopping 
centres.  While  r is ing  rents  and 
“goodwil l”  payments  have  reduced 
the  number  of  people  able  to 
lease  these  shops,  the  model 
of  the  Somal i  shopping  centre 
of fers  many  Kenyans  otherwise 
excluded  f rom  the  reta i l  economy 
an  opportunity  to  become  smal l-
business  owners  and  shopkeepers. 
S igni f icantly,  this  change  in  the 
reta i l  economy  was  not  the  resul t 
of  governmental  intervent ion 
or  publ ic  planning,  but  of 
pr ivate  investment  by  ordinary 
businesspeople.  The  model  of  the 
Somal i  shopping  centre  of fers 
shopkeepers  a  secure  but  a lso 
accessible  t rading  platform,  a 
space  to  potent ia l ly  prosper  in 
the  face  of  the  uncerta inty  that 
accompanies  informal  economic 
pract ices.
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Operat ing  them  proved  di f f icul t 
in  many  cases.  In  Nakuru,  for 
instance,  the  construct ion  of 
Wakul ima  and  Nasher  markets 
was  overshadowed  by  corrupt ion 
a l legat ions.  In  contrast,  the 
pr ivate  shopping  centres  st i l l 
f lour ish,  creat ing  an  interl inkage 
of  informal  and  formal  ways  of 
doing  business.  Over  t ime  some 
of  these  businesses  have  become 
more  formal ized :  they  are  ful ly 
incorporated  into  the  Kenyan 
reta i l  landscape,  though  within 
their  wal ls  much  business  act ivi ty 
remains  more  or  less  informal. 
Rents  for  micro-sta l ls  in  a  Somal i 
shopping  centre  are  much  lower 
than  for  a  room-size  shop  in  a 
western-style  mal l,  and  even  with 
a  re lat ively  smal l  investment  i t  is 
possible  to  establ ish  a  respectable 
business  in  these  shopping 
centres.  While  r is ing  rents  and 
“goodwil l”  payments  have  reduced 
the  number  of  people  able  to 
lease  these  shops,  the  model 
of  the  Somal i  shopping  centre 
of fers  many  Kenyans  otherwise 
excluded  f rom  the  reta i l  economy 
an  opportuni ty  to  become  smal l-
business  owners  and  shopkeepers. 
S igni f icantly,  this  change  in  the 
reta i l  economy  was  not  the  resul t 
of  governmental  intervent ion 
or  publ ic  planning,  but  of 
pr ivate  investment  by  ordinary 
businesspeople.  The  model  of  the 
Somal i  shopping  centre  of fers 
shopkeepers  a  secure  but  a lso 
accessible  t rading  platform,  a 
space  to  potent ia l ly  prosper  in 
the  face  of  the  uncerta inty  that 
accompanies  informal  economic 
pract ices.
moment,  Afr ica  is  the  continent 
with  the  fastest  growing cement 
consumption and demand is 
expected  to  r ise  by  50% by the 
year  2020,  according  to  a  2015 
Bloomberg  report.  The  cement 
industry  has  even described sub-
Saharan Afr ica  as  “the  last  cement 
f rontier”  (Waerp  and Arnoldson, 
2011) .  Some speak of  cement  as  the 
“new oi l”  while  others  refer  to  the 
r ichest  man in  Afr ica,  the  Nigerian 
businessman Aliko  Dangote,  as 
the  “king  of  cement”  (Agbugah, 
2016) .  With  the  growing number 
of  cement  factories  opening  across 
Afr ica,  the  continent  is  unl ikely 
to  remain  a  net  importer  of  this 
crucial  bui lding  material  for  much 
longer. 
Al l  this  cement  is  not  only 
channel led  towards  projects  of 
futurist ic  satel l i te  c i t ies,  shopping 
malls,  tower  blocks  and r ing  roads, 
but  a lso  towards  the  mil l ions 
of  small  domestic  construct ion 
projects  that  are  increasingly 
visible  on  the  peri-urban 
landscape.  Drawing on research 
in  Inhapossa,  an  expansion 
suburb  in  central  Mozambique,  I 
approach cement  as  both  an  index 
and a  dr iver  of  socio-economic 
transformation in  the  region.  I 
further  show how,  as  a  pol i t ical ly 
and affect ively  charged material, 
cement  offers  a  useful  vantage 
point  f rom which to  examine the 
contours  of  prosperi ty.
After  spending  the  last  few decades 
uncovering  the  roots  of  uncertainty 
and documenting  the  di f ferent 
creat ive  ways  in  which people 
get  by  in  t rying  environments, 
Here,  I  am more  interested  in  the 
material i ty  of  prosperi ty  than in 
prosperi ty  as  an  ideal. 
I t  is  my contention that  prosperi ty, 
l ike  cr is is  and poverty,  for  example, 
deserve  academic  attention. 
Instead of  s imply  qual i fying  the 
“Afr ica  r is ing”  thesis,  or  dismissing 
i t  a l l  together,  I  propose  to  take 
prosperi ty  ser iously.  Although 
I  recognise  that  far  too  many 
in  Mozambique l ive  in  abject 
poverty,  I  wish  to  g ive  prosperi ty 
the  benefi t  of  the  doubt.  To  do 
so,  I  ask  what  the  vast  quanti ty 
of  cement  that  is  being  imported, 
manufactured,  invested  in,  dreamt 
about  and ult imately  mixed into 
concrete  can tel l  us  about  the 
contours  of  prosperi ty. 
I f  bui lding  a  house  is  every  young 
person’s  dream and a  key marker 
of  adulthood across  sub-Saharan 
Afr ica,  for  many i t  has  become,  at 
best,  a  deferred  dream,  as  young 
people  throughout  the  continent 
struggle  to  get  by,  let  a lone  become 
able  and respectable  adults.  Over 
the  last  decade,  I  have  seen young 
people  in  southern Mozambique 
devote  much t ime and energy 
to  worrying  about  their  bleak 
prospects.  However,  when these 
same young adults,  started  making 
blocks  in  earnest  and relocat ing  to 
Inhapossa,  i t  became evident  that 
the  “cr isis  of  social  reproduction” 
framework no  longer  gel led  with 
the  real i t ies  I  encountered  on the 
ground. 
The  growth of  Inhapossa  owes, 
in  part,  to  a  happy combination 
of  demographics  and new 
opportunit ies.  Among the  chi ldren 
of  refugees  who f led  to  the  c i ty  at 
the  height  of  the  war  in  the  late 
1980s,  many have since  graduated 
and a  number  have  recently 
secured jobs  as  teachers,  pol ice 
scholars  interested  in  Afr ica  have 
developed a  wealth  of  concepts 
and tools  to  make sense  of 
how people  tackle  and engage 
with  adversi ty  and frustrated 
aspirat ions.  But  what  happens 
when condit ions  on the  ground 
start  changing,  seemingly  for  the 
better ;  when economic  growth 
begins  to  t r ickle  down? While 
there  is  ample  reason to  qual i fy 
the  “Afr ica  r is ing”  thesis  proposed 
by Th e  E c o n o m i s t  in  2011 ,  i t  seems 
more  di f f icult  to  dismiss  a l l  this 
excitement  about  cement  as  mere 
T
here  is  something 
about  cement—and 
the  way i t  can be 
mixed into  concrete—
that  captures  the 
imaginat ion.  At  the 
The stacks  of  concrete  blocks  in  the  Mozambican suburb of 





With the growing 
number of cement 
factories opening across 
Africa, the continent is 
unlikely to remain a net 
importer of this crucial 
building material for 
much longer
hype;  more  di f f icult  to  ignore  the 
bui lding  boom that  is  fuel l ing,  and 
to  some extent  a lso  fuel led  by,  the 
r is ing  demand in  cement.
Prosperi ty  is  commonly  assessed 
by  i ts  s igns  and symbols  such as 
economic  growth,  investment  in 
infrastructure;  but  prosperi ty,  l ike 
well-being  more  broadly,  is  a lso 
experiential.  Prosperi ty,  in  short, 
has  i ts  own material i t ies  and 
temporal i t ies.  I t  a lso  tends  to  be 
aspirat ional,  something  to  str ive 
towards,  and often,  especial ly 
when the  focus  turns  to  the  global 
South,  something  that  needs  to  be 
promoted.  
J U L I E  S O L E I L  A R C H A M B A U L T
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off icers,  administrators  and 
technicians.  Their  story  is  turning 
into  a  rather  happy one.
Across  the  suburb  of  Inhapossa, 
there  are  pi les  of  neatly  stacked 
concrete  blocks  everywhere, 
increments  towards  the 
material isat ion of  part icular 
bui lding  dreams.  In  recent  years, 
“making  blocks”  ( b a te r  b l o c o s )  has 
shif ted  to  the  forefront  of  local 
concerns.  Everyone,  f rom civi l 
servants  to  day labourers,  seems 
to  be  buying  cement  and making 
blocks.  In  fact,  people  ta lk  about 
making  blocks  and bui lding,  more 
broadly,  as  being  “in  fashion”. 
Overlapping  geographies  of  labour 
migrat ion,  Portuguese  colonial 
rule,  c ivi l  war  and a  br ief  social ist 
period,  shape  how Mozambicans 
reimagine  the  ci ty  towards  and 
from suburbia.
Mozambicans  have  long  engaged 
with  cement  as  a  pol i t ical ly  and 
affect ively  charged material. 
Colonial  c i t ies  were  commonly 
bui l t  on  the  divide  between 
the  cement  and the  reed  ci ty, 
the  former  for  settlers  and the 
assimilated  few,  the  latter  for 
the  indigenous  populat ion. 
Across  the  continent  today, 
decaying  infrastructure  stands 
as  reminders  of  more  prosperous 
days,  as  reminders,  a lso,  of  what 
could  have  been;  in  southern 
Mozambique,  decaying  art  deco 
bui ldings  recal l  the  prosperous 
days  of  Portuguese  colonial  rule. 
Amidst  this  decay,  however,  are 
f reshly  moulded concrete  blocks 
oozing  with  promises  of  a  better 
future.  Indeed,  i t  is  only  recently 
that  cement  has  become so 
accessible.
Construct ion,  more  broadly,  is 
entangled  in  c laims of  belonging 
and ci t izenship,  and involves 
making  a  powerful  statement 
about  how actors—individuals, 
famil ies,  municipal  governments—
project  themselves  into  the  future. 
Anthropologist  Morten Nielsen has 
written  extensively  about  this.  He 
argues  that  the  sub-contract ing 
of  large  infrastructure  projects—
many of  which are  funded by 
Chinese  capital  under  the  banner 
of  “resources  for  infrastructure” 
deals—highl ights  the  weakness 
of  the  state  and test i f ies  to  the 
“retreat  of  sovereignty”,  to  use 
anthropologist  Charles  Piot’s 
formulat ion.  In  this  view,  these 
projects  merely  part ic ipate  in 
the  spectacle  of  the  state,  a  state 
subsist ing  on performance.  But  I 
f ind  i t  more  useful  to  approach 
nat ion-building  as  a  dialogue 
between the  state  and i ts  c i t izens; 
a  dialogue  expressed in  the 
language  of  cement. 
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Much of  the  growth in 
Mozambique,  l ike  in  Angola,  has 
been fuel led  by  the  exploitat ion 
of  oi l  and gas  reserves  and is 
therefore  ineluctably  volat i le. 
Renewed f ight ing  along  the 
nat ional  highway,  a long  with  civi l 
unrest,  are  reminders  of  just  how 
tenuous  this  prosperi ty  is.  Scholars 
l ike  Jason Sumich,  who  focus  on 
the  Mozambican el i te,  speak of 
the  “uncertainty  of  prosperi ty” . 
I t  remains  unclear  how recent 
developments,  such as  the  “secret 
debt  scandal”  which exposed 
secret ive  loans  total l ing  $1-bi l l ion 
that  led  the  country  to  default  on 
debt  repayment,  wil l  af fect  l iving 
condit ions  and opportunit ies. 
For  the  young people  I  have  been 
fol lowing  for  over  a  decade, 
however,  things  at  this  specif ic 
juncture  are  def initely  improving. 
I  hear  narrat ives  of  f rustrated 
aspirat ions  and nostalgic 
In  Mozambique,  infrastructure 
projects  t r igger  anything  from 
measured excitement  to  cynicism. 
They never  pass  unnoticed.  “The 
state  is  working,”  I  have  heard 
people  say  on numerous  occasions. 
That  the  tendering  process  is 
ta inted  by  corruption is  not  lost  on 
anyone,  but  the  state  is  working, 
doing  something  tangible,  moving 
the  country  forward,  despite 
i ts  shortcomings  in  other  areas, 
including,  in  fact,  in  the  area  of 
infrastructure.  In  Inhapossa,  while 
everyone is  busy “making  blocks”, 
the  municipal  government  has 
recently  started  paving  some of  the 
c i ty’s  main  arter ies.  Residents  are 
enthusiast ical ly  hopeful :  “One day 
we’ l l  no  longer  have  to  walk  on 
sand !”,  I  was  told.
In  this  era  of  growing prosperi ty, 
there  seems to  be  more  at  play 
than performance and spectacle. 
I  think that  behind the  façade, 
behind what  Andrew Apter  cal ls 
the  “empire  of  s igns”  (2005) , 
l ies  something  more  substantial, 
possibly  more  enduring.  At  play, 
at  least  in  part,  is  a  growing 
emphasis  on  transparency 
and accountabi l i ty,  and also  a 
revived fai th  in  progress  and 
modernizat ion.  Meanwhile,  by 
invest ing  in  cement  and eventual ly 
by  bui lding,  Mozambicans  insist 
that  they are  doing  their  part  in 
helping  the  country  move forward; 
in  helping  Mozambique look 
beauti ful.  Whether  academics 
agree  or  not  on  measuring 
prosperi ty  through i ts  s igns 
and symbols,  this  is  of ten  how 
everyone else  assess  prosperi ty 
and progress.  
I f  the  end of  the  Cold  War 
marked,  as  Piot  suggested  in 
his  book No s ta l g i a  f o r  th e  Fu t u re 
(2010) ,  “a  real  break from the 
colonial  system of  governance,” 
especial ly  fol lowing  the  drying 
up of  Cold  War  monies,  then I 
think  i t  is  t ime to  look at  the  so-
cal led  global  f inancial  cr is is  as 
an  important  threshold  in  Afr ica, 
which as  a  whole,  has  emerged 
rather  unscathed in  comparison 
to  the  north  Atlantic  economies. 
The  growing popular i ty  of  reverse 
migrat ion,  as  i t  is  sometimes 
referred  to,  whereby Europeans 
seek their  fortune in  former 
colonies—scores  of  Portuguese 
nat ionals  have,  for  instance, 
immigrated  to  Mozambique and 
Angola  in  the  last  few years—
certainly  speaks  to  s ignif icant 
g lobal  reconfigurat ions. 
By investing in cement, 
mozambicans insist that 
they are doing their part 




ideal izat ion far  less  these  days 
than I  did  only  a  few years  ago. 
Prosperi ty  rather  than cr isis  has 
come to  dominate  local  narrat ives. 
Prosperi ty  inevitably  comes  with 
new (and sometimes  not  so  new) 
dependencies,  exclusions  and 
interdependencies,  and China’s 
recent  economic  slowdown 
may prove  to  have  far  reaching 
consequences.  Quest ioned on this 
very  issue  in  a  2015  interview, 
Al iko  Dangote,  who has  probably 
done his  market  research,  said : 
“We don’t  think that  short 
term.  Afr ica  wil l  be  bui lding  for 
decades.”  As  an  increasingly 
powerful  medium,  cement 
s imultaneously  indexes  and drives 
prosperi ty.  Cement,  in  short,  is  the 
thing  of  now.
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are  mater ia l  as  much  as  they  are 
socia l—and  that  they  do,  in  fact, 
matter.
This  has  led  me  to  think  about  the 
suburb  as  a  spat ia l,  bui l t  form  as 
much  as  i t  is  a  part icular  socia l 
space  in  which  c lass  d i f ference  is 
reproduced  socia l ly  and  cul tural ly. 
Class  d i f ference  is  made  and 
reproduced  through  the  pract ices 
of  acquir ing  land,  bui lding  a  house 
and  l iving  a  suburban  l i festyle. 
Such  pract ices  involve  local  and 
g lobal  c i rculat ions :  among  other 
things,  of  people,  cash,  documents, 
bui lding  mater ia ls,  cars,  design 
ideas  and  sof t  furnishings.  But  they 
a lso  involve  accret ion—of  assets 
such  as  houses  and  cars,  of  ways 
of  doing  things  such  as  planning 
and  bui lding,  and  of  the  bui l t 
environment,  such  as  landscapes. 
Suburban  landscapes  are  the 
outcome  of  decades  of  overlapping 
colonial  and  post-colonial 
laws,  planning  procedures  and 
attempts  at  urban  development ; 
ad  hoc  donor  and  pr ivate  sector 
intervent ions ;  and  the  accret ion  of 
thousands  of  individual  bui lding 
pro jects.  In  the  rest  of  this  p iece  I 
want  to  br ief ly  show  how  suburban 
landscapes,  suburban  housing 
and  suburban  futures  provide 
windows  on  to  the  c i rculat ions  and 
accret ions  that  enable  middle  c lass 
accumulat ion  in  contemporary  Dar 
es  Salaam. 
Al though  these  suburban 
landscapes  are  re lat ively  new  they 
have  been  in  the  making  s ince  at 
least  the  1960 s.  Today  they  are 
socia l ly  mixed  places,  dominated 
by  individual  wal led  plots  and 
punctuated  by  col lect ions  of  more 
haphazard  dwel l ings  bui l t  in  the 
suburban  interst ices—in  val leys 
and  disused  quarr ies,  near  swamps 
and  open  ground  for  infrastructure 
l ike  gas  pipel ines  and  e lectr ic i ty 
pylons.  This  socia l  mix  ref lects  the 
The  emerging  suburbs  are 
dominated  by  the  middle  c lasses, 
but  not  ( yet )  exclusively  so.
New  and  dist inct ive  l i festyles 
are  evident  in  Dar  es  Salaam’ s 
suburbs,  character ised  by  the 
house  as  a  s i te  of  d isplay  and 
consumption,  a  preference  for 
Engl ish-medium  pr ivate  schools 
and  a  re l iance  on  the  pr ivate  car, 
which  part ly  explains  the  gr inding 
dai ly  commute  of  up  to  three 
hours  to  the  c i ty  centre.  Those 
who  do  not  work  in  town  avoid  the 
c i ty  centre  a l together  and  conduct 
a l l  o f  their  shopping,  banking 
and  socia l  act ivi t ies  local ly.  Dai ly 
grocer ies  and  f resh  foods,  baked 
goods,  pharmaceut ical  products, 
l ivestock  feed,  bui lding  mater ia ls, 
c lothes  and  homewares  can  a l l 
be  purchased  in  the  many  smal l 
shops  interspersed  with  the 
bars,  hair  sa lons,  wrought-iron 
workshops  and  re l ig ious  bui ldings 
l ining  the  roads  and  paths  that 
wind  through  the  suburbs.
As  these  observat ions  suggest, 
in  the  course  of  the  broader 
pro ject  that  this  p iece  comes 
f rom  I  have  been  thinking 
about  how  suburban  landscapes 
get  made  in  post-colonial 
contexts,  and,  in  part icular,  the 
role  of  the  middle  c lasses  in 
making  these  landscapes.  I  am 
part icularly  interested  in  the 
middle  c lass  “boundary  work” 
that  d ist inguishes  interests, 
l i festyles,  values,  aesthet ics  and 
socio-economic  posi t ion.  Here  I 
draw  attent ion  to  the  speci f ical ly 
spat ia l  forms  of  boundary  work 
that  take  place  in  the  suburbs. 
Star t ing  f rom  the  assumption 
that  the  socia l  and  the  spat ia l 
make  each  other,  I  argue  that  we 
should  pay  attent ion  to  the  ways 
in  which  the  spaces  invoked  in 
discussions  of  boundary  work, 
socia l  h ierarchies  and  inequal i t ies 
I
f  the  Afr ican  middle 
c lass  is  growing, 
how  is  this  group 
shaping  contemporary 
urban  landscapes ?  I 
sketch  out  an  answer 
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by  looking  at  the  re lat ionship 
between  middle-class  growth  and 
suburbanizat ion  in  Dar  es  Salaam, 
Tanzania.  The  middle  c lasses 
and  the  suburbs  are  mutual ly 
const i tut ive  in  contemporary 
urban  Afr ica.  Processes  of 
c i rculat ion  and  accret ion 
involving  land  and  housing  shore 
up  c la ims  to  middle  c lassness  at 
the  same  t ime  that  they  produce 
dist inct ive  suburban  landscapes  in 
what  was,  20  years  ago,  the  p e r i-
urba n  edge  of  the  c i ty.
These  suburban  landscapes  have 
emerged  in  an  arc  about  20 - 30 km 
to  the  north  and  west  of  the  c i ty, 
in  places  such  as  Bunju,  Goba, 
Kimara,  Segerea  and  Wazo.  Dar  es 
Salaam  has  had  suburbs,  def ined 
by  s ingle  houses  in  individual 
plots,  sometimes  surrounded  by 
a  garden  or  a  wal l,  s ince  at  least 
the  1970 s  with  s i tes  and  services 
schemes  in  the  ( now )  inner 
suburbs  of  S inza  and  Kij i tonyama, 
about  1 0 - 15 km  from  the  c i ty 
centre.  These  places  have  s ince 
undergone  low-rise  densi f icat ion 
( subdivided  plots,  larger  bui lding 
footpr ints  on  plots )  and  the 
f ront ier  of  suburban  growth  has 
subsequently  moved  outwards 
i nto  the  c i ty’ s  former  per i-
urban  hinterland.  Low-densi ty 
resident ia l  neighbourhoods 
dominate  these  suburban  spaces. 
The  housing  is  character ised  by 
detached  bungalows  and  vi l las, 
surrounded  by  gardens  and 
enclosed  by  wal ls.  However,  these 
houses  are  se l f-bui l t—they  are 
not  the  large  planned  housing 
schemes  bui l t  and  then  sold  by 
developers  that  are  underway 
a long  Dar’ s  coastl ine.  
CORRIDORS_Design_v1.indd   40 2017/08/17   8:01 AM
are  mater ia l  as  much  as  they  are 
socia l—and  that  they  do,  in  fact, 
matter.
This  has  led  me  to  think  about  the 
suburb  as  a  spat ia l,  bui l t  form  as 
much  as  i t  is  a  part icular  socia l 
space  in  which  c lass  d i f ference  is 
reproduced  socia l ly  and  cul tural ly. 
Class  d i f ference  is  made  and 
reproduced  through  the  pract ices 
of  acquir ing  land,  bui lding  a  house 
and  l iving  a  suburban  l i festyle. 
Such  pract ices  involve  local  and 
g lobal  c i rculat ions :  among  other 
things,  of  people,  cash,  documents, 
bui lding  mater ia ls,  cars,  design 
ideas  and  sof t  furnishings.  But  they 
a lso  involve  accret ion—of  assets 
such  as  houses  and  cars,  of  ways 
of  doing  things  such  as  planning 
and  bui lding,  and  of  the  bui l t 
environment,  such  as  landscapes. 
Suburban  landscapes  are  the 
outcome  of  decades  of  overlapping 
colonial  and  post-colonial 
laws,  planning  procedures  and 
attempts  at  urban  development ; 
ad  hoc  donor  and  pr ivate  sector 
intervent ions ;  and  the  accret ion  of 
thousands  of  individual  bui lding 
pro jects.  In  the  rest  of  this  p iece  I 
want  to  br ief ly  show  how  suburban 
landscapes,  suburban  housing 
and  suburban  futures  provide 
windows  on  to  the  c i rculat ions  and 
accret ions  that  enable  middle  c lass 
accumulat ion  in  contemporary  Dar 
es  Salaam. 
Al though  these  suburban 
landscapes  are  re lat ively  new  they 
have  been  in  the  making  s ince  at 
least  the  1960 s.  Today  they  are 
socia l ly  mixed  places,  dominated 
by  individual  wal led  plots  and 
punctuated  by  col lect ions  of  more 
haphazard  dwel l ings  bui l t  in  the 
suburban  interst ices—in  val leys 
and  disused  quarr ies,  near  swamps 
and  open  ground  for  infrastructure 
l ike  gas  pipel ines  and  e lectr ic i ty 
pylons.  This  socia l  mix  ref lects  the 
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dif ferent  ways  that  people  have 
accessed  land  in  the  area  over 
the  last  hal f-century,  including 
erstwhi le  farmers  who  farmed 
here  in  the  1960 s  an d  70 s  as  part 
of  state-led  ini t ia t ives  to  increase 
agr icul tural  output,  but  who  have 
now  turned  their  farmland  into 
hom esteads.
More  recent  arr ivals  include 
inner-ci ty  residents  looking  for 
a f fordable  land  on  which  to  bui ld 
a  house  and  a  minori ty  who  have 
bought  planned  plots  in  newly 
la id  out  resident ia l  areas.  The 
state  has  provided  some  formal 
planned  land  for  housing,  such  as 
the  20 , 000  Plots  scheme  launched 
in  2002  that  a l located  surveyed 
land  for  se l f-bui lders  in  suburban 
and  per i-urban  areas.  By  2006 
some  30 , 000  plots  had  been  made 
avai lable  c i tywide.  The  major i ty  of 
suburban  residents,  however,  have 
acquired  and  developed  their  land 
i nformal ly  over  t ime.
Beginning  in  the  la te  1980 s,  the 
former  per i-urban  f r inges  of 
the  c i ty  were  t ransformed  into 
suburbs.  As  people  star ted  to 
bui ld  houses,  the  per i-urban  areas 
t ransformed  f rom  what  John  Br iggs 
and  Davis  Mwamfupe  in  2000 
descr ibed  as  “a  zone  of  survival” 
into  “a  zone  of  investment” .  By 
1997 ,  they  est imate  that  two-
thirds  of  the  houses  under 
construct ion  in  the  new  suburbs 
were  being  bui l t  by  middle-
class  state  employees  who  were 
ent i t led  to  a  Tsh 1 00 , 000  ( ro ughly 
$ 160 )  monthly  housing  a l lowance, 
whi le  others  bui l t  with  “windfal l 
cash”  associated  with  the  new 
opportunit ies  that  presented 
themselves  with  economic 
l iberal izat ion. 
The  rush  to  acquire  suburban 
land  was  a lso  fuel led  by  land 
law  reform  ( in  part icular 
the  Land  Act  1999  and  the 
Vi l lage  Land  Act  1999 ) ,  which 
ef fect ively  commodif ied  land 
and  st imulated  a  land  market 
in  Tanzania.  Speculat ion 
increased  dramatical ly  as  land 
acquisi t ion  and  house-bui lding 
became  signi f icant  investment 
st rategies  for  the  middle  c lasses 
in  the  absence  of  mortgage 
f inancing.  Only  a  minori ty  of 
urban  dwel lers,  however,  hold 
legal  t i t le  to  their  land,  despi te 
at tempts  at  formal isat ion  through 
the  Property  and  Business 
Formal izat ion  Programme,  or 
Mpango  wa  Kurasimisha  Rasi l imal i 
na  Biashara  za  Wanyonge 
( MKURABITA ) ,  which  issues 
resident ia l  l icenses  to  people 
with  informal  r ights  in  unplanned 
areas.  Ef for ts  to  issue  t i t les  have 
fa l len  way  behind  appl icat ions. 
In  unplanned  suburbs  residents 
are  st i l l  most  l ikely  to  hold 
customary  or  informal  r ights  to 
land  sanct ioned  by  neighbours  and 
the  st reet  government,  the  lowest 
level  of  urban  local  government. 
These  changes  have  meant  that 
places  that  used  to  be  regard ed 
as  the  c i ty’ s  per i-urban  f r inges 
have  become  popular  resident ia l 
neighbourhoods  as  more  people 
seek  re lat ively  af fordable  land 
c lose  to  the  c i ty  on  which  to 
bui ld  a  house.  In  the  past  plots 
located  20 km  and  beyond  f rom 
the  c i ty  centre  would  not  have 
been  desirable.  But  c i ty  dwel lers 
have  been  increasingly  drawn 
to  the  suburbs  as  residents  have 
brought  infrastructure ;  pr ivate  car 
ownership  has  increased  and  new 
pr ivate  buses  now  serve  the  c i ty’ s 
many  resident ia l  neighbourhoods. 
Houses  of fer  perhaps  the 
most  reveal ing  window  on  to 
contemporary  c lass  pract ices, 
marrying  the  c i rculat ion  of 
money,  things  and  taste  with  the 
s low  accret ion  of  concrete  wal ls, 
window  frames  and  roof ing  sheets. 
The  suburban  vi l la  or  bungalow 
has  increasingly  become  a  s i te 
of  d ist inct ion  s ince  pol i t ica l  and 
economic  l iberal izat ion  in  the 
mid- 1980 s.  Because  each  house 
is  an  individual  bui lding  pro ject, 
they  are  the  c learest  statement  an 
individual  can  make  about  their 
status  and  their  taste. 
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Bui lders  can  now  tap  into  a 
g lobal ised  market  of  archi tectural 
features,  roof  shape,  paint  colour, 
mater ia ls  and  level  of  f in ishing  to 
d ist inguish  their  homes  f rom  both 
poor  and  middle-class  neighbours. 
Addit ional  considerat ions  that 
ref lect  c lass  posi t ion  include  the 
physical  locat ion  of  a  plot  ( such 
as  near  tarmacked  roads  and  high 
up  on  hi l ls ides  to  capture  the 
breeze ) ,  the  s ize  of  the  house 
and  the  qual i ty  of  the  garden 
enclosed  within  the  plot  wal ls. 
No  two  houses  are  the  same,  but 
contemporary  houses  do  look 
very  s imilar  to  each  other.  This 
is  part ly  because  of  the  inf luence 
of  contemporary  fashions  and 
avai lable  mater ia ls,  but  i t  is 
a lso  an  outcome  of  the  fact  that, 
whi le  houses  ref lect  the  vis ion 
of  the  individual  resident,  they 
are  nevertheless  bui l t  by  local 
bui lders  and  craf tsmen  who  share 
a  part icular  repertoire  of  bui lding 
techniques.
Houses  are  s i tes  of  accret ion 
as  wel l  as  of  c i rculat ion.  In  a 
very  physical  sense,  houses  are 
assembled  s lowly  and  a lmost 
ent i re ly  in  the  absence  of  housing 
f inance.  Anyone  who  can  complete 
a  house  in  a  short  space  of  t ime 
is  immediately  viewed  with 
suspic ion  ( “Where  did  they  get 
that  much  cash  f rom ? ” ) .  The 
house,  and  the  land  on  which  i t  is 
bui l t,  is  of ten  an  individual’ s  most 
s igni f icant  asset.
Dar  es  Salaam’ s  suburban 
neighbourhoods  are  the  accret ions 
of  thousands  of  individual 
bui lding  pro jects.  The  process  is 
a lmost  ent i re ly  informal,  cash-
based  and  highly  precar ious.  There 
is  no  f inance  capi ta l  here,  though 
there  may  be  pr ivate  debt  as  a 
resul t  of  market  or  pr ivate  loans. 
There  is  some  state,  donor  and 
pr ivate  sector  act ivi ty  in  service 
provis ion.  Those  residents  who 
can  af ford  to,  connect  to  patchy 
e lectr ic i ty  services  provided  by 
the  state-owned  energy  ut i l i ty 
and  some  connect  to  the  water 
services  provided  by  the  water 
parastata l,  a l though  many 
suburban  residents  prefer  to  re ly 
on  their  own  boreholes  or  pr ivate 
del ivery  service.  Some  roads 
have  been  tarmacked  as  part  of 
World  Bank  or  state  pro jects,  but 
the  major i ty  are  d ir t  t racks  that 
d is integrate  in  the  ra ins. 
The state has provided 
some formal planned 
land for housing, such as 
the 20,000 Plots scheme 
launched in 2002 that 
allocated surveyed 
land for self-builders 
in suburban and peri-
urban areas
Neighbours  use  socia l  media  to 
ra ise  money  for  improvements  to 
their  local  infrastructure.  Pr ivate 
pr imary  and  secondary  schools 
are  re lat ively  plent i ful,  whi le 
poorer  residents  bear  the  brunt  of 
the  state’ s  fa i lure  to  keep  up  with 
these  burgeoning  neighbourhoods. 
Local  government  of f ices  exist, 
but  are  inadequately  resourced 
and  descr ibe  their  own  role  as 
“conf l ic t  resolut ion,  keeping  the 
peace  and  secur i ty” .  The  lat ter, 
secur i ty,  is  in  some  instances 
organised  and  provided  by 
residents  themselves.  Procedures 
around  urban  planning,  surveying 
and  t i t l ing  are  unpredictable  but 
a lways  expensive.  Maps  del imit ing 
the  planned  use  of  space  are 
not  in  c i rculat ion,  so  that 
neighbourhoods  develop  according 
to  their  own  logics  and  pol i t ics.  In 
any  case,  maps  can  a lways  be  re-
drawn  for  a  fee.
I t  is  therefore  no  surpr ise  to  learn 
that  a  major  e lement  of  middle-
class  boundary  work  involves 
var ious  st ruggles  over  land :  border 
d isputes  ( between  neighbours 
or  family  members ) ,  st ruggles 
over  of f ic ia l  tenure  ( against 
d i f ferent  levels  of  the  state ) ,  state 
demoli t ion  ( of  st ructures  too  c lose 
to  b i ts  of  infrastructure )  and  the 
very  ownership  and  use  of  land 
( between  poor  and  middle-class 
residents ) .
In  this  context  the  suburb  emerges 
not  just  as  a  place  of  accret ion 
for  middle-class  assets,  but 
a lso  as  a  s i te  through  which 
the  middle  c lasses  c i rculate  as 
they  accumulate.  The  middle 
c lasses,  who  part ly  re ly  on  the 
dist inct iveness  of  the  suburban 
landscape  to  shore  up  their  status 
c la ims,  are  nevertheless  a l ready 
making  plans  to  move  on.  As  the 
unplanned  and  informal  pract ices 
that  dominate  suburban  land  use 
lead  increasingly  to  unregulated 
sub-divis ion  and  bui lding,  so  are 
the  middle  c lasses  looking  to  their 
next  bui lding  pro ject  in  Dar  es 
Salaam’ s  neighbouring  regions. 
Many  have  a l ready  acquired  land 
in  these  dist r ic ts,  which  they 
currently  farm.  In  ten  years  t ime 
they  wi l l  move  to  new  houses  – 
possibly  by  then  located  in  the 
new  suburbs  of  Dar  es  Salaam, 
leaving  their  current  homes  as 
rental  pro jects.  Circulat ing  and 
accret ing  land  and  houses  in 
Dar  es  Salaam  is  a  spat ia l  and 
temporal  middle-class  st rategy  of 
accumulat ion.
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shaping  regions  and  geographies 
are  important  to  negot iat ing 
conte mporary  attempts  of  port-
making  in  the  western  Indian 
Ocean  l i t toral.  For  instance,  in  a 
f i f teenth-century  poem  celebrat ing 
the  craf t  of  the  pi lot,  the  Arab 
navigator  Ibn  Maj id  mentions  f ive 
routes  to  t raverse  the  Red  Sea.  The 
f i rst  two  are  coasta l  routes  sa i l ing 
between  reefs  and  the  coast.  The 
third  route  is  down  the  middle, 
with  no  land  vis ible,  and  the  f inal 
two  navigate  f rom  is land  to  is land, 
snaking  their  way  down  the  sea. 
For  Ibn  Maj id,  the  f i rst  two  are 
“mere  chi ld’ s  play ;  the  routes 
taken  by  the  r u b b a n  [ representat ive 
of  the  shipowner ]  of  the  coast”  and 
“not  the  path  of  the  t rue  m u a l l i m ” 
( navigator ) .
According  to  Ibn  Maj id,  a  real 
m u a l l i m  sa i led  up  and  down 
the  middle  of  the  sea  and  only 
moved  towards  the  coast  when 
in  the  correct  posi t ion,  steer ing 
st ra ight  into  the  harbour.  From 
the  de mands  of  the  r u b b a n  to 
jutt ing  reefs  and  ever-present 
wind  gusts,  navigat ion  for  Ibn 
Maj id  and  contemporar ies  was  not 
merely  movement  through  space 
but  entai led  a  form  of  mastery, 
negot iat ion,  and  entanglement—a 
way  of  dwel l ing  in  inhospi table 
space.  Navigat ion  was  a lso  central 
to  creat ing  a  t rans-regional  world 
of  t rade  and  mobi l i ty  that  brought 
together  a  st r ing  of  port  c i t ies 
across  the  Indian  Ocean  l i t toral, 
f rom  Mogadishu  to  Malacca. 
As  early  as  the  f i rst  century  AD, 
ta les  f rom  ports  in  the  “land  of 
Punt”  appeared  on  papyrus  in 
arr ival,  few  European  goods  were 
in  demand.  The  Portuguese  brought 
s i lver  f rom  the  Americas,  thus 
connect ing  the  Atlant ic  to  the 
Indian  Ocean  world.
A  now,  largely-discredi ted, 
view  also  emphasized  European 
incursions  as  marking  the  end  of 
peaceable  t rade  and  usher ing  a 
melding  of  cannon  and  commerce 
in  these  formerly  placid  waters. 
However,  as  histor ians  l ike  Patr ic ia 
Risso,  Sebast ian  Prange  and 
Lakshmi  Subramanian  note,  p i racy 
and  other  forms  of  predat ion  have 
been  equal ly  central  to  this  l iquid 
domain.  Pract ices  of  armed  escort, 
narrat ives  of  notor ious  pirate 
monarchs  and  coasta l  ra iding 
communit ies  bear  testament  to 
the  inter twined  and  s l ippery 
re lat ionship  between  t rade  and 
ra id. 
Much  has  been  made  of  recent 
Chinese  investment  and 
infrastructural  engagement  in  this 
region.  These  debates  have  usual ly 
sought  to  place  the  movement  of 
Chinese  capi ta l  and  labour  into 
f rameworks  of  neo-imperia l ism 
or  indexing  possibi l i t ies  for  more 
equitable  south-south  sol idar i ty. 
Thinking  through  navigat ion  is 
not  a  denial  of  the  possibi l i t ies 
of  exploi tat ion  or  sol idar i ty 
across  cont inents,  but  instead, 
recognit ion  of  the  weight  of 
h istory  as  both  process  and  pro ject 
in  shaping  the  world  of  port-ci t ies, 
past  and  present,  in  the  western 
Indian  Ocean. 
In  August  2014 ,  Ch ina’ s  largest 
state-owned  infrastructure 
enterpr ise,  the  China 
Communicat ions  Construct ion 
Company  ( C CCC ) ,  s igned  a  $ 478 . 9 
mil l ion  deal  to  construct  three 
berths  at  the  Kenyan  Indian  Ocean 
port  of  Lamu.  This  construct ion 
ancient  Greece.  Compiled  into 
the  Pe r i p l u s  Ma r i s  E r yt h ra e i ,  these 
parchments  descr ibe  a  r ich 
commercia l  world  shaped  by 
wind  patterns  where  the  lure 
of  l u b b a n  or  f rankincense  drew 
traders  f rom  across  the  ocean  to 
ports  l ike  Berbera  and  Mogadishu. 
Fol lowing  the  Pe r i p l u s ,  the  east 
Afr ican  coast  and  Somal ia  appear 
in  the  early  Is lamic  works  of 
the  ninth  century  including  a l-
Hamawi’ s  K i ta b  M u’ j a m  a l-B u l d a n ,  a 
geographical  d ict ionary  that  noted 
the  importance  of  Mogadishu  as 
the  central  t rade  emporia  on  the 
east  Afr ican  coast. 
H
istor ies  of  navigat ion 
and  the  ways  through 
which  pro jects  of 
movement  across 
l iquid  domains  have 
been  product ive  in 
Old sea stories  are  central  to  China’s  investment  and 





Practices of armed 
escort, narratives 
of notorious pirate 
monarchs and coastal 
raiding communities 
bear testament to the 
intertwined and slippery 
relationship over the 
longue-durée between 
trade and raid
By  the  f i rst  hal f  of  the  tenth 
century,  a  r ing  of  coasta l  towns 
emerged  creat ing  a  world  of  t rade 
a long  whose  pathways  t ravel led 
a  dazzl ing  array  of  mater ia l 
objects,  f ree  and  un-free  people, 
and  the  world  Is lamic  re l ig ion. 
Vasco  da  Gama’ s  entry  into  this 
world  in  1498 ,  fac i l i ta ted  by 
a  myster ious  local  navigator, 
c la imed  by  mari t ime  communit ies 
f rom  Cal icut  to  Mal indi,  marked  a 
shi f t  f rom  a  regional  economy  to 
a  g lobal  one.  Pr ior  to  Portuguese 
J A T I N  D U A
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project  is  part  of  a  wider  Lamu 
Port  South  Sudan  Ethiopia 
Transport  ( LAPSSET )  corr idor 
and  at  complet ion  wi l l  include  a 
32 -berth  port  a long  with  ra i l road 
and  oi l  infrastructure  connect ing 
inland  east  and  central  Afr ica  to 
the  wider  Indian  Ocean.  Orig inal ly 
conceived  in  1972 ,  the  idea  for  a 
container  port  in  Lamu—one  of  the 
earl iest  coasta l  sett lements  on  the 
coast  of  east  Afr ica—was  beset  by 
delays  and  controversies  f rom  the 
outset,  and  was  eventual ly  shelved 
in  the  la te  1970 s. 
In  the  early  2000 s,  as  the  Kenyan 
government  turned  to  the  Indian 
Ocean  as  part  of  a  wider  eastward 
shi f t,  the  Lamu  port  pro ject  was 
revived  amidst  interest  f rom  the 
Chinese  government  looking  to 
establ ish  a  port-of-cal l  on  the 
east  Afr ican  coast.  In  the  midst 
of  negot iat ions  to  construct  the 
port,  the  Chinese  government 
a lso  sought  to  create  a  longer 
narrat ive  of  Chinese  presence  on 
the  east  Afr ican  coast.  Anchored 
in  DNA  test ing  and  underwater 
archaeological  expedit ions,  Lamu 
was  establ ished  in  this  narrat ive 
as  the  locale  of  one  of  Zheng 
He’ s  shipwrecks  f rom  the  early 
f i f teenth  century. 
A  Hui  Musl im,  Zheng  He’ s  voyages 
across  the  Indian  Ocean  have  been 
central  in  establ ishing  a  vis ion 
of  pre-modern  China  as  a  g lobal 
power  with  sovereignty  over  the 
sea.  As  Chinese  state  focus  and 
capi ta l  moved  across  the  Indian 
Ocean,  interest  in  Zheng  He  and 
his  oceanic  wanderings  has  been 
revived  as  histor ical  precedent  for 
China’ s  contemporary  westward 
expansion  through  the  New  Si lk 
Road  and  other  infrastructural 
in i t ia t ives.  Zheng  He’ s  navigat ions 
were  central  to  “secur i t iz ing” 
Chinese  investment  by  locat ing 
contemporary  Chinese  ef for ts 
to  create  a  m l a n g o  wa c h i n a 
( Chinese  doorway )  into  east  and 
central  Afr ica  within  a  famil iar 
language  of  genealogy  and 
oceanic  exchange.  In  the  Lamu 
archipelago,  the  Shange  and 
Famao  c lans  on  Pate  Is land,  just 
north  of  the  proposed  port,  c la im 
descent  f rom  Chinese  sa i lors  who 
survived  a  shipwreck  of f  the  coast 
of  Pate.
The  largest  is land  in  the  Lamu 
archipelago,  Pate  was  once  the 
pol i t ica l,  economic  and  re l ig ious 
locus  on  the  east  Afr ican  coast. 
By  the  e ighteenth  century,  Pate’ s 
prominence  was  ecl ipsed  in  a 
ser ies  of  conf l ic ts  with  i ts  more 
i l lustr ious  neighbour  to  the  south, 
Lamu,  and  i ts  lack  of  a  natural 
deep-water  harbour.  Today,  Pate 
is  a  lush  jumble  of  ruins  amidst 
ramshackle  sett lements.  I t  has 
a  d ist inctly  f ront ier  feel ing.  The 
crumbling  remains  of  mosques, 
tax  houses  and  other  bui ldings 
test i fy  to  the  former  g lory  of  Pate 
and  the  numerous  comings  and 
goings  that  character ized  l i fe 
on  this  is land,  and  the  Swahi l i 
coast  as  a  whole.  In  one  such 
ramshackle  town  is  a  smal l  mud 
house  that  in  recent  years  has 
become  a  s i te  of  p i lgr image  and 
cur iosi ty  for  Chinese  diplomats, 
western  journal ists  and  sol i tary 
anthropologists. 
Residents  of  S iyu  used  to  cal l 
the  inhabitants  of  this  house 
the  wa c h i n a  based  on  a  passing 
physical  resemblance  to  the 
occasional  Asian  tour ists  who 
made  their  way  to  Lamu.  In  2005 , 
a  team  of  Chinese  genet ic ists 
arr ived  to  ver i fy  these  c la ims  and 
through  DNA  samples  taken  f rom 
these  famil ies,  d iscovered  that 
s ix  Siyu  residents  were  of  d istant 
Chinese  ancestry,  including  the 
residents  of  this  house.  These 
inhabitants  of  Pate  soon  became 
known  as  the  “Lamu  Chinese. ” 
With  great  fanfare,  the  Chinese 
government  invi ted  the  young 
woman  who  l ived  in  that  house, 
Mwamaka  Shar i fu  Lal i,  to  Nanj ing 
to  at tend  celebrat ions  of  the  s ix-
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hundredth  anniversary  of  Zheng 
He’ s  voyages.  Shar i fu  was  a lso 
g iven  a  scholarship  to  study  in 
Bei j ing  and  cont inues  to  l ive  in 
China.  “We  used  to  be  ashamed 
about  being  cal led  Chinese,  but 
now  I’ m  happy  that  we  have  a 
home  across  the  sea, ”  Shar i fu’ s 
m othe r  told  me.
In  addi t ion  to  DNA  test ing,  the 
Chinese  government  a lso  funded 
underwater  archaeological 
expedit ions  in  order  to  recover 
mater ia l  t races  of  Zheng  He’ s 
vis i ts.  This  was  not  the  f i rst  t ime 
that  Zheng  He’ s  journey  had  been 
l inked  to  capi ta l  investments  and 
the  forging  of  other  south-south 
engagements.  Unl ike  Tanzania 
or  socia l ist  Somal ia,  Kenya 
remained  f i rmly  in  the  orbi t  of 
the  United  States  throughout  the 
Cold  War.  Kenya  did  however  have 
s igni f icant  interact ion  with  China 
shortly  af ter  i ts  independence 
in  1963 .  Diplomatic  re lat ions 
with  the  People’ s  Republ ic  of 
China,  as  opposed  to  Taiwan, 
were  establ ished  soon  af ter 
independence.  The  move  was 
led  by  the  lef t  wing  of  the  rul ing 
Kenya  Afr ican  Nat ional  Union 
( KANU )  party,  in  part icular  by 
Jaramogi  Oginga  Odinga,  then 
KANU’ s  vice  president. 
Odinga’ s  vis ion  of  re lat ions 
with  China  was  one  greatly 
inf luenced  by  a  post-Bandung 
i nte rnat ional ism  and  ant i-
colonial  sol idar i ty.  Bandung 
internat ional ism  was  nonetheless 
rooted  in  a  terr i tor ia l  nat ional ist 
imaginary  and  emphasized 
the  common  exper ience  of 
colonial ism  and  a  valor isat ion 
of  the  nat ion-state—shared 
exper iences  of  colonial ism,  not 
shared  histor ies.  Zheng  He’ s 
voyages  were  seen  as  emblematic 
of  this  form  of  internat ional ism 
and  numerous  Chinese  vis i tors 
to  newly  independent  Afr ican 
countr ies  would  emphasize  the 
decidedly  non-colonial  nature  of 
his  voyages.  One  such  example 
occurred  in  1964  when  Chinese 
Premier  Zhou  En-Iai,  addressing 
a  packed  audience  in  Mogadishu, 
highl ighted  that  Zheng  He  did  not 
occupy  a  s ingle  piece  of  land  or 
se ize  any  i l l-gotten  weal th. 
Zheng  He’ s  navigat ion  was 
t ransformed  in  this  moment 
as  an  example  of  ant i-colonial 
nat ional ism.  What  was  important 
was  that  Zheng  He  had  no  imperia l 
ambit ions  and  lef t  without  a 
t race :  cannon  and  commerce 
were  f i rmly  separated  in  this 
rhetor ic  of  engagement.  This 
ant i-colonial  t ransnat ional ism 
fa i led  to  gain  much  foot ing  in 
of f ic ia l  c i rcui ts  in  the  early  era 
of  Kenyan  independence.  Indeed, 
Chinese  and  Kenyan  re lat ionships 
were  qui te  tense  in  the  1960 s 
and  70 s,  a l though  both  countr ies 
paid  l ip  service  to  this  vis ion. 
In  the  1980 s,  in  the  af termath 
of  st ructural  adjustment  and 
l iberal izat ion,  the  cal l  o f  business 
and  investment  was  central 
to  bui lding  new  relat ionships 
between  China  and  Kenya,  mostly 
in  manufactur ing  and  pr ivate 
investments. 
In  2005 ,  Zheng  He’ s  spr i t  was 
revived  when  Kenya  and  China 
s igned  a  memorandum  of 
understanding  for  infrastructural 
investments.  The  memorandum, 
among  other  things,  l isted  funding 
for  archaeological  d igs  a long 
the  coast  and  funding  Kenyan 
underwater  archaeologists  to 
search  for  Zheng  He’ s  wrecks. 
Unl ike  the  Zheng  He  of  the 
1960 s,  who  lef t  without  a  t race, 
i t  was  precisely  the  mater ia l 
and  genealogical  remains  of  this 
f i f teenth-century  voyage  that 
now  mattered.  I t  was  within  this 
newer  narrat ive  of  navigat ion  that 
Shar i fu  and  the  Lamu  Chinese 
were  swept  up :  mater ia l  remains 
of  older  histor ies  that  sought  to 
anchor  modern  investments.  Ming 
coins,  shipwrecks  and  st rands  of 
DNA  emerged  as  the  infrastructure 
through  which  of fshore  o i l 
dr i l l ing,  port  pro jects,  and 
expanding  ra i l  l ines  f rom  coast  to 
hinterland  were  f ramed. 
Navigat ion  is  bumpy.  I f  Shar i fu’ s 
story  f i ts  seamlessly  into  Zheng 
He  as  histor ical  proxy  for  the 
contemporary  expansion  of 
Chinese  state-owned  enterpr ise 
capi ta l,  o ther  ta les  of  navigat ion 
muddy  these  waters  and  a lso 
become  framing  devices  to  think 
about  the  ethics  of  infrastructure 
and  investments.  Unl ike  Shar i fu, 
most  Famao  ( Lamu  Chinese ) 
recol lect  a  d i f ferent  ta le  about 
their  or ig ins.  For  the  Famao  their 
story  begins  with  a  shipwreck. 
Instead  of  a  f i f teenth-century 
imperia l  f leet,  i t  begins  with  an 
e ighteenth-century  ship  of  Haj j 
p i lgr ims  en  route  to  the  Hijaz,  a 
region  in  Saudi  Arabia  border ing 
on  the  Red  Sea.
In  a  vividly  narrated  poem,  the 
Famao  te l l  o f  winds  that  d isor ient 
and  disrupt  this  p i lgr image.  Lost, 
hungry  and  parched,  a l l  hope 
is  apparently  lost  as  the  ship 
runs  aground.  Once  the  storm 
clears,  the  shipwrecked  pi lgr ims 
f ind  themselves  miraculously 
at  a  beach  next  to  Pate’ s  oldest 
mosque.  Taking  this  as  a  s ign 
f rom  Al lah,  the  Famao  decide  to 
stay  in  Pate  and  br ing  the  correct 
interpretat ions  of  Is lam  to  this 
vi l lage. 
This  story  of  shipwreck  and 
salvat ion  highl ights  a  d i f ferent 
modal i ty  of  navigat ion  than 
the  of f ic ia l  story  of  Zheng  He’ s 
descendants  and  hegemonic 
modes  of  understanding  Chinese 
capi ta l  investments  in  sub-
Saharan  Afr ica.  Instead  of  the 
“smooth”  space  of  imperia l  contact 
and  seamless  long  histor ies,  this 
is  a  “str iated”  space  of  smal l  boats 
a f loat  in  a  dangerous  sea.  This  is 
a  world  that  reveals,  as  Maurice 
Blanchot  puts  i t,  the  “sovereignty 
of  the  accidental” .  At  the  same 
t ime,  there  are  s igns  and  channels 
through  which  to  navigate  this 
tumultuous  sea.  The  mosque 
onshore  and  the  status  of  the 
seafarers  as  p i lgr ims  emphasizes 
the  pathways  through  which  to 
t ravel,  f rom  sea  to  land,  and  the 
ways  to  become  incorporated  into 
the  ebbs  and  f lows  of  the  east 
Afr ican  coast.
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These  cal ls  emphasize  a  mater ia l 
h istory  informed  by  Is lamic 
pr inciples  unrelated  ton  colonial 
h istory,  but  which  have  their  roots 
in  the  Sul tanate  of  Zanzibar  ( 1856 -
1964 ) —one  of  the  f i rst  per iods 
in  which  wa q f  endowments  were 
introduced  on  the  East  Afr ican 
coast.  A  debate  has  ensued 
concerning  whether  i t  is  benef ic ia l 
to  pr ivat ize  and  commodify  wa q f 
endowments  by  convert ing  them 
under  state  inst i tut ions.
Proponents  for  the 
commodif icat ion  of  land  argue  for 
the  maximum  output  and  prof i t ; 
they  further  argue  wa q f  i s  an  out-
dated  system  that  holds  land, 
render ing  i t  useless  and  denying 
an  exchange  value  associated  to  i t. 
There  has  a lso  been  a  great  deal  of 
resistance  to  the  commodif icat ion 
of  land :  i t  is  argued  that  wa q f  i s  a 
sacred  histor ical  arrangement  that 
protects  the  land  for  the  benef i t 
o f  the  community  and  assists  the 
poor,  fur thermore  that  i t  reaf f i rms 
a  history  that  is  unavai lable  to  the 
rest  of  the  Kenyan  state,  a  history 
that  belongs  to  the  Is lamic  world. 
Secessionists  have  taken  up  these 
arguments  in  their  demands  and 
gr ievances  against  the  state.  The 
st ruggle  for  coasta l  autonomy 
was  f i rst  ar t iculated  in  pol i t ica l 
terms  dur ing  the  move  towards 
independence  f rom  the  Br i t ish.  The 
idea  of  independent  nat ion  was  at 
the  forefront  of  negot iat ions  and 
debates  at  the  Lancaster  House 
conferences  ( 1960 ,  1962 ,  1963 ) 
in  which  Kenya’ s  const i tut ional 
f ramework  and  independence  were 
negot iated.  The  Coast  Peoples’ 
Party  ( CPP ) ,  one  of  the  coasta l 
part ies  c la iming  autonomy, 
argued  that  independence  would 
improve  the  wel lbeing  of  people 
belonging  to  a  d i f ferent  geographic 
history,  a  history  that  the  Kenyan 
government  was  not  a  part  of. 
These  wa q f  endowments  have 
come  to  def ine  the  urban  space 
of  Mombasa.  There  have  been 
attempts  by  the  state  to  curb 
their  h istor ical  development  to 
f i t  in  with  the  capi ta l ist  logic 
of  accumulat ion.  The  colonial 
state  sought  to  create  the  Wa q f 
Commission  Act  in  Kenya  in  order 
to  capture  the  income  der ived 
f rom  wa q f  endowments.  The  post-
independence  state  maintained 
the  Waqf  Commission,  which  was 
seen  as  nothing  short  of  corrupt, 
a  vessel  in  which  wa q f  incomes 
were  used  to  l ine  individual 
pockets.  In  many  cases  the  Waqf 
Commission  permitted,  and  in 
ef fect  fac i l i ta ted,  the  t ransfer  of 
property  and  lands  into  the  land 
tenure  system,  which  t ransformed 
land  into  a  commodity.  In  both 
instances,  the  funds  used  and 
generated  f rom  wa q f  endowments 
( meant  to  be  used  to  maintain  the 
endowment )  were  converted  into 
“incomes”  that  the  state  would 
accumulate  and  administer.
This  has  been  a  major  point  of 
content ion,  prompting  cal ls  to 
re instate  wa q f  endowments  as 
a  form  of  resistance  to  the  land 
grabs. 
A
t  their  b i r th,  many 
post-independence 
nat ions  in  Afr ica  saw 
the  looming  threat  of 
secession,  but  cal ls 





Arguments  for  and against  secession have the  potential  to  open up 
questions  about  the  nature  of  the  nation-state  in  Africa
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dismissed  as  counter-progressive 
and  as  undoing  the  victor ies  of 
the  independence  st ruggles.  Yet 
secessionist  movements  persisted, 
and  at  every  juncture  where  they 
surfaced  they  revealed  gr ievances 
re lated  to  the  mater ia l  real i t ies 
of  the  masses  and  the  c lass 
contradict ions  le f t  unresolved 
by  independence  st ruggles.  In 
this  essay  I  argue  that  whi le  the 
pol i t ica l  language,  be  i t  that  of  the 
nat ion  or  secessionist  movement, 
is  mired  in  contradict ion,  but 
rather  than  dismiss  i t  we  should 
think  of  i t  as  of fer ing  insights  into 
the  cr is is  in  socia l  and  economic 
re lat ions. 
In  di f ferent  forms,  Kenya’ s  coasta l 
peoples,  in  this  part icular  case 
in  Mombasa,  have  st ruggled 
for  secession.  The  current 
manifestat ion  of  this  movement 
has  been  the  Mombasa  Republ ican 
Counci l.  One  of  the  main  contests 
has  revolved  around  land, 
part icularly  the  re lat ionship  to 
land,  in  part icular  the  st ruggle 
ove r  wa q f  endowments.  The  awa q a f 
agreements  organize  propert ies 
held  by  Musl ims  as  endowments 
for  the  benef i t  o f  the  community, 
or  for  the  benef i t  o f  family 
l ineages  ( ext inct ion  of  r ight  of 
property  without  t ransferr ing  the 
property  to  anyone  e lse ) .  Most 
importantly  the  propert ies  that 
are  endowed  cannot  be  owned 
by  a  third  party  and  remain  so 
in  perpetui ty  with  the  funds 
f rom  the  property  benef i t t ing  the 
com munity  at  large.  The  awa q a f 
agreements  must  be  honoured 
in  perpetui ty  to  protect  the 
property  and  land  f rom  arbi t rary 
conf iscat ion. 
Waqf endowments 
have come to define 
the urban space of 
Mombasa. There 
have been attempts 
by the state to curb 
their historical 
development to 
fit in with the 
capitalist logic of 
accumulation. 
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These  cal ls  emphasize  a  mater ia l 
h istory  informed  by  Is lamic 
pr inciples  unrelated  ton  colonial 
h istory,  but  which  have  their  roots 
in  the  Sul tana te  of  Za nzibar  ( 1856 -
1964 ) —one  of  the  f i rst  per iods 
in  which  wa q f  endowments  were 
introduced  on  the  East  Afr ican 
coast.  A  debate  has  ensued 
concerning  whether  i t  is  benef ic ia l 
to  pr ivat ize  and  com m odify  wa q f 
endowments  by  convert ing  them 
under  state  inst i tut i ons.
Proponents  for  the 
commodif icat ion  of  land  argue  for 
the  maximum  output  and  prof i t ; 
they  further  a rgu e  wa q f  i s  an  ou t-
dated  system  that  holds  land, 
render ing  i t  useless  and  denying 
an  exchange  value  associated  to  i t. 
There  has  a lso  been  a  great  deal  of 
resistance  to  the  commodif icat ion 
of  land :  i t  is  a rgued  that  wa q f  i s  a 
sacred  histor ical  arrangement  that 
protects  the  land  for  the  benef i t 
o f  the  community  and  assists  the 
poor,  fur thermore  that  i t  reaf f i rms 
a  history  that  is  unavai lable  to  the 
rest  of  the  Kenyan  state,  a  history 
that  belongs  to  the  Is lamic  world. 
Secessionists  have  taken  up  these 
arguments  in  their  demands  and 
gr ievances  against  the  state.  The 
st ruggle  for  coasta l  autonomy 
was  f i rst  ar t iculated  in  pol i t ica l 
terms  dur ing  the  move  towards 
independence  f rom  the  Br i t ish.  The 
idea  of  independent  nat ion  was  at 
the  forefront  of  negot iat ions  and 
debates  at  the  Lancaster  House 
conferences  ( 1960 ,  1962 ,  1963 ) 
in  which  Kenya’ s  const i tut ional 
f ramework  and  independence  were 
negot iated.  The  Coast  Peoples’ 
Party  ( CPP ) ,  one  of  the  coasta l 
part ies  c la iming  autonomy, 
argued  that  independence  would 
improve  the  wel lbeing  of  people 
belonging  to  a  d i f ferent  geographic 
history,  a  history  that  the  Kenyan 
government  was  not  a  part  of. 
In  order  to  make  this  c la im 
legible  to  the  colonial  state  and 
to  the  nat ional ist  movements, 
part icularly  the  Kenya  Afr ica 
Nat ional  Union  ( KANU ) ,  CPP 
drew  upon  the  1895  agreement 
between  the  Sul tan  of  Zanzibar 
and  the  Br i t ish  Government.  In 
terms  of  the  agreement,  a  ten-mile 
coasta l  st r ip  that  had  never  real ly 
been  mapped  out  or  properly 
demarcated  was  t ransferred  to 
the  Br i t ish  Government  as  a 
protectorate  for  an  annual  rent  to 
the  Sul tan.  This  agreement  was 
used  as  a  peg  upon  which  to  hang 
the  demand  for  coasta l  autonomy. 
The  main  argument  was  that  the 
legal  status  of  the  East  Afr ica 
Protectorate.  The  argument  was 
that  i t  was  di f ferent  f rom  the  rest 
of  the  Br i t ish  colony  and  upon 
atta ining  internal  se l f-government 
the  re lat ionship  between  the 
inter ior  Colony  of  Kenya  and  the 
coast  changed  g iven  their  d i f fer ing 
legal  status.  Each  should  go  their 
separate  way,  the  CPP  c la imed. 
KANU  members  vehemently 
at tacked  the  coasta l  autonomists 
for  delaying  the  process  for 
ful l  independence.  They  a lso 
accused  CPP  of  harbouring  an 
ant i-nat ional ist  sent iment  and 
betraying  the  ant i-imperia l ist 
cause  by  negot iat ing  with 
the  Br i t ish  regarding  their 
status.  While  KANU  waived  the 
nat ional ist  f lag,  CPP  made  a 
s imilar  c la im  that  they  were  in 
fact  more  nat ional ist  because  they 
did  not  d ist inguish  between  race, 
re l ig ion  and  ethnic i ty.
The  secessionist’ s  argument  drew 
strongly  on  the  pol i t ica l  ideal  of 
nat ionhood.  Interest ingly,  the 
use  of  the  idea  of  an  autonomous 
nat ion  emerged  at  the  same  t ime 
as  the  1895  agreement  with  the 
Sul tan  of  Zanzibar  for  the  East 
Afr ica  Protectorate,  and  was  used 
as  a  means  to  control  the  Musl im 
populat ion  and  br ing  i t  under 
the  colonial  administrat ion.  In 
the  la te  nineteenth  century,  the 
imperia l  powers  were  cr ippled  by 
the  so-cal led  “Musl im  problem” 
in  East  Afr ica,  part icularly 
as  i t  re lated  to  labour  and 
administrat ion,  but  a lso  the 
common  cause  proposed  by  pan-
Islamism. 
Pan-Islamism  was  a  threat 
because  i t  contained  the  germ 
of  pol i t ica l  centra l izat ion, 
a lbei t  under  the  umbrel la  of  the 
spir i tual  force  of  Is lam  re ject ing 
central izat ion  under  the  colonial 
state  and  the  “tr ibal izat ion”  of  i ts 
subjects.  “So  much  so, ”  remarked 
a  local  Ugandan  administrator, 
Captain  Phi l ips,  “that  in  enquir ing 
the  t r ibe  of  the  nat ives  one  is 
f requently  met  with  the  reply,  ‘I 
am  a  Muhammedan’ . ” 
Between  1913  and  1918 ,  B r i t ish 
administrators  wrote  several 
le t ters  to  the  secretary  of  state 
colonies  in  Br i ta in  drawing 
upon  the  German  exper ience 
to  administer  and  control  the 
Is lamic  tendency  to  venture 
into  a  pol i t ica l  force  in  sub-
Saharan  Afr ica.  Many  of  these 
le t ters  st rongly  recommend  the 
need  to  “encourage  st rong  and 
isolated  t r ibal  nat ional ism”  and 
the  “development  of  nat ional 
feel ing  with  i ts  natural  d ivis ions, 
to  develop  del iberate ly  the 
‘insulat ing  area’  between  the 
great  Muhammedan  populat ions, 
to  restra in  by  means  of  re l ig ious 
tolerat ion  and  secular  educat ion 
the  inroads  of  re l ig ious 
fanat ic ism” .  The  East  Afr ica 
Protectorate  was  merely  a  tool 
in  which  the  terr i tor ia l  nat ion 
was  af f i rmed  and  the  threat  of  an 
“Is lamic”  uni ty  averted ;  i t  d id  not 
hold  much  value  for  the  Br i t ish  in 
terms  of  the  status  i t  had  with  the 
Sul tanate  of  Zanzibar. 
Histor ical  instances  of  nat ional ist 
sent iment  in  Kenya  have  been 
rooted  in  both  systems  of 
oppression  and  colonial  d ivis ion, 
and  within  the  discourse  of 
l iberat ion.  I t  emerged  at  per iods 
of  pol i t ica l  contest  as  a  tool 
of  the  state  and  a  d iscourse  of 
l iberat ion.  Perhaps  these  moments 
of  pol i t ica l  cr is is  to  do  with 
secession  can  open  up  quest ions 
about  the  nature  of  the  nat ion-
state  in  Afr ica,  and  what  pol i t ica l 
c la ims  to  a l ternat ive  geographies 
reveal  about  the  t rajector ies 
of  the  nat ion  in  Afr ica  and  the 
antagonist ic  socia l  re lat ions  i t 
c la ims  to  encapsulate  and  unify.
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famil ies  of  Arab  descent  in  Tabora, 
Sumbawanga  and  Mpanda.  The  on-
going  mobi l i t ies  of  these  famil ies, 
between  coast  and  hinterland, 
emphasis  their  st rong  connect ion 
to  the  Indian  Ocean—an  ocean 
that  doesn’ t  end  at  the  coastl ine, 
but  that  is  based  on  re lat ions 
that  might  st retch  far  in land. 
The  family  I  want  to  concentrate 
on  to  i l lustrate  this  point  l ives 
in  Sumbawanga,  a  town  of 
approximately  200 , 000  inhabitants 
s i tuated  in  Uf ipa,  a  plateau 
between  Lake  Tanganyika  and 
Lake  Rukwa.  Al though  not  on  the 
main  caravan  route  f rom  Uji j i  to 
Bagamoyo,  i t  st i l l  l ies  on  the  route 
f rom  Katanga  to  the  coast  a long  the 
southern  end  of  Lake  Tanganyika. 
In  the  early  twent ieth  century, 
as  Arab  t raders  st ruggled  with 
increasing  compet i t ion  f rom  Asian 
t raders,  they  moved  further  into 
the  per ipher ies.  Sumbawanga  was 
one  of  the  places  that  appeared  to 
of fer  good  business  opportunit ies 
to  Arab  t raders.  The  c i ty  st i l l  has 
a  smal l  Arab  community,  most 
of  who  are  involved  in  t rading. 
One  such  businessman  is  Mzee 
Mohamed.  He  is  considered  to 
be  the  f i rst  Arab  who  sett led  in 
Sumbawanga.  Al though  born  in 
Kigoma,  he  was  ra ised  i n  Oman 
and  returned  to  Tanzania  in 
the  1940 s  looking  for  business 
opportunit ies.  In  the  early  1950 s 
he  headed  for  Sumbawanga,  f i rst 
taking  the  boat  f rom  Kigoma  and 
then  walking  f rom  Kasanga,  a 
f ishing  vi l lage  on  the  southern 
shore  of  Lake  Tanganyika. 
Sumbawanga  didn’ t  of fer  much 
when  he  arr ived :  the  market  was 
l i t t le  more  than  a  few  shant ies 
and  huts.  Mohamed  bui l t  h is  large 
house  c lose  to  the  market  and 
included  space  for  shops  in  f ront. 
Apart  f rom  opening  a  shop,  he  a lso 
star ted  a  t ransport  business  with 
several  t rucks  and  jeeps  running 
that  extends  f rom  Somal ia  to 
Mozambique  a long  the  east  coast 
of  Afr ica.  In  so  doing,  he  s i tuated 
“the  Swahi l i”  nei ther  in  Afr ica 
nor  in  Arabia,  but  between,  in  a 
d ist inct  corr idor  character ised  by 
a  speci f ic  mixture  of  inf luences 
f rom  both  regions. 
In  Swahi l i  scholarship,  the 
quest ions  who  the  Swahi l i  are 
and  where  to  s i tuate  them  in 
re lat ion  to  the  convent ional 
regions  has  occupied  a  great  deal 
of  twent ieth-century  academic 
wri t ing.  More  recently,  however, 
a  number  of  scholars  have  turned 
towards  the  Indian  Ocean.  In 
2002 ,  Er ik  Gi lbert  stated,  “one 
can  better  understand  the  history 
of  the  coast  by  dropping  the 
t radi t ional  Afr ica /Arabia  and 
Afr ica  /Asia  d ichotomies  and 
instead  view  the  coast  and  is lands 
of  the  western  Indian  Ocean  as 
a  region” .  The  major i ty  of  work 
fol lowing  this  thesis  has  focussed 
on  the  inclusive  nature  of  the 
Indian  Ocean,  a  space  that  is 
general ly  considered  to  uni te 
through  fol lowing  actual  re lat ions 
instead  of  separat ing  according  to 
ar t i f ic ia l  colonial  or  cont inental 
boundaries.  The  border ing  ef fects 
of  the  Indian  Ocean,  i ts  exclusions 
and  l imits,  however,  have  been 
neglected.  While  a  focus  on 
oceanic  l inkages  indeed  unites 
regions  that  have  been  regarded 
separately  before,  i t  st i l l  creates 
boundaries.  Such  mari t ime 
thinking,  part icularly  in  respect  to 
the  East  Afr ican  coastl ine,  creates 
a  rather  homogeneous  Indian 
Ocean  space  on  the  one  hand, 
whi le  at  the  same  t ime  leading  to 
a  conceptual  separat ion  between 
coast  and  hinterland. 
During  my  research  on  the  t rans-
local  mobi l i t ies  of  contemporary 
Swahi l i  t raders,  I  have  spent 
considerable  t ime  with  Swahi l i 
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partners—including  farmers, 
agr i-businesses,  investment 
banks,  pr ivate  companies  such  as 
Nestlé,  Monsanto  and  Uni lever, 
and  development  agencies  l ike 
AGRA,  USAID,  IUCN,  UN DP  and 
the  World  Bank—launched  the 
Southern  Agr icul tural  Growth 
Corr idor  of  Tanzania  ( SAGCOT ) , 
an  agr icul tural  enterpr ise 
designed  to  improve  agrar ian 
product ivi ty,  food  secur i ty  and 
l ivel ihoods  in  Tanzania.  In  2008 
the  United  Nat ions  proposed  the 
concept  of  Afr ican  Agr icul tural 
Growth  Corr idors,  which  was 
subsequently  adopted  at  the  World 
Economic  Forums  in  2009  and 
201 0 .  Tanzania  is  not  the  only 
country  to  introduce  high-prof i le 
ini t ia t ives  a imed  at  convert ing 
mil l ions  of  hectares  of  land 
to  industr ia l  agr icul ture  and 
contract ing  pr ivate  companies  to 
bui ld  re lated  new  infrastructure 
l ike  roads,  ra i lways,  i r r igat ion, 
storage,  processing  and  ports. 
Rather  than  focus  on  current 
debates  about  the  potent ia l  impact 
and  var iable  outcomes  of  SAGCOT, 
this  essay  wi l l  pay  attent ion  to  the 
long-standing  mobi l i t ies  that  have 
occurred  a long  this  corr idor  for 
many  decades,  in  part icular  the 
smal l-scale  t rading  re lat ions  that 
have  existed  between  Zanzibar, 
Dar  es  Salaam  and  Sumbawanga. 
Long  before  SAGCOT,  Arab 
merchants  formed  t rade  routes 
l inking  this  region’ s  coast  and 
hinterland.  These  t rade  routes 
form  a  crucia l  foundat ion  to  what 
archaeologist  Mark  Horton,  in  a 
1987  ar t ic le  for  S c i e n t i f i c  A m e r i c a n , 
descr ibed  as  the  “Swahi l i 
corr idor” .  This  corr idor  refers  to  a 
coasta l  st retch  of  roughly  3000 km 
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famil ies  of  Arab  descent  in  Tabora, 
Sumbawanga  and  Mpan da.  The  on-
going  mobi l i t ies  of  these  famil ies, 
between  coast  and  hinterland, 
emphasis  their  st rong  connect ion 
to  the  Indian  Ocean—an  ocean 
that  doesn’ t  end  at  the  coastl ine, 
but  that  is  based  on  re lat ions 
that  might  st retch  far  in land. 
The  family  I  want  to  concentrate 
on  to  i l lustrate  this  point  l ives 
in  Sumbawanga,  a  town  of 
approximately  200 , 000  inhabitants 
s i tuated  in  Uf ipa,  a  plateau 
between  Lake  Tanganyika  and 
Lake  Rukwa.  Al though  not  on  the 
main  caravan  route  f rom  Uji j i  to 
Bagamoyo,  i t  st i l l  l ies  on  the  route 
f rom  Katanga  to  the  coast  a long  the 
southern  end  of  Lake  Tanganyika. 
In  the  early  twent ieth  century, 
as  Arab  t raders  st ruggled  with 
increasing  compet i t ion  f rom  Asian 
t raders,  they  moved  further  into 
the  per ipher ies.  Sumbawanga  was 
one  of  the  places  that  appeared  to 
of fer  good  business  opportunit ies 
to  Arab  t raders.  The  c i ty  st i l l  has 
a  smal l  Arab  community,  most 
of  who  are  involved  in  t rading. 
One  such  businessman  is  Mzee 
Mohamed.  He  is  considered  to 
be  the  f i rst  Arab  who  sett led  in 
Sumbawanga.  Al though  born  in 
Kigoma,  he  was  ra ised  i n  Oman 
and  returned  to  Tanzania  in 
the  1940 s  looking  for  business 
opportunit ies.  In  the  early  1950 s 
he  headed  for  Sumbawanga,  f i rst 
taking  the  boat  f rom  Kigoma  and 
then  walking  f rom  Kasanga,  a 
f ishing  vi l lage  on  the  southern 
shore  of  Lake  Tanganyika. 
Sumbawanga  didn’ t  of fer  much 
when  he  arr ived :  the  market  was 
l i t t le  more  than  a  few  shant ies 
and  huts.  Mohamed  bui l t  h is  large 
house  c lose  to  the  market  and 
included  space  for  shops  in  f ront. 
Apart  f rom  opening  a  shop,  he  a lso 
star ted  a  t ransport  business  with 





between  Sumbawanga  and  the 
surrounding  vi l lages.  Mohamed 
spent  most  of  h is  t ime  s i t t ing  in 
f ront  of  h is  house,  supervis ing 
the  shop  as  wel l  as  the  t ransport 
arrangements  that  had  to  be 
made.  With  more  and  more  Arabs 
coming  to  l ive  in  Sumbawanga, 
a l l  regularly  passing  by  to  greet 
him  and  exchange  some  news,  the 
space  in  f ront  of  h is  house  soon 
developed  into  a  l ively  meet ing 
place.  To  make  these  vis i ts  more 
comfortable,  he  decided  to  open 
the  f i rst  m ka h awa  ( cof fee  house ) 
in  town.  The  cof fee  house, 
says  Mohamed,  considerably 
st rengthened  the  Arab  community 
a nd  made  him  famous.
Ve ry  l i t t le  of  this  l ively,  f uture-
or iented  atmosphere  evoked 
by  Mohamed  in  his  narrat ives 
is  le f t  today.  The  m ka h awa  i s 
o f ten  c losed,  and  many  of  his 
old  companions  have  lef t  town, 
mostly  for  the  Arabian  Peninsula. 
But  those  st i l l  around  regularly 
meet  to  te l l  stor ies  about  the  past 
and  their  family  histor ies,  and 
jo intly  imagine  the  Indian  Ocean. 
This  performance  of  what  is 
considered  to  be  an  Arab  l i festyle, 
including  the  shared  stor ies  and 
memories,  form  an  important  way 
of  maintaining  and  st rengthening 
their  imaginat ive  l inks  to  the 
Indian  Ocean.  The  stor ies  and 
memories  shared  have  been 
passed  on  to  Mohamed’ s  sons,  who 
have  a lso  taken  over  his  t rading 
company  and  of ten  jo in  the  older 
m e n  in  the  m ka h awa . 
Mohamed’  wife  wife  a lso 
part ic ipates  in  the  t ransfer  of 
stor ies  when  she  gathers  in  her 
s ixteen  grandchi ldren  in  the 
courtyard  and  te l ls  them  about  her 
chi ldhood  on  Zanzibar’ s  is lands, 
and  how,  af ter  her  wedding,  she 
had  to  take  the  t ra in  to  Kigoma 
and  then  a  boat  to  Kasanga,  f rom 
where  she  was  picked  up  and 
taken  to  what  seemed  to  her  as 
“the  end  of  the  world” .  Marr iage 
is  cer ta inly  another  way  of 
emphasizing  one’ s  associat ion 
with  the  coast.  Al l  o f  Mohamed’ s 
sons  have  marr ied  women  from 
Zanzibar.
In  the  town  of  Zanzibar  especia l ly, 
many  women  put  considerable 
ef for t  into  looking  Arab.  This  is 
represented  by  the  style  of  their 
b u i b u i  ( the  long  black  overcoat 
worn  by  Arab  women  in  the 
Gulf  States )  and  the  part icular 
ways  in  which  they  arrange  their 
headscarves,  general ly  imitat ing 
the  la test  styles  in  Dubai  and 
Oman.  In  Sumbawanga  these 
af fectat ions  are  not  necessary.  Due 
to  l ighter  skin  colour,  d i f ferent 
looks  and  speaking  Kiswahi l i  or 
even  Arabic  as  their  vernacular, 
most  women  of  Arabic  descent 
can  easi ly  be  dist inguished  f rom 
the  major i ty  of  Sumbawanga’ s 
populat ion—they  are  immediately 
ident i f ied  as  so-cal led  wa a ra b u . 
The  Arab  women  in  Sumbawanga 
nonetheless  place  great  store  in 
Arab  goods.  They  wi l l  regularly 
vis i t  the  coast,  or  receive  guests 
f rom  the  coast  in  order  to  f i l l 
a t  the  coast  ( and  beyond ) ,  who 
provide  them  with  suppl ies  of 
necessary  i tems  of  Arab  cul ture. 
The  recent  infrastructure 
investments  in  the  development 
of  SAGCOT  has  intensi f ied  this 
mobi l i ty.  Not  only  has  i t  become 
much  more  convenient  to  t ravel 
on  the  new  tar  roads,  actual  and 
expected  investments  associated 
with  SAGCOT  has  drawn  young 
Swahi l i  to  Sumbawanga  as  a  place 
“to  search  for  a  l iving”  ( k u ta f u ta 
m a i s h a )  and  f ind  new  business 
opportunit ies.  These  mobi l i t ies 
should  not  only  be  seen  as  the 
resul t  of  new  investment  pol ic ies 
and  nat ional  business  st rategies 
a long  the  new  corr idors  but  as  a 
cont inuat ion  of  a  dynamic  Indian 
Ocean  space  that  t ransgresses 
“corr idor ia l”  thinking.
The  increasing  at tent ion  g iven 
to  the  Indian  Ocean  as  a  useful 
uni t  of  study  general ly  entai ls 
a  rethinking  of  space  as  i t 
d ist inguishes  i tse l f  c learly  f rom 
the  convent ional  separat ion  of  the 
world  into  di f ferent  world  regions 
or  areas.  Instead  of  re lying  on  set 
boundaries  of  cont inents,  nat ional 
borders  or  corr idors,  concept ions 
of  mari t ime  spaces  demand  the 
careful  considerat ion  and  pursui t 
of  a  mult i tude  of  re lat ions  when 
t rying  to  def ine  their  ends.  To  this 
end,  the  l i fe  of  the  family  of  Mzee 
Mohamed  shows  the  extent  to 
which  cul ture  associated  with  the 
Indian  Ocean  reaches  far  into  the 
hinterland—through  imaginat ive, 
so ci a l  and  mater i a l  co nnect i o ns.
 
In  Sumbawanga  and  other  places 
in  the  hinterland  with  s imilar 
“Arab”  communit ies  there  is 
not iceable  connect ion  with  this 
mari t ime  region.  Even  though 
“Arabs”  l iving  in  the  Tanzanian 
hinterland  c learly  make  an  ef for t 
to  maintain  these  Indian  Ocean 
connect ions,  they  do  not  withdraw 
from  their  local  surrounding  in 
any  radical  way.  They  st i l l  form 
part  of  Sumbawanga,  as  i t  is 
currently  included  in  nat ional 
development  vis ions.  Therefore,  i t 
i s  the  study  of  the  entanglements 
and  t ransgressions  of  old  and 
new  corr idors,  and  how  they 
might  re late  to  and  re-enl iven  the 
Indian  Ocean  that  encourages  us 
to  think  of  spaces  in  less  c lear-
cut  and  f ixed  terms,  as  oceanic, 
meandering,  f lu id  and,  thus, 
a lways  in  movement.
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The collaboration 
between Arab traders 
...who have settled in 
one of the stop-over 
spots on the old trade 
routes, and itinerant 
traders who continue 
to move back and forth 
along the trade routes 
that link the interior 
of Africa to the coast 
remain as vital as they 
were 200 years ago
their  suppl ies  of  “Arab”  i tems. 
They  include  u d i  ( f rankincense ) , 
as  wel l  as  cream  and  oi ls  made  of 
i t—they  are  considered  essent ia l 
i tems  for  most  Arab  women  to 
perform  their  sense  of  belonging 
and  thus  usual ly  f i l l  the  bags  of 
the  t ravel lers.  Moreover,  cul inary 
del icacies,  such  as  spices, 
octopus,  dr ied  anchovies  ( d a g a a ) 
and  nazi  ( coconut ) ,  are  pr ized 
so  that  d ishes  cooked  in  the 
hinterland  have  a  proper  coasta l 
taste. 
The  col laborat ion  between  Arab 
t raders  l ike  Mohamed,  who  have 
sett led  in  one  of  the  stop-over 
spots  on  the  old  t rade  routes,  and 
i t inerant  t raders  who  cont inue 
to  move  back  and  for th  a long 
the  t rade  routes  that  l ink  the 
inter ior  of  Afr ica  to  the  coast 
remain  as  vi ta l  as  th ey  were  200 
years  ago.  As  in  the  past,  Arabs  in 
the  hinterland  general ly  stay  in 
constant  touch  with  their  re lat ives 
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